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The value and importance of traditional knowledge in Africa cannot be over 
emphasised. Paradoxically, such knowledge within the global knowledge economy 
is perceived to be raw, archaic and devoid of any economic value and not befitting 
instructive artificial and scientific exploration. The classification of traditional 
knowledge in such a negative category has constructively marginalised traditional 
communities, opening them up to adverse palpable effects which inter alia, 
include misappropriation of traditional knowledge for commercial exploitation with 
no or minimal consideration, social disintegration, to the sheer disappearance of 
the knowledge together with its associated genetic resources. The challenges 
affecting the victims of traditional knowledge misappropriation and 
marginalisation in Africa should not be conceived as natural and inevitable but 
should be traced back, to the history of the integration and subordination of 
traditional knowledge to the world system of knowledge. Through the aid of a 
radical and critical victimological paradigm, the thesis sought to identify the 
source of victimisation of traditional communities through a historical enterprise 
located in the elements and factors that influence the creation of a social 
formation, guided by material forces of production with their corresponding 
superstructure. 
 
The findings of this study show that traditional knowledge within post-colonial 
Africa has become a contested discourse, inundated by a history of oppression, 
subjugation, colonialism, cultural violence and ideological prejudice. Institutional 
and structural power relations have been key in the facilitation of the sustained 
victimisation of traditional knowledge holders in Africa, to the extent that the 
framework that purports to protect traditional knowledge in Africa, largely 
reproduces inequality and victimisation of traditional knowledge communities. 
Within an emancipatory African victimological framework, remedial measures are 
proposed to dismantle the structures of knowledge imperialism thereby seeking to 
empower traditional knowledge holders in the furtherance of justice and sustained 
equilibrium. As such it is proposed that an ‘African victimology’ is not a mere 




through supplanting deleterious tenets of the intellectual property regime with the 
humanising values of Maat and Ubuntu. The thesis recommends that the policy 
framework that protects traditional knowledge communities should recognise the 
latter as victims of historical injustices and oppression. A policy framework that 
recognises traditional knowledge communities as victims of colonial and 
institutional imperialism, will be capable of addressing the factors and conditions 
that contributed to their marginalisation and victimisation. In this regard, from a 
theoretical perspective, victims should be empowered to self-assert and affirm 
dialogue with apprehensions affecting their humanity.  Hence, justice is not the 
procedural and substantial administration of legal rules but the just and proper 
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The traditional knowledge protection framework in Africa represents the law of the elephants and 





GENERAL ORIENTATION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION 
“If you want to get to the root of the murder, you have to look for the blacksmith 





The protection of traditional knowledge in Africa has been a subject of structural 
and institutional contested discourses, mainly grounded in intellectual property. 
Despite the continuance of contestations, hardly any settled solutions confirming 
the practical protection of traditional knowledge in Africa have been 
implemented; and where they have been adopted, they have not been effective in 
their application. In addition, the current legal solutions are largely a patchwork of 
ambivalent prescriptions that are not consistent with the cultural context and 
needs of traditional African communities. Consequently, due to the existent legal 
vacuum traditional communities have been on the receiving end of, these 
protracted contestations have contributed to the plunder and marginalisation of 
traditional knowledge through institutional instruments of the intellectual property 
system. Resultantly, the misappropriation of traditional knowledge for genetic or 
artistic production without assigning appropriate acknowledgements or 
considerations, tows the line of criminality.   
Based on the stated assertion, the misappropriation and marginalisation of 
traditional knowledge contributes to the victimisation of traditional communities 
as it amounts to an alienation of their source of livelihood.  Therefore, through the 
application of the critical Marxist paradigm, this thesis seeks to examine and 
possibly unravel the historical factors (precedent) that have contributed to the 
victimisation of traditional knowledge communities in Africa. In addition it shall, 
explore whether the historical factors (if any) that contributed to the 
peripherisation of traditional knowledge recur in the current frameworks (policy) 
and discourses that purport to protect traditional knowledge in Africa. Based on 
these findings, this study shall proffer alternatives for traditional knowledge 






Before placing the phenomenon of traditional knowledge misappropriations in a 
broader framework of victimisation, it is necessary to discuss the key concepts of 
this study. 
1.2.1. Traditional knowledge 
 
There is no agreed definition of traditional knowledge, due its complex and 
heterogeneous nature in terms of its locality, form and content. Hence, the 
context and object for its intended use, more often shapes the meaning of 
traditional knowledge.1  For instance in general terms, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), defines traditional knowledge as a “broad 
description of subject matter, generally the intellectual and intangible cultural 
heritage practices and knowledge systems of traditional communities including 
indigenous and local communities (WIPO, 2008: 23). While in the strictest sense, 
ARIPO (2010)  and  WIPO (2010) define traditional knowledge as a product of 
intellectual activity which arises in a traditional form. This knowledge includes 
inter alia “know how, skills, practices and learning that form part of traditional 
systems and knowledge embodying life the styles of indigenous and local 
communities or contained in codified knowledge systems passed through 
generations” (OseiTutu, 2011: 164; ARIPO, 2010; WIPO, 2010). The difference 
between the two definitions is that the former refers to the general characteristics 
of traditional knowledge, while the latter refers to the constituent elements of 
such knowledge.  
The Convention on Bio-Diversity (CBD) of 1992 defines traditional knowledge as 
“knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities 
embodying traditional lifestyles”.2 On the other hand, the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of benefits3 (2010) 
                                                          
1
 The World Intellectual Property Organisation and the African Regional Intellectual Property Organisation 
define traditional knowledge in intellectual property terms, while the Convention on Bio-Diversity and the 
Nagoya Protocol define traditional knowledge in ecological terms. 
2
 See Article 8 (j) of the Convention of Bio-Diversity, Available at 
http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/default.shtml?a=cbd-08 Accessed on 12 March 2013. 
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schedules that traditional knowledge is “associated with genetic resources that are 
held by indigenous and local communities”.4  
Scholars have attempted to define traditional knowledge as a very broad concept 
of information, practices, lived experiences, traditions and cultural expressions 
that embrace the technical, spiritual and cultural dimensions of a local indigenous 
context (Aguilar, 2001; Arewa, 2006; Arewa, 2006b; Eyong, 2007; Gulyani & Singh, 
2010). The said knowledge is derived from long-standing traditions and practices of 
certain regional, indigenous or local communities (Finetti, 2011). Other scholars, 
locate traditional knowledge as a “set of interactions between the economic, 
ecological, political, and social, environments within a group or groups with a 
strong identity, emanating  from local resources through patterned behaviours that 
are transmitted from generation to generation and deals with change” (Eyong, 
2007: 122).  
Therefore, reference to the term ‘traditional’ does not “necessarily mean that the 
knowledge is old, archaic or static” (OseiTutu, 2011: 164) because it constantly 
evolves and adapts to the socio-economic conditions and needs that exist within a 
traditional or indigenous community at a particular time. Furthermore, the 
knowledge is passed from one generation to the other, adapted and applied to a 
context which transmits history, aesthetics, ethics and traditions of the indigenous 
community (Gulyani & Singh, 2010). These technical concepts are intrinsically 
connected to the cultural, spiritual, physical meanings and beliefs of the 
communities and they define the way indigenous people survive in the surrounding 
environment (Finetti, 2011).  
From the foregoing, one can deduce the common thematic characteristics that 
constitute traditional knowledge: 
a) That knowledge is created, preserved and passed from one generation to 
another; 
                                                          
4
 See also Article 7 of the protocol at http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf. The 
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from 
their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity is an international agreement which aims at sharing 
the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources in a fair and equitable way, including by 
appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into 
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby contributing 




b) It is intrinsically linked to the local, indigenous or traditional community; 
c) The knowledge incorporates the social, spiritual, political and economic 
values of the traditional communites; 
d) The knowledge contains intrinsic value that contributes to the conservation 
of the environment, food security, sustainable agriculture, health, culture, 
artistic skills and the progress of science and technology; and 
e) The knowledge is integral to the cultural, spiritual and intellectual identity 
of traditional communities that hold such knowledge which is governed and 
maintained formally or informally by customary laws and practices. 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, traditional knowledge is distinctively 
associated with a traditional or indigenous group. Such knowledge contains social, 
cultural, economic, intellectual, ecological, agricultural, medicinal, technological 
and educational value, which is integral to the spiritual and cultural identity of 
traditional communities in Africa.  
1.2.1.1. Authentication of traditional knowledge 
 
The lived and demonstrable experiences of the elders and ancestors, which 
correspond with the historical reality of the indigenous community, determine the 
validity and authenticity of traditional knowledge. Rituals, initiation rites, 
symbolism and aesthetic expressions of song poetry, genetic resources, craft and 
designs among others represent modus for the expression of traditional knowledge. 
Hermeneutics of concealment also subside within traditional knowledge and this 
usually transpires through riddles, proverbs, rituals, epic stories and symbolism 
(Dutfield, 2001). Certain forms of traditional knowledge are kept secret and only 
accessed by the initiated, while at the same time they may be used for the greater 
benefit of the community (La Fontaine, 1986). Therefore, a fiduciary duty binds 
the custodians of sacred knowledge to use such knowledge for the overall benefit 





1.2.1.2. The metaphysical nature of traditional knowledge  
 
Spiritual rituals and symbolisms validate traditional knowledge as a source of 
power within traditional African communities. Cosmology and theodicy form the 
epistemological foundation of traditional knowledge in an indigenous context for 
without it; the foundation of the traditional knowledge system collapses.  In other 
words, the meta-physical principle affirms that traditional knowledge produced in 
an indigenous context has supernatural origins because reality is manifestation of 
interconnectedness between cosmology and universe. Therefore, traditional 
knowledge is integral knowledge of the living and non-living, divination, telepathy, 
physical phenomena, artistic productions and supernatural knowledge. This stated 
observation confirms Mbiti (1969) assertion that Africans are notoriously religious.  
1.2.1.3. Difference between traditional knowledge and indigenous 
knowledge 
 
The terms ‘traditional knowledge’ and ‘indigenous knowledge’ are used 
interchangeably, although they are conceptually different. Indigenous knowledge 
refers to knowledge that is held and used by communities that are or have been 
identified as ‘indigenous’5 (WIPO, 2010; 2001). Indigenous knowledge is generally 
considered to be a more precise body of knowledge than traditional knowledge 
because it is developed, maintained and disseminated by indigenous people who 
are recognised as such (WIPO, 2008). Therefore, indigenous knowledge is the 
traditional knowledge of a specific group that is known to be indigenous. 
In other words, “all indigenous knowledge is traditional knowledge but not all-
traditional knowledge is indigenous” (Oseitutu, 2011: 162). Traditional knowledge 
can thus be held by a traditional or local community which is not necessarily 
indigenous (WIPO, 2008). Although traditional knowledge and indigenous 
                                                          
5
  Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are “those which, having a historical continuity with ‘pre-
invasion’ and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other 
sectors of the societies now prevailing in those countries, or parts of them. They form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their 
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identities, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 





knowledge are not synonymous in definition, they share many attributes, such as 
being unwritten, customary, pragmatic, experimental, holistic, and this may 
explain why these concepts are often used interchangeably in the same context 
(Kudngaongarm, 2010). 
1.2.2. Intellectual property 
 
Intellectual property refers to creations of the human mind where exclusive rights 
to such creations are recognised. Intellectual property is divided into two broad 
categories namely, industrial property and copyright. Industrial property includes 
patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks and trade 
names, indications of source or appellations of origin and the repression of unfair 
competition (Arewa, 2006). Copyright extends to literary and artistic expressions 
that are original and not to ideas, procedures, and methods of operation or 
mathematical concepts (Boyle, 2003). Patents protect inventions that are new, 
inventive and industrially applicable while trademarks extend protection to marks, 
symbols or words, which are distinctive (Boldrin & Levine, 2002). The shelf life for 
patents is 20 years, while for copyright it is 50 years, subject to restrictions 
governed by national laws.   
The owners of intellectual property have the rights to exclude any person or 
juristic persona from the making, use, sale, distribution or commercialisation of 
the stated property without their consent; hence, the exclusionary nature of 
intellectual property rights (Carrier, 2004). The owner of the intellectual property 
has the exclusive right to commercially exploit his or her intellectual product to 
the exclusion of others. In that light, the monopoly mainly creates an incentive for 
further innovation through the protection of the rents that arise through 
commercialisation of such creations. It is on this basis that intellectual property 
rights are argued to spur economic development to provide benefits to all (Boldrin 
& Levine, 2002). However, the monopoly that is granted by intellectual property 
rights is not absolute in nature, as it is limited in time and scope and granted only 




In this thesis, intellectual property shall refer to all the creations of the human 
mind that are protected by the state subject to certain limitations and in return, 
the owners of such incorporeal property are expected to disclose the knowledge 
which is under protection. 
1.2.3. Victimology/Victimisation 
 
Victimology is the study of victimisation where the plight of a victim of abuse of 
power is critically analysed within a context of interrelations between him or her 
and the formal justice system and the victim’s relationship with the perpetrator of 
the criminal act (Hudson & Galaway, 1975). The Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power  delineates the study and scope of 
victimology to persons who either individually or collectively suffered harm, 
through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws and criminal abuse 
of power. The international instrument focuses on the harm that becomes 
apparent because of a breach of national and international law pertaining to 
crime.  
The major objective of any victimological research is to analyse the impact and 
effect that victims suffer as a result of the actions of perpetrators of their harm. 
This assessment is observed and explored in a specific context, which 
victimologists seek to analyse the extent to which the victim’s plight has been 
exploited, belittled, neglected and manipulated by ideological, socio-economic 
and politico-legal forces (Viano, 1994).  
In terms of ideology, three victimological paradigms occupy the theoretical space 
within the discipline. These are positivist victimology, radical victimology and 
critical victimology. For purposes of this thesis, positivist victimology shall not be 
utilised in analysing the factors that have contributed to the victimisation of 
traditional knowledge communities as it focuses on victimisation “through the so 
called ordinary or criminal acts,6 thus neglecting important issues of mass or 
collective victimisation” (Letschert, 2012: 95). 
                                                          
6
  The positivist perspective on victimology is criticised for its cardinal allegiance to the social construct of a 




Hence, this thesis shall draw from radical and critical victimology in analysing 
factors that have plunged traditional knowledge communities into an unending 
cycle of victimisation. Radical victimology questions how the relationship between 
the state and law has been used in the social construction of the victim offender 
relationship. It seeks to make visible the power relations that underpin who is seen 
and responded to as a victim and who is not, and affords a much wider and far-
reaching conceptualisation of what counts as crime (Walklate, 2012). It implores 
victims to stop being pawns in conventional criminal justice and instead to 
radically challenge official policies. 
The thrust of radical victimology is centred on a human rights approach, which is 
believed to offer victimology with “boundaries that do not include merely official 
victimological definitions but offer more objective measures of victimisation” 
(Elias, 1985: 17). Therefore, international human rights standards and covenants 
become a yardstick in measuring how the law and the state create victims through 
the violation of the human rights norms. However, radical victimology has been 
criticised for its brazen attack on positivist victimology, while innately itself slips 
in positivism by assuming the applicability of human rights conventions without 
explaining how they were historically created (Mawby & Walklate, 1994). Radical 
victimology’s intense criticism arises from its assumption that the law and state 
are at all instances driven by capitalist tendencies. The problemetisation of the 
law and the state as the major culprits of victimisation has been criticised for its 
simplistic assessment of the relationship between the law and the state. 
Critical victimology, as a complementary tool of analysis shall be adopted to 
address the apparent shortcomings of radical victimology. Mawby and Walklate 
(1994) argue that critical victimology permits for the exploration of types of 
victimisation, which are unobservable and unfamiliar thus exposing processes that 
go beyond “our back” which contribute to victims.  This ideology lays out a more 
active and politically sophisticated role for victims that could help develop a 
victim movement that challenges rather than submits to state policies (Elias, 
1996).  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
like victims of the police force, victims of war, victims of the correctional system, victims of state violence and 




Understanding how generative mechanisms of race, class capitalism and patriarchy 
set conditions in which different victims movements have gained prominence forms 
the dominant ethos of critical victimology. It recognises how individualised, victim 
rights can be co-opted, recommending instead of rights, claims that focus on 
collective, structural inequities that are suffered by vulnerable populations. By 
focusing on substantive and not merely procedural rights, this approach is justice-
based, rather than rights-based, victimology (Mawby & Walklate 1994). However, 
critical and radical victimologies are too broad and based on the euro centric 
conception of what constitutes a victim. Both perspectives mainly focus on paper-
based rights, which “chiefly serve to mask the hegemony of disenfranchised groups 
participating in mechanisms of their own oppression” (Peacock, 2013, 2).  
Peacock (2013b), argues that any study of victimology within Africa, needs to 
located in a broader multifaceted historical context of colonialism, 
institutionalised racism, institutional and structural violence, abuse of power and 
conflict. Such an analysis generates the need to look closely and further explore 
the historical and political legacy together with its associated interlocking systems 
of oppression that lie behind victimisation (Shalhoub-Kevorkian & Braithwaite, 
2010).  
Therefore, a historical conception of how power relations, the law and the state 
operate within the social, economic and legal spheres, in producing victims’ 
traditional knowledge victimisation. Such an observation has been omitted in 
mainstream victimology, which has consequently excluded traditional knowledge 
communities to be recognised as legitimate victims of subordinate stages. The 
trickle-down effect of the exclusion largely denies these traditional communities 
from receiving the requisite assistance they require. The aim of this thesis is to 
analyse the extent to which policies, processes and practices that amount to an 
abuse of power by governments and economic powers contribute to the 






1.2.4. Human security 
 
Human security is the latest in a long line of neologisms which include common 
themes of security, global security, cooperative security, and comprehensive 
security. It encourages policymakers and scholars to consider international security 
as something more than the military defence of state interests and territory (Paris, 
2001). The state has remained the fundamental purveyor of security yet it often 
fails to fulfil security obligations and has always been a source of threat to its own 
citizens. The reason for the paradigm shift from state security to security of the 
people – human security; seeks to enhance human rights, protect people against a 
broad range of threats to individuals and communities and further seeks to 
empower them to act on their own behalf. 
Two paradigms, the qualitative and the quantitative dimensions constitute human 
security. The quantitative aspect of human security operates at a level where 
basic human needs require fulfilment. For instance, at the most basic level; food, 
shelter, education and health care are essential for the survival of humans. 
Therefore the pursuit of human security must have at its core the satisfaction of 
basic material needs of all human kind (Thomas, 2000: 6). 
The qualitative aspect of human security pursues the achievement of human 
dignity, which incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and 
unhindered participation in the life of the community. In this realm human security 
is oriented towards the active and substantive notion of democracy at all levels, 
that ensures the opportunity of all for the participation in the decisions that affect 
their lives. In that regard, human security is grounded on human integrity (poverty, 
disease and environmental concerns); human consequences of armed conflicts and 
dangers posed to civilians by repressive governments and state failure; non-
traditional security issues such as HIV and AIDS, drugs, human trafficking and 





In this thesis, human security shall be applied to enhance the protection of human 
rights held by communities that are custodians of traditional knowledge in Africa, 
through the:- 
a) Protection from actions, laws and policies that present an imminent threat 
to their proprietary rights over land, environment and bio-diversity; 
b) Incorporation of personal autonomy of traditional communities and 
unhindered participation in processes that directly or indirectly affect their 
lives and 
c) Creation of an environment that operates at a level where all basic 
material, legal, psychological and physical needs are fulfilled without direct 
interference of the state. 
Traditional knowledge holders and communities in Africa have hardly been taken 
into consideration in the analysis of factors that threaten their human security. 
Therefore any conception of security which neglects this reality is conceptually, 
empirically and ethically inadequate (Newman, 2010). 
Before outlining the scope and objectives of the study, it is imperative that a 
general impression of the historical background of the development of the African 
knowledge systems together with their associated civilisations is given. 
1.3. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
There is a general assumption that Africa is a dark continent with no history whose 
significance emerged upon the arrival of the Europeans (Hobson, 2004). A random 
selection of a conventional history scripts instructs that the history of civilisation 
developed on the contributions of one race group, the Europeans. Accordingly, the 
averment is: 
 
Greece begot Rome, Rome Begot Christian Europe; Christian Europe begot 
the Renaissance, the Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment 
Political Democracy and the Industrial Revolution. Industry crossed with 
democracy, in turn yielded the United States embodying the right to life , 




Therefore, history has been convoluted into a tale where the west emerged at the 
top of the world owing to its “unique ingenuousness, scientific rationality, rational 
restlessness, democratic and progressive qualities” (Hobson, 2004: 2; Bernal, 
Spencer, Ali, Bingham & Britain, 1993). However, the converse of this assertion is 
true. The development and success of the world’s civilisation is largely founded on 
African civilisation. The following discussion shall trace and demonstrate evidence 
of the latter while at the same instance disproving the fact that Africa was a dark 
continent. 
 1.3.1 Ancient times 
 
Archaeological and anthropological evidence suggests that Africa is the cradle of 
humankind (Lewin, 1987).  The locus is, to a great degree of certainty that 
mankind was born in Africa within the region of Kenya and around the area of 
Ethiopia and Tanzania (also known as the Great Lakes Region), dispersing along a 
north-south axis all the way to South Africa (Allen, 2008). Humans born around the 
Great Lakes Region almost on the equator were necessarily pigmented and black 
because the Gloger Law calls for warm- blooded animals to be pigmented in a hot 
and humid climate (Allen, 2008). 
Van Sertima (1992: 241), observes that “mankind having developed in Africa, the 
first was black-skinned; therefore blacks had to be the originators of the world's 
first civilisation”. Therefore, the pod and prime mover of ‘western civilisation’ was 
Africa, specifically the Egyptians. Nevertheless, who were the Egyptians? 
Herodotus, a Greek historian, repeatedly reported in 365 B.C that the Egyptians 
were dark skinned people with woolly hair, who had the same tint as that of the 
Ethiopians (Grene, 1987; Diop, 1991). Maspero &    McClure (2003) summated the 
opinions of ancient historians by asserting that the Egyptians belong to the African 
race, which first settled on the middle Nile and following the course of the river 
gradually.7  
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In that regard, the fundamental pillars of African civilisation were heralded during 
the desertification of the Sahara in 7000B.C (Bernal, 1987). The desiccating of the 
Sahara instigated the migration of its occupants towards the Nile River, as the 
living conditions became intolerable and callous. Migration into equatorial Africa 
was deemed unviable because of the dense nature of the woodlands (Bernal, 1987; 
Diop, 1989). The Nile was more appropriate but it provided different living 
conditions to those that existed before the desertification of the Sahara. The new 
migrants in the Nile valley had to adapt to the new living conditions, which led to 
the creation of the first known form of civilisation, presently known as Egypt. 
Adaption in the Nile valley “required technical expertise in terms of irrigation and 
dams, precise calculations to foresee the inundations of the Nile, geometry to 
delimit property after floods had obliterated boundary lines, transformation of the 
hoe into ploughs first drawn by humankind and then later by animals” (Diop, 1989: 
23). This civilisation developed over a period of 10 000 years and gradually spread 
through to the lower Nile and Mediterranean basin (Diop, 1989; 1991), thus 
developing the first form of globalisation (Hobson, 2004).  
It is postulated that during these 10 000 years that the Africans who had moved 
and spread to the lower Nile gradually penetrated into the interior of the 
continent to form the nuclei of the continent’s civilisation.8 Evidence of the stated 
observation is strewn across Africa in countries such as Zimbabwe,9 Cameroon,10 
and Ghana.11 The Africans who had moved into the epicentre of a once feared 
dense forest encountered different existential conditions that were different to 
those that existed in the upper Nile. Therefore, the scientific and technical 
instrumentality that had assured their survival in the Nile was no longer applicable 
in the interior of Africa. Hence, a novel form of adaption was required to establish 
a new equilibrium. The abundant economic and natural resources at their disposal 
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 The movement was caused as a consequence of overpopulation of the valley and of social upheavals (Diop, 
1989). 
9
 In Zimbabwe they are monuments and cities built of stone famously known as the Great Zimbabwe which 
cover a radius of “100 to 200 miles, a diameter almost as great as the nation of France” (Cole, 2009) The 
stones that built the cities are placed on one another with no cement holding them in fashion similar to the 
Pyramids of Egypt, a form of architecture known as Cyclopean (Diop, 1989). 
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 An authentic piece of hieroglyphic writing exists in Cameroon, which is similar to Egyptian hieroglyphics. 
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 In Ghana there is what is termed the lost city of Kukia, which is deemed to have been in existence during the 
time of the pharaohs. The designs and construction of the city have been labelled to be complicated with an 
assortment of metallurgical workshops, outside tombs, well designated streets  and stone walls which are 




assured the new settlers the insignificance of perpetual inventions thus making 
them largely materially indifferent to material progress from their predecessors. 
The migrants were thus oriented towards the development of their  social, 
political and moral organisation rather than speculative scientific research (Diop, 
1989). 
However, these new African civilisations were isolated from their motherland by 
virtue of distance, expansion of maritime trade around the coasts of Africa and the 
subsequent conquest of Egypt by the Persians in 525 B.C, the Macedonians under 
Alexander in 333 B.C and the Romans under Julius Caesar in 50 B.C. (Diop, 1989; 
Connah, 2001). However, the invasion of Egypt and the plunder of its knowledge 
resources relatively contributed to the development of knowledge in Rome and 
Greece (Cribiore, 2005). During these invasions, scholars from Europe went on 
pilgrimages to drink at the fountain of scientific, religious, moral and social 
knowledge that the Africans had acquired through their ingenuity (Diop, 1989). 
For instance, Isokrates truly adored the “caste system, the rulership of the 
philosophers and the rigour of Egyptian philosophers, priests and paideia 
(education) that produced the aner theoretikos (contemplative man)” (Bernal, 
1987: 240). In the Phaidros,12 Plato, a student of Socrates, forced Socrates to 
proclaim that “Theuth-Toth, the Egyptian God of wisdom was the one who 
invented numbers, arithmetic and geometry and most important of all letters. 
Aristotle the great mathematician and astronomer is believed to have stayed in 
Egypt for sixteen months shaving his head in order to study with the priests 
there.13 Aristotle argued, Egypt is the cradle of mathematics, geometry, arithmetic 
and astronomy, which the Greeks were beginning to possess (Diop. 1989). Bernal 
(1987) and Diop (1989), have argued that Greek Mythology is an import of Egyptian 
myth and religion. 
However, the transition of African knowledge systems and civilisations from the 
ancient period to medieval period has hardly been documented. 
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1.3.2. Medieval period 
 
There is little concrete data available on Sub-Saharan civilisations because much of 
their history is based on oral traditions rather than writings (Blaha, 2003). 
However, upon the arrival of the Europeans within Sub-Saharan Africa in the 15th 
Century they found particular systems of advanced civilisation flourishing. For 
instance, the Great Zimbabwe civilisation located between the Limpopo and 
Zambezi rivers east of the Kalahari Desert shows the magnitude of this civilisation 
which is estimated to have lasted approximately from 500AD to 1600AD  (Blaha, 
2003). The construction of freestanding, dry stone-walls required skill and 
architectural brilliance which might escape the imagination of modern day 
architectures14. Mining and metallurgy, were conducted at a considerable scale 
which in turn led to the production of gold, iron, tin and copper (Connah, 2001). 
The moral and social organisation of the region and the Great Zimbabwe was in 
constant trade with the Portuguese and the Arabs at the port of Sofala in 
Mozambique.15 Such magnificence and construction of one of the greatest 
civilisations in sub Saharan Africa required substantive intellectual capacity and a 
tried and tested system of advanced knowledge. 
The moral and social organisation of West Africa was similarly at the same level of 
perfection. Monarchies were constitutional, with a people’s council representing 
every individual at every level in the social strata (Diop, 1989). The revelations of 
the navigators from the 15th - 18th century provide positive proof that black Africa 
which extended south of the desert zone of the Sahara was still in full bloom, 
harmonious and well organised (Frobenius, 1952). Northern Africa at the same time 
was in a continuous momentum of development. For instance, in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, there was an advanced system to quarry and transport, which saw the 
construction of a monolith  which was 33 meters long and about 517 tonnes in 
weight which required advanced theoretical knowledge, practical skill and good 
knowledge (Connah, 2001).  
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The influence of Egyptians in European science was also evident during this period 
as exemplified by Sir Isaac Newton’s laws of gravity. He certainly believed in the 
Egyptian prisca sapienta which was essential in the development of the theory of 
gravitation, and through its use in measuring the degree of latitude of the 
pyramids he was capable to get an accurate measurement of the circumference of 
the earth (Bernal, 1987). 
1.3.3. Exploration and colonisation of Africa 
 
The demands of survival and progress of traditional communities in Africa spurred 
the development of traditional knowledge and African civilisation. On the flipside, 
in Europe technical development was stressed, as the climatic conditions 
demanded the same for the continuance for their survival. Though the Africans 
were the first to develop iron, they had not built canons, “the secret gun powder 
was known only to Egyptian priests who used it solely for religious purposes, at 
rites such as the Mysteries of Osiris” (Diop, 1989: 35). By virtue of the technical 
superiority of the Europeans (which was not necessary for the Africans), Africa was 
labelled a ‘dark continent’ that supposedly required the assistance of the 
Europeans to deliver it from savagery and barbarism. 
Africa grew "dark" as Victorian explorers, missionaries, and scientists 
flooded it with light, because the light was refracted through an 
imperialist ideology that urged the abolition of "savage customs" in the 
name of civilization (Brantlinger, 1985: 166). 
Inflated by their technical superiority, the Europeans looked down on Africa and 
the discovery of America with its virgin land made Africa into readymade reservoir 
for cheap labour spurring it into the slave trade (Diop, 1989). Africa was thrown 
into its darkest history that was to last for four centuries. The question of skin 
colour during the 16th and 17th century reared its ugly head, with the presumption 
that whites were superior to blacks. This dominant ideology justified slavery and 
domination of the African indigenous communities. 
A dominant ethos immediately materialised; western knowledge was organised, 
structuralised and conceptualised as a mode of economic activity (Hountondji, 
1997). African traditional knowledge was deemed to be archaic, complex, 




connotations devoid of economic significance.16 The negative connotations 
attached to traditional knowledge presumed that scientific western knowledge 
leads the path for others to follow. Hence, non-western epistemologies were 
deemed to be backward and unscientific thus occupying the lower rung of the 
epistemological ladder, a design which was a result of the colonial agenda i.e. the 
traditional healer, accordingly was labelled as an odious figure, the personification 
of the devil himself and embodiment of darkness. 
The colonisation of Africa in the 19th century, shaped by power, economic and race 
relations typified the relevance and certainty of the western knowledge system 
(Arewa, 2006b). The international political structures during that time 
marginalised indigenous Africans through barring them to participate in processes 
that affected them. Resultantly, the political and cultural orders that emerged 
were asymmetrical; establishing a hierarchy that played an important role in which 
type of knowledge was to be protected by the intellectual property regime. The 
dialectical impact of colonialism enclosed African traditional knowledge as 
insignificant, which needed replacement with western knowledge (Ntuli, 2002). 
The colonisers gathered traditional knowledge as raw data for transmission to their 
laboratories which would interpret the knowledge before integrating it into a 
comprehensive system of ‘main stream’ knowledge (Hountondji, 1997). As a 
consequence the use of western science in the transformation of traditional 
knowledge, was and is still deemed to be “tool of progress but while on the 
backcloth it is imperialistic and hegemonic” (Ratuva, 2009: 153). Western science 
has been used as a tool for the exploration of new frontiers of knowledge, pursuing 
neo liberal objectives through legal arrangements used as a basis for the capital 
accumulation of knowledge resources (Ratuva, 2009). Science has thus been used 
as a tool to modify the cultural, political, economic and ideological polemics; 
turning the cultural properties of the traditional knowledge into commodifiable 
goods that serve the Masters of the perceived ‘western science’. 
On the auspices of development and progress in science, traditional knowledge 
holders have suffered different forms of victimisation, which has resulted in 
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traditional knowledge misappropriation and marginalisation. The integration of 
traditional knowledge into the world process of knowledge production has 
entailed, among other palpable effects, such as the “steady withering, 
impoverishment and in worst cases sheer disappearance of such knowledge 
together with its associated resources” (Hountondji, 1997: 13). 
Therefore, the troubles and shortcomings of the traditional knowledge protection 
in Africa should not be conceived as natural and inevitable but it should be traced 
back, to the history of the integration and subordination of traditional knowledge 
to the world system of knowledge (Hountondji, 1995). Therefore, to understand 
the subordination of traditional knowledge, “one must know the genesis, context 
and development of such subordination; for every event that occurred in the past 
created the context of future events, which is the present” (Robinson, 2011: 4). 
The main objective of this thesis seeks to critically unravel the factors that 
contributed to the exclusion and marginalisation of traditional knowledge from the 
intellectual property frameworks and how such neglect or failure has contributed 
to the victimisation of traditional knowledge holders in Africa. It would be 
enlightening to place the present state of affairs in Africa into its historical 
context and view present-day shortcomings and weaknesses in the field of 
traditional knowledge protection in hindsight (Hountondji, 1995). 
With the key concepts and a brief historical background of the development of 
traditional knowledge as a general orientation, the following discussion will 
formulate the statement of the problem based on politico-legal and social factors 
that have inspired this study. 
1.4.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
Traditional knowledge as the fundamental bedrock of primary health care in Africa 
remains important, as 80% of the inhabitants of the African continent depend on 
traditional medicines for primary health care (World Health Organisation, 2008). 
Up to 72 percent of the South African population and 68 percent of the Ethiopian 
population rely on traditional medicine, and at least 20,000 plant species are used 
for medicinal and related purposes (Omokhua, 2011). These plant species are part 




communities. The commercial value of traditional knowledge has been on steady 
increase. To demonstrate, the global market of herbal medicines associated with 
traditional knowledge was estimated at US$16.5 billion in 1997 and it rose to 
US$22 billion in 2000 (Biswal & Biswal, 2003). In 2008, the estimated market value 
of traditional knowledge in Africa per year was pegged at US$60 billion (Tilburt & 
Kaptchuk, 2008) with industrial analysts estimating the value to increase to US$90 
billion per year in 2015 (Global Industry Analysts, 2012). 
 
The fact that research companies resort to medicinal plants used by traditional 
communities in Africa, as an alternative for research and development has been 
identified as the major reason for the rise of the value of traditional knowledge 
(Chakrabarti, 2014). However, such juristic personas misappropriate traditional 
knowledge, patent and commercialise it, without acknowledging or compensating 
the producers of the traditional knowledge (Aguilar, 2001). For instance, in 1995 
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) patented the chemical 
component P57 of the Hoodia plant,17 without the consent of the San population 
situate in the Kalahari Desert (Vermaak et al., 2011). In 1998, the patent was 
licensed to Phytopharm a British pharmaceutical company which later licensed it 
for US$32 million to Pfizer (Laird, 2010). In all these processes, the indigenous San 
communities never received appropriate consideration and acknowledgement as 
the original producers of such knowledge. It was only when the indigenous group 
threatened to sue CSIR under the Convention for Bio-Diversity (CBD) in 2002 when 
a settlement was reached to award a proportion of royalties received from 
Phytopharm to the San community, but in reality the San received only 0.003% of 
total retail sales of the products (Chakrabarti, 2014). Another case is that of the 
Rose Periwinkle flower found in Madagascar, which cures the Hodgkinson disease. 
The plant was misappropriated and is currently selling at an estimated US$100 
million a year (Nejat, Valdiani, Cahill, Tan, Maziah & Abiri, 2015) with no 
compensation or recognition of the indigenous communities of Madagascar.  
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In Zimbabwe, the Snake-Bean plant (Mutukutu) a plant used by traditional 
communities to treat fungi was subject to misappropriation by University 
institutions. The University of Zimbabwe and the University of Lausanne based in 
Switzerland entered into an agreement whereof the Department of Pharmacy from 
the University of Zimbabwe would extrapolate the chemical components of the 
plant while the University of Lausanne would provide financial and material 
support to the former (Magaisa, 2007). It was a further term to the agreement that 
the University of Lausanne would have access to more than 5 000 plant species 
used by traditional communities in Zimbabwe (Magaisa, 2007). The beneficiaries of 
this agreement were the University of Zimbabwe and the University of Lausanne, 
whereof the results of the research were to be patented and the proceeds from 
commercialisation shared equally by both parties (Magaisa, 2007) at the exclusion 
of traditional communities.  
 
However, the agreement suffered a major setback when the University of 
Lausanne solely applied for a patent for the plant and negotiated licencing 
arrangements with a United States (US) pharmaceutical company, Phytera without 
consent from the University of Zimbabwe. When this development was discovered, 
contestations ensued not only between the two contracting parties; with 
traditional communities whose knowledge had been misappropriated by the 
University of Zimbabwe claiming disenfranchisement of their knowledge (Magaisa, 
2007). The University of Lausanne defended itself, arguing that no documented 
evidence of the use of such a plant to treat fungal infections had been 
uncovered.18 The underlying reverberation from the foregoing is representative of 
the misappropriation of traditional knowledge without recognising or assigning 
appropriate consideration to the initial producers of such knowledge.19 
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 The Head of research from the University of Lausanne, Dr Merton argued that ““I don’t want to pretend 
nobody has used it in any antifungal activity in traditional medicine, but we don’t have any documented 
evidence”  (Magaisa, 2007: : Page 4)  
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 Canada’s Option Biotech, a Montreal based company, had patented the seeds of Aframomum stipulatum, 
obtained from Congo, for making of anti-impotency drug ‘Biovigora’. The  Tabernanthe iboga has been used 
for long years in Central and West Africa as a stimulant. In larger doses, it acts as a hallucinogen. It is 
traditionally used for these properties by ‘shamans’. Now iboga is found to be effective in treatment of drug 
addiction and quite a few patent applications have been made by Myriad Genetics and by Washington 
University. Brazzein a protein derived from West African berry (Pentadiplandra brazzeana); it is used as a 
replacement of natural, low-calorie sweetner as it is many times sweeter than sugar. Researchers of University 





This form of injustice is not limited to traditional medicines but it extends to 
literary and artistic works, expressions of folklore and cultural expressions 
(Garnweidner, Terragni, Pettersen & Mosdøl, 2012). The improper and unjust 
utilisation of a very broad spectrum of community heritage affects the holders of 
that knowledge who are more often from the lower echelon of society, inflicting 
great losses to their lives and communities (WIPO, 2001b). Consequently, it 
contributes to the dissolution of communities, inciting socio-economic and cultural 
degradation of their individual members (Francis, 2008). Furthermore the loss of 
bio-diversity through human depredations is a real risk because traditionally 
utilised medicinal plants disappear, thus preventing its use by those who 
discovered them, as well as by the rest of humanity (Eimer, 2012).  
 
However, despite the existence of evidence that has contributed to the 
victimisation of traditional communities in Africa there is hardly an effective legal 
framework that seeks to protect the interests of these vulnerable groups. The 
following discussion shall critically examine the efficacy of frameworks that 
purport to protect traditional knowledge. 
1.4.1. Adapting intellectual property mechanisms to traditional knowledge 
 
Traditional knowledge largely shares similar characteristics with knowledge 
protected under the intellectual property system. For instance, traditional cultural 
expressions are entitled to protection under the copyright system. However, 
traditional cultural expressions do not meet the prescribed requirements for 
copyright protection because it is deemed not to be original.20 Traditional 
medicines fall within the ambit of products and processes under the Patent 
regime. However, they do not meet the definitive requirements of novelty,21 
inventive step, and industrial applicability22 to be entitled patent protection 
because they are deemed to be prior art. Furthermore, knowledge protection 
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and European Patent. West African native communities knew this property since ages (Chakrabarti, 2014). 
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 Originality is determined if the artistic or literary work has ‘not been copied’ and it contains a ‘modicum of 
creativity’ (Lavik & Gompel, 2013). 
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 The invention or process should not be part of prior art (Scotchmer & Green, 1990). 
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granted under the intellectual property system is limited to a specific period while 
traditional knowledge is passed from generation to generation thereby making its 
relevance to the community continuous with no prescribed fixed period (Rahman & 
Mamun, 2015). In that regard, the “intellectual property system does not 
necessarily protect traditional knowledge relating to the medicinal uses of plants, 
reproductions of communal works, traditional cultural practices, or spiritual 
rituals” (OseiTutu, 2011: 151). In addition, intellectual property recognises 
individual rights rather than community rights in its general ambit for knowledge 
protection (UNESCO, 2014). This is contrary to the general structure of knowledge 
ownership within traditional communities where knowledge is communal rather 
than individual. In cases where the individual holds it, he or she holds it in a 
fiduciary capacity for the overall benefit of the community.  
 
The ‘disclosure of origin’; a defensive tool to traditional knowledge protection 
makes it mandatory for patents based on genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge to specify the origins of such knowledge (Dutfield, 2005). Failure to 
disclose the origin would enable the invalidation of a patent based on traditional 
knowledge that has been improperly acquired or utilised (Alison, Hoare  & 
Tarasofsky, 2007). However, the viability of this policy option is highly contested 
especially after considering that intellectual property laws are territorial.23 
Therefore, the question of enforceability of such a requirement treads the thin 
line of sovereignty as it goes beyond the geographical jurisdiction of the affected 
state. In addition, countries benefiting from misappropriated traditional 
knowledge might be reluctant to pass legislation prescribing such a remedy. 
Furthermore, the monitoring and policing of patents together with the patent 
applications that have not adhered to this requirement might be cumbersome and 
expensive. This is because traditional communities hardly have the means and 
technological capability to monitor patent applications globally. Such issues raise 
questions of how and to what extent the historical development of the intellectual 
property system has contributed to the marginalisation of traditional knowledge. 
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1.4.2. The second enclosure movement 
 
The intellectual property system is currently undergoing what is termed the 
‘second enclosure movement’ where knowledge in the public domain is privatised 
under the auspices of intellectual property 24 (Boyle, 2003). Overtly and covertly, 
common facts and ideas are enclosed or privatised in the name of property. For 
instance, patents are increasingly stretched out to cover ‘ideas’ that 20 years ago 
all scholars would have agreed were unpatentable (Boyle, 2003). Most troubling of 
all are the attempts to introduce intellectual property rights over mere 
compilations of facts (Boyle, 2003).  
Power relations of those who control the means of production determine these 
changes. However, the expansion of the intellectual property regime hardly 
addresses concerns of “social justice as it often reflects who has access to the 
decision-making process at the international and national level” (Pagano, 2014: 9). 
The second enclosure movement has seen the enforcement of politically protected 
monopoly rights to exclude others from using information that has been in the 
public domain (Evans, 2005). In that regard, the second enclosure movement is a 
source of great inequality and stagnation within the knowledge domain (Pagano, 
2014). The inequality promoted by the second enclosure system is that it treats 
traditional knowledge as being part of the public domain because it is not part of 
the intellectual property system and yet paradoxically treats such knowledge as 
raw materials for the intellectual property system. 
The inequality is more prominent in light of the bedrock principle in international 
law that the right to own property is fundamental.25 When the interests and assets 
of an entire group are by definition not embraced within the protective mantle of 
property, it prompts questions of why and how the right to property has hindered 
the full development of full-fledged rights for the protection of traditional 
knowledge (Bratspies, 2007). Furthermore, an exploration of how the development 
of the intellectual property system has trapped traditional knowledge holders as 
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victims in a seemingly and unending cycle of dispossession and exploitation needs 
to be undertaken.  
1.4.3. Traditional knowledge framework in Africa 
 
The frameworks for the protection of traditional knowledge at a national level in 
Africa are few and far between with only Ethiopia26 and Zimbabwe27 having 
enacted legislation to protect traditional knowledge. The efficacies of these 
legislative measures in the administration of justice remain elusive because their 
practical application is yet to be realised. At a regional level, three instruments 
have been adopted namely the Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore (Swakopmund Protocol), the 
Africain Relatif a la Protection des Savoirs Traditionels (OAPI framework on 
traditional knowledge) and the African Union Model law on the protection of 
genetic resources and access benefit sharing (AU Model law). The regional 
approach towards the protection of traditional knowledge is arguably incoherent 
because the general formulations of the instruments are different in legal and 
political approaches and enforcement strategies, which represent a clash of 
cultures. Eventually, such incoherence has resulted in the loss of the goal and 
purpose of traditional knowledge regulation in Africa (Drahos, 2007). 
 
Furthermore, the three regional instruments have been labelled as a patchwork of 
ambivalent, inconsistent and often contradictory prescriptions that are 
characterised by a considerable variance both in their ratification status and in 
respect of available enforcement mechanisms (Randeira, 2010). The predominant 
view is that the legal treaties are mainly bound to a kind of insularity. That is to 
say, they omit answering the needs and concerns of the traditional societies and 
act like artificial islands floating on the surface of a sea without any roots 
(Hountondji, 1995; Hountondji, 2002b; 2002a). A critique of the regional 
traditional knowledge framework is necessary because the said instruments do not 
proffer a clear representation of the interests and needs of traditional 
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  Section 33 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the State must take measures to preserve, protect 
and promote indigenous knowledge systems, including knowledge of the medicinal and other properties of 




communities. The non-reflection of the interests of traditional communities in the 
regional frameworks invokes questions about the foundational ideology of the 
protocols or treaties in question. In this context, issues of colonialism, sovereignty, 
identity and exploitation inevitably swirl beneath the surface of the exclusion of 
the protection of traditional knowledge holders in processes that affect them.  
 
Therefore, the possible interaction of these instruments and traditional 
communities is likely to raise troubling questions about their impact upon 
implementation (see chapter 4 for a discussion of the challenges that will affect 
traditional knowledge communities through the application of these treaties and 
protocols). The lack of ‘rigor’ in understanding and redressing the real concerns of 
traditional knowledge protection in Africa represents a troubling phenomenon for 
traditional communities. An exploration of reasons underlying the exclusion of 
traditional knowledge communities from the broader discourse of traditional 
knowledge protection becomes imperative within a victimological paradigm. 
1.4.4. International policy options 
 
At an international level, various policy options for the protection of traditional 
knowledge have been advocated which inter alia include; state ownership as 
articulated in article 8(j) of the Convention of Bio Diversity (CBD) and private 
ownership under Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). The 
Nagoya Protocol calls for States to place measures that ensure that traditional 
knowledge and its associated genetic resources is accessed after traditional 
communities have granted prior informed consent. The United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous People recognises the rights of traditional communities 
to maintain, control, protect their traditional knowledge and their associated 
cultural and genetic resources. It further calls on contracting states to ensure they 
provide the requisite mechanisms for indigenous communities to realise these 
rights while at the same time protecting them from the depredations of traditional 
knowledge misappropriates. 
 
The stated international frameworks vary in terms of the objectives pursued 




objective is to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade and 
therefore proposes that the international intellectual property framework to 
protects any form of knowledge that falls under its scope.28 The CBD considers 
traditional knowledge protection as a means to achieving conservation and 
sustainable use of bio-diversity. Therefore, the protection of traditional knowledge 
is secondary to environmental conservation. Furthermore, subjecting the state 
protection to traditional knowledge is prejudicial to traditional knowledge 
communities because states have been identified as being at the centre of 
undermining the human security of its citizens (Newman, 2010). The Nagoya 
Protocol and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ 
main objective is to recognise, preserve and protect the cultural heritage and 
knowledge of traditional communities, while ensuring that it is commercially 
exploited for economic development subject to prior informed consent. The 
challenges associated with these international instruments is that they are not 
binding on member states thereby relegating them to model laws which are 
applicable at the discretion of member states. 
 
The international frameworks for the protection of traditional knowledge 
potentially conflict with the true aspirations of the needs of traditional knowledge 
holders (See Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion for the needs and interests of 
traditional communities). Traditional knowledge holders in Africa have found 
themselves in direct conflict not only with their own states,29 but also with 
multinational companies; all vying for control over traditional knowledge 
(Bratspies, 2007). Questions of whether ideological prejudices attached to these 
international frameworks are the result of global capital or historically constructed 
within the general development of the international knowledge regimes requires 
further interrogation. Understanding the root cause of such ideological prejudices 
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 Note should be made that the intellectual property system is not crafted to protect traditional knowledge. 
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 Although the principle of national sovereignty is important in promoting equitable benefit sharing between 
countries, it is generally interpreted as government ownership, with the rights of other actors, notably 
indigenous and local communities, often unclear or unrecognised. The CBD only requires the Prior Informed 
Consent (PIC) of State Parties for access to genetic resources, and not of indigenous and local communities. 
Thus, it separates rights over natural and genetic resources, which are ‘owned’ by the state, and rights to 




is imperative in constructing an appropriate response to the marginalisation of 
traditional knowledge in Africa. 
1.4.5. WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Traditional Knowledge (WIPO 
IGC) 
 
WIPO, in response to the contestations regarding the misappropriation and 
marginalisation of traditional knowledge from the intellectual property system; 
convened an Intergovernmental Committee on the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge (WIPO IGC) in the year 2000. The mandate of the WIPO IGC at its 
inception was the 
selection of appropriate terms to describe the subject matter for which 
protection is sought; develop new international standards for the 
protection of traditional knowledge not covered by the intellectual 
property tools; the integration of traditional knowledge into intellectual 
procedures for defensive protection and to enable traditional knowledge 
holders to use and enforce rights under the intellectual property system 
(WIPO, 2000: 6-7) 
After nine years of deliberating the appropriate framework towards the protection 
of traditional knowledge, the mandate of WIPO IGC in 2009 changed. Its new 
mandate was to “undertake text-based negotiations with the aim of reaching an 
agreement on a text of an international legal instrument which will ensure the 
effective protection of traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions” 
(WIPO, 2013; OseiTutu, 2011: 162). The 15 year deliberation has resulted in the 
WIPO IGC formulating draft provisions concerning the protection of traditional 
knowledge and has documented the views of the states, indigenous communities, 
and civic society on various issues.  
However, there has been more divergence than convergence within the WIPO IGC 
between industrialised countries and the African countries concerning the need 
and scope of protection for traditional knowledge. The background of such 
divergence is; that the longer the deliberations take, the greater they benefit 
industrialised countries. In other words, the WIPO IGC negotiations simply serve as 
a diversion for African countries not to focus on implementing their regional 
protocols and treaties on the protection of traditional knowledge but rather 




exploitation of traditional knowledge vis-à-vis a balanced international system of 
traditional knowledge protection. Against this diversion and controversy, most 
African governments have failed to realise that the “world economy remains highly 
territorialised, based around demarcated trading blocs, national and sub-national 
sources of competitiveness and innovation, and national patterns of economic 
exclusion and inequality” (Amin, 2004: 222).  
Therefore, the debates at the WIPO IGC unravel a powerful transformative process 
that have acquired hegemonic status as a result of its operative logic and 
ideological connotations (Prempeh, 2004), which bid to keep profitable 
opportunities in Africa open. Such developments are representative of an 
international enclosure movement that seeks to fence off areas that provide 
attractive policy options for less developed countries (Yeutter & Goldberg, 1996). 
Consequently, African countries are likely to adopt inappropriate intellectual 
property mechanisms that result in them losing the ability to respond to domestic 
crises within their borders (Yu, 2007). Accordingly, the romantic optimism and 
euphoria of the WIPO IGC provides new frontiers, which are likely to entrench and 
legalise traditional knowledge misappropriation. 
In addition to the above, if the WIPO IGC comes out with well thought model laws 
and provisions, including a misappropriation regime, there is a great possibility for 
its non-support by all member countries by virtue of the divergence of opinion 
within the forum. What exacerbates these challenges is the effectiveness and 
validity of the results of the WIPO IGC because traditional communities are not 
fully represented in these meetings thereby making the applicability of the laws in 
the member states experimental whose results will serve as another case study. 
1.4.6. Socio-Economic Implications of Traditional Knowledge Misappropriation 
 
The misappropriation and marginalisation of traditional knowledge in Africa 
manifests itself within a context burdened by countless vulnerabilities caused by 
colonialism, which distress the socio-economic sphere of traditional communities. 




. . . land issues and loss of territory that sustains indigenous peoples and 
local communities; cultural absorption of indigenous peoples and local 
communities into dominant societies as indicated through language loss; 
biodiversity loss and its impact on traditional biodiversity-related 
knowledge; and loss of traditional biodiversity knowledge in conflict and 
post-conflict areas. Many have been disrupted by the imposition of external 
regimes and by colonial and postcolonial military and civil conflicts. Such 
disruptions have caused the collapse of rural economic systems in some 
cases, and thereby diminished the capacity of these small scale societies to 
continue their traditional subsistence activities (Langton & Ma Rhea, 2013: 
48-49) 
African governments have further embedded this victimisation through neglect of 
traditional communities, which are often considered backward and impediments to 
modernisation (Mervyn, 1999). Such neglect is a result of the poor understanding of 
the interrelatedness of traditional knowledge to the socio-economic life of 
traditional communities; a factor that has contributed to the continued loss of bio-
diversity and traditional knowledge (Langton & Ma Rhea, 2013).  
As a result, traditional communities are often omitted from national development 
agendas only to be included if it pursues the interests of the political elite. The 
challenges of traditional knowledge misappropriation are made less obvious 
because politics and power dynamics are embedded in the process (Shackeroff & 
Campbell, 2007). This creates silent or unknown victims of abuse of power. 
Furthermore, the absorption of traditional communities into the nation-state poses 
a great threat to the capacity of these groups to sustain their social and economic 
systems and to some extent cause their complete disappearance (Langton & Ma 
Rhea, 2013). 
Lack of awareness of the impropriety of traditional knowledge misappropriations 
by traditional communities compounds their predicament. Witlessness on the part 
of traditional communities has been crucial to the success of traditional knowledge 
misappropriations, as most traditional communities not parties to international 






1.4.7. Cultural implications of traditional knowledge misappropriations 
 
Traditional knowledge is influenced by cultural values that cannot be translated 
without the aid of its social and spiritual context (Correa & del Sur, 2002). The use 
of traditional knowledge in a community forms part of the cultural practices that 
are central to the social and symbolic system, which links individuals to families 
and families to the community (Frommer, 2002). This makes traditional 
knowledge, “sacred with a systemic unity that supplies a foundation upon which 
members of a traditional culture sense their communitas, personal identity, and 
ancestral anchorage” (Brush & Stabinsky, 1996: 26). Its use forms the glue that 
strengthens social cohesiveness and cultural identity (Dutfield, 2006). 
Therefore, the use of traditional knowledge outside its context disables its 
continuous evolution in a dynamic system (Coombe, 2005). The misappropriation of 
traditional knowledge and its privatisation under the intellectual property system 
construct a genetic monoculture that concentrates on industrial and agricultural 
activities, which is a phenomenon that is in conflict with the morals of many 
traditional societies (Mugabe, 1999). The challenge is a derivative of the public 
domain notion, which classifies knowledge held by traditional communities as 
being the common heritage of humankind. The privatisation of traditional 
knowledge under intellectual property eliminates the holistic nature and spiritual 
value of the knowledge that gives it relevance. 
In addition, the misappropriation of traditional knowledge largely inhibits 
traditional communities from practicing their own culture. For instance, 
trademarks have been used by third parties to harness cultural icons, signs, and 
symbols in pursuit of their own commercial ends (Frankel, 2007). Consequently, 
traditional communities lose control of their signs and symbols to the trademark 
owner, effectively barring them from using those signs in any cultural event they 
have (Frankel, 2007). 
The implications of a system that effectively bars or precludes a particular 
traditional community from practising its culture, presents an immediate threat to 




identity and self-determination that the community is entitled to naturally. In that 
regard, intellectual property has become a tool to control and distort all facets of 
life and has gradually contributed to structural and institutional victimisation 
(Peacock, 2013a). The harm that is caused by the misappropriation of culture 
embellishes the continuance and entrenchment of systems of dominance and 
subordination that were used to colonise, assimilate, and oppress traditional 
communities (Riley, 2005). 
1.4.8. Human security and victimology concerns 
 
Expanding markets, “industrialisation, urbanisation, state power, economic 
globalisation and the alteration of property rights has been instrumental in 
marginalisation and misappropriation of traditional knowledge” (Kellert, Mehta, 
Ebbin & Lichtenfeld, 2000: 706). Such developments centred on state power and 
state security, have gradually peripherised traditional communities thereby 
affecting their human security. The current insecurity suffered by traditional 
knowledge holders in Africa represents a case of extreme vulnerability. The weak 
state-society relations between traditional knowledge communities and their 
respective governments have hindered the attainment of human security (Thomas, 
2000). The continued misappropriation of traditional knowledge and the absence 
of an effective property regime that protects traditional knowledge present a case 
of glaring inequalities and abuse of human rights especially in light of the bedrock 
principle of the right to property as enshrined by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
The fundamental causes of traditional knowledge misappropriation, unequal 
treatment of traditional knowledge holders and neglect by their governments 
require attention lest the realisation and achievement of the human security ideal 
will be impossible.  The challenges suffered by traditional knowledge holders need 
to be reviewed and understood within a context which recognises the colonial past 
of Africa and the existent global power structures. Adopting such an approach 
increases the possibility of identifying threats and underlying interdependencies 




preventing the latter and the former from occurring there is need to mitigate their 
effects when they do occur (Letschert, 2012). 
Human security and victimology alternatives can therefore play complementary 
roles in assisting traditional knowledge holders to address issues, which are 
injurious to their communities and individuals. Human security and victimology 
combined would address issues of protection and empowerment of the vulnerable, 
emphasise the importance of a bottom up approach, adopt a holistic and 
comprehensive approach and use human rights as a standard benchmark in 
protecting and assisting individuals (Letschert, 2012). The application of both 
concepts in remedying the harm that traditional communities suffer is not 
reformative but it provides alternative pathway towards protecting the vulnerable. 
Hence, the solution is not founded in a formalised system but is underpinned by 
evolving ideas about the appropriate nature, purpose and policy focus on 
governance, from local to global (Thomas, 2000; Thomas & Wilkin, 1999; 
Letschert, 2012). Adopting such an approach in the development of this thesis will 
emphasise a comprehensive human security oriented approach toward victim 
protection within the traditional knowledge discourse in Africa; enriching the 
human security concept through the incorporation of progressive victimological 
approaches. 
From this perspective, it will be possible to comprehend how the structural 
historical development of knowledge misappropriations resulted in certain groups 
being systematically disadvantaged or victimised in relation to other groups. This 
approach will effectively open the field of traditional knowledge protection for 
examination to a variety of factors that are injurious to societies (Viano, 1994) 
thus enabling the creation of remedies that are founded in the cause rather than a 
symptoms. 
1.5.  RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The viability and value of traditional knowledge within the 21st century has sparked 
an inappropriate knowledge enclosure movement, which has attracted its share to 
prospectors, pirates, hucksters and thieves (Bratspies, 2007). Such a phenomenon 




An effort to address such demands has produced vast writings about traditional 
knowledge misappropriation, bio-piracy and anticipated protection regimes. Such 
developments are important because the knowledge accumulated so far, sets a 
foundation for the further development of effective frameworks that protect 
traditional knowledge.  
The disconcerting part is that the solutions proffered have failed to gain legitimacy 
from traditional communities. As a result, the vast amount of literature may not 
have produced the desired results and in some cases, they may even have caused 
more harm than good. The absence of a legitimate and effective property 
protection regime that consolidates the rights of traditional knowledge holders and 
communities has made this situation increasingly precarious as it exposes the later 
to victimisation. Interest in and support for the protection of traditional 
knowledge has surged, but there are questions about the basis for such support 
and about its depth. Despite the existence of academic literature around this field, 
no research has endeavoured to analyse how the historical development of 
knowledge misappropriations has contributed to the victimisation traditional 
communities. Furthermore, victimology has failed to recognise traditional 
communities as victims, in the broader scope of traditional knowledge 
misappropriation. 
This research will assist political leaders, traditional knowledge officials and 
internal constituencies in Africa who know little about knowledge protection 
experiences. It will proffer in-depth knowledge of relevant knowledge protection 
mechanisms and the myths and misunderstanding that often obscure and mask 
their relevance. Equally great is the need for effective use of a broad range of 
economic and social insights in developing the proper infrastructure for the 
protection of traditional knowledge. Therefore, this thesis endeavours to analyse 
and understand how deviance that has been inspired by the knowledge economy 
was historically constructed thus plunging traditional communities into an 






1.6.  RESEARCH AIMS 
 
The challenges affecting traditional communities are not only obstacles but also 
present an opportunity for the further development of a framework on the 
protection of traditional knowledge. Consequently, this research examined how 
the historical development of knowledge misappropriations contributed to the 
marginalisation of traditional knowledge. The importance of studying the history of 
knowledge misappropriations; is not for its own sake but for the great lessons it 
contains. Without an understanding of the development of the knowledge 
misappropriations, it is not possible to foresee future perspectives or the reasons 
why traditional knowledge policies have failed to gain legitimacy within the 
knowledge frameworks in Africa. Hence, a thorough inquiry requires attention with 
the objective of producing new knowledge that addresses the neglected concerns 
of traditional knowledge holders in Africa. In pursuing the above, the research 
shall was guided by the following aims: 
  
1. To examine the historical factors that contributed to the victimisation and 
marginalisation of traditional knowledge communities in Africa within a 
critical and radical paradigm of victimology; 
2. To assess whether or not the historical factors that contributed to the 
marginalisation and victimisation of traditional knowledge communities have 
been reproduced in the current traditional knowledge frameworks in Africa 
and, 
3. To recommend the incorporation of African victimological remedial 
measures in the traditional knowledge discourse to render traditional 
knowledge policies effective. 
The research unravelled the complex historical factors namely the political, legal, 
economic and ideological factors that contributed to the victimisation of 
traditional knowledge communities, which in turn culminated in the systematic 




1.7.  CONCLUSION 
 
In understanding the factors that have contributed to the victimisation of 
traditional communities, one should take cognisance of the cultural and historical 
context of the African continent together with the colonial antecedents of 
structural and institutional victimisation (Peacock, 2013b). Such a historical 
appreciation would allow the exposition of factors that have contributed to the 
creation of silent or forgotten victims. Furthermore, such an approach will create 
a context of prescribing the appropriate responses to the nemesis that has haunted 
traditional communities for centuries. Therefore, realising the stated goal requires 
a theoretical framework was used to explain the factors that contribute to the 
development of a social phenomenon. The deconstruction of a social phenomenon 
within a historical paradigm assists in exposing the vices that have beleaguered 
traditional communities in their fight for self-determination. The following chapter 







SETTING THE STAGE: THEORATICAL PERSPECTIVES 
“Without the belief that it is possible to grasp the reality with our theoretical 
constructions, without the belief in the inner harmony of our world, there would 
be no science” (Peter, 2007: 296) 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Louis Althusser stated,  
In the development of a theory, the invisible of a visible field is not 
generally anything outside and foreign to the visible defined by that field. 
The invisible is defined by the visible as its invisible, its forbidden vision: 
the invisible is not therefore simply what is outside the visible, the outer 
darkness of exclusion – but the inner darkness of exclusion, inside the 
visible itself because it is defined by its structure (Althusser, 1970: 48). 
The assertion sets a platform for inquiry into the factors that contribute to the 
inner darkness of exclusion of global knowledge regimes, which set a prescribed 
embargo on traditional knowledge. The outer darkness of exclusion (that is the 
visible) of the global knowledge infrastructure has stipulated market and industrial 
expedience as the major reasons for the embargo (See Chapter 1 for a discussion 
into the reasons that have prohibited traditional knowledge protection). The 
invisible which is the theoretical problematic non-vision of traditional knowledge 
by global knowledge regimes has been the blinded eye of the latter; where it scans 
its ‘non-problems’ without seeing them, in order not to look at them (Althusser, 
1970). Therefore, there is need to unravel the complex historical processes of the 
theoretical problematic ‘non vision’ of traditional knowledge because it presents a 
realistic opportunity to understand the victimisation of traditional communities 
through historically concrete systems of relationships endowed with corresponding 
institutions (Correa & del Sur, 2002).  
A historically constructed analysis of the victimisation of traditional communities is 
imperative because it unravels the complex elements, which are associated with 
the present historical reality under investigation (Weber, 1930). Such an approach 
to victimisation presents a phenomenon unique in its individuality. It cannot be 
defined according to a formula genus proximum (nearest genus) or differentia 




parts which are taken from historical reality to make it up with the aid of a 
defined theory or theories (Weber, 1930). 
Critical Marxist, Weberian, Althussian and Foucauldian theoretical approaches on 
historical structural causality proffer an appropriate conceptual premise to initiate 
a discussion on the factors that contribute to the victimisation of traditional 
knowledge holders. The theories permit for the structural and institutional 
demystification of the existent social order in retrospect thus allowing a full 
appreciation of the factors that influenced the victimisation of traditional 
knowledge communities in Africa. Furthermore, these theories seek to understand 
and explain society as a social whole, intrinsically connected to a complex 
hierarchy of instances that unearth domination, subjugation and oppression within 
every epoch of a historical formation. This affirms Peacock’s (2013a) assertion that 
victimisation within a social formation is embedded in the functional historical 
institutional structures of society (Peacock, 2013a). 
Other causality theoretical models have been omitted from this thesis because of 
their approach in understanding a problem in an abstract nature (Frommer, 2002). 
Such an approach applies “epicyclical codas to the models in order to account for 
ever further deviations from empirical expectations” (Wallerstein, 1974: 59). In 
that regard; 
We turn to history and only to history if what we are seeking are the actual 
causes, sources, and conditions of overt changes of patterns and structures 
in society. (Nisbet, 1969: 302). 
Therefore, the structural causality theories align appropriately to the main 
objective of this thesis which seeks to espouse the sources and development of the 
factors within the structures of society that have contributed to the victimisation 
of traditional knowledge holders. 
 2.2. DETERMINANTS OF A SOCIAL FORMATION 
 
To understand the factors that contribute to the development of a particular social 
phenomenon there is need to historically understand society as whole (Weber, 
1949). Understanding a social whole within a historical framework requires an 




society as a totality of instances (Milovanovic, 2003). The discussion that follows 
explores the historical factors that contribute to the creation of a social formation, 
which gradually contributes to victimisation of marginalised groups. 
2.2.1. Marx’s theory of general social development 
 
Marx (1906) set out to investigate an economic system, which produced misery 
along with the immense growth of wealth, science and technology. In his analysis, 
he broadened the general theory of society where he discovered that world history 
could be comprehended as a series of class struggles which were caused and in 
their form determined by the mode of production of the particular period (Weber, 
Rheinstein & Shils, 1954). In that regard, he located the causal primacy of a social 
formation in the relative overburdening of productive forces over the relations of 
production (Callinicos, 1989). Consequently, the primary forms of oppression, 
subjugation and victimisation in “every social formation arise from the interaction 
between the dominant mode of production and the relations of production” 
(Althusser, 1968: 91). Hence, the success of victimisation and oppression is reliant 
on the material conditions of production (Marx & Engels, 1976). Marx conceived of 
such phenomenon is his locus classicus where he stated; 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that 
are independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to 
a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The 
sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real basis on which raises a legal and political 
superstructure and to which correspond definite form of social 
consciousness. (cited in McLellan, 1977: 389). 
 
The superstructure and the economy formulate “the ‘real basis’ that constitutes a 
causally determined system of society (Grebo, 1985: 90). Therefore, the 
superstructure and the economic base equally and unevenly influence each other 
in establishing and maintaining oppressive relations of production (Cullenberg, 
1999). The aggregate total of the mode of production contributes to the 
victimisation individuals and groups in any given society. Within that 
understanding, the victimisation of traditional knowledge holders is located within 
praxis where the economy and superstructure mutually interact with each other 






The continuation of the oppressive material conditions of production is grounded in 
the reproduction of its relations of production together with their associated 
productive forces (Althusser, 1968).30 Althusser (2006) and Marx (1906) argued that 
a society that does not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time it 
produced would not survive within its predetermined mode of production. Engels 
(2003) enhanced the clarity to this analysis in his letter to Joseph Bloch, where he 
noted that in the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining 
element of oppression and violence is the production and reproduction of real life 
(Stephens, 1979).  
 
In that regard, the institutions and structures of politics, law, economy and 
ideology are historically conditioned to facilitate the reproduction of oppressive 
social conditions that have been borrowed from the past. Therefore, history is not 
made under “self-selected circumstances but under existing circumstances given 
and transmitted from the past.” (Marx, 1937: 1) 
 
It is important to qualify the words of Marx, with the aid of an example. When 
feudalism evolved into capitalism, the latter developed along the lines and 
principles of the latter31. The material conditions of production under capitalism 
mirrored that of feudalism; namely, the production of wealth was dependent on 
the reproduction of repression (Marx, 1963). In other words, the oppressive 
material conditions of production that produced a movement that made history 
(Marx, 1963). Therefore, the development of society corresponds to the 
development of humankind and its productive forces. To understand traditional 
knowledge misappropriation, there is need to understand the development and 
reproduction of the historical material conditions of knowledge production that 
trapped traditional knowledge communities in an intricate web of victimisation.  
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In that light, if the sustenance of the material mode of production is dependent on 
the reproduction of conditions and relations of production; the economic base 
operates as a determinant of last instance32 (Althusser, 2006; Stephens, 1979); 
“the final cause, the prime mover” (Ricoeur, 1994: 44). Poulantzas (2000) 
developed this concept further by critically assessing that the primacy of 
productive forces over relations of production enabled the process of production 
and reproduction. Therefore, a social formation is a complex structure that 
consists different levels of activity which influence one another in a complex set of 
mutual relationships (Ferretter, 2006). To understand the phenomenon that 
negatively affects traditional knowledge holders, one should have an appreciation 
of the framework of structures, integrated and articulated into a meaningful 
whole.  
 
It is important to note that each individual structure has a distinct existence of its 
own yet each maintains a relative autonomy and mode of determination (Resch, 
1992). To explicate this point, a social revolution does not ipso facto transform the 
existent superstructure and ideologies. They have their own constitutive 
consistency that enables them to exist and transform beyond the immediate life 
context, (Althusser, 1977). For example, the colonial and apartheid antecedents of 
structural and institutional victimisation in Africa have continued to reproduce 
oppression, social imbalances and injustices despite the much celebrated 
independence from political colonialism (Peacock, 2013a; 2013b). 
2.2.2. Weber’s multi-causal formulation of a social phenomena 
 
Weber unlike Marx, views the latter’s mono-causal approach of the factors that 
influence the creation of a social phenomenon as prejudicial to the appropriate 
reconstruction of social historical connections (Weber, 2013). Max Weber (1930) 
disputed the economic determinist approach to the development of social 
phenomenon. He labelled Karl Marx’s approach as naïve, as the domination and 
the victimisation of marginalised groups by an elite group arose somewhere, not in 
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a group of isolated individuals (bourgeois), but as life of the whole groups of 
people (Weber, 1930).  
 
In dismissing social relations model of Marx (1906), Weber (1930: 21 -22) opined 
that “universal reign of absolute unscrupulousness in pursuit of selfish interests by 
the making of money, ruthless acquisitions, had been a characteristic that 
appeared in all periods of history which however could not be ethically justified 
but had to be accepted as a fact for its unavoidability”. He likened the latter to 
war, piracy and trade, which are unrestrained in their relation to outsiders. 
However, Weber did not explicitly disregard the historical interpretation of a 
social phenomenon in economic terms, but he rejected the “absolute petrification 
of its explicative criterion and its solidification into a dogma” (Ferrarotti & Fraser, 
1982: 69). Nevertheless, Weber (1954) argued that the economy and the 
superstructure are interrelated and it was impossible to explicably understand the 
superstructure in legal terms only. That is to say, “it cannot be understood as a set 
of norms of logically demonstrable process and correctness, but rather as a 
complex of actual determinants of actual human conduct” (Weber et al., 1954: 
12). He criticised the ‘materialistic conception of history’ on the basis that in some 
instances a strict economic explanation of a particular phenomenon, in certain 
instances faced obstacles (Ferrarotti &  Fraser, 1982). He highlighted that; 
Sometimes every historical event, which is not explicable by the 
invocation of economic motives, is regarded for that very reason as a 
scientifically insignificant “accident.” At others, the definition of 
“economic” is stretched beyond recognition so that all human interests 
which are related in any way whatsoever to the use of material means are 
included in the definition. If it is historically undeniable that different 
responses occur in two situations, which are economically identical? Due 
to political, religious, climatic and countless other non-economic 
determinants? Then in order to maintain the primacy of the economic all 
these factors are reduced to historically accidental “conditions” upon 
which the economic factor operates as a “cause.” (Weber, 1949: 69)  
 
Weber was against the conception that the superstructure reflected the economic 
base (Weber, 1949). The reflective discourse of the base and the superstructure 
was in Weber’s opinion given so much extra ordinary significance while it omitted 
the fact that certain factors play an independent role in the victimisation of 




analogy to the effect that “if the conduct of a dog, a men’s best friend, is inspired 
by the man, such conduct, obviously cannot be described as a reflection of man by 
dog”(Weber et al., 1954: 23).   
 
Therefore, in Weber’s view citing economic causes as a sole contributor to the 
development of a social phenomenon is irrational (Weber, 1930). In other words, 
the victimisation of traditional communities in Africa cannot only be explained in 
economic terms but through other historically conditioned factors and institutions. 
In that regard, several factors contribute to victimisation. The degree of a factor’s 
contribution to victimisation is determined by the cluster of antecedents to “which 
impute those specific elements of the phenomenon in question to which we attach 
significance in given cases and in which we are interested”(Weber, 1949: 71). 
Therefore, Weber is of the opinion that for one to understand the conception of a 
particular phenomenon there is need to examine society as whole within its 
particular period of historical development. The initial step requires the 
construction of an unambiguous definition, classification, and systemisation of the 
social phenomena whose interrelationships are to be traced (Weber, 1930). In 
other words human history cannot be comprehended until it is observed, described 
and systematically arranged for ready reference (Weber et al., 1954). It is thus the 
particularisation of the elements, which help in characterising or describing a 
concrete historical phenomenon.  
 
From this angle, the elements that need particular characterisation in an analysis 
of a social phenomenon are the political, religious, economic and other non-
economic factors (Weber et al., 1949). Weber (1949) explained that non-economic 
factors, among others included, human relations, norms, normativity, society and 
its corresponding structure (state), religious, social stratification and law created a 
an appropriate context for change and in turn altered not only the definition of 
cultural wants or preferences but their constituents in the most subjective 
aspects. The economy, therefore is one factor, but a plethora of factors 
simultaneously are at work in producing a social phenomenon (Milovanovic, 2003). 
It is thus the responsibility of a social scientist to view that polity, social structure, 




legal structures of given societies separately and investigate their 
interrelationships in history to best understand victimisation (Trubek, 1972; 
Milovanovic, 2003). For Weber, historical and social uniqueness results from 
specific combinations of general factors, which when isolated are quantifiable 
(Weber, 2013: 50). The indiscreet influence of social relations, institutions and 
social classes governed by the material productive forces extend into all corners of 
victimisation without any reservation. 
 
As such, Weber(1954) recognised capitalism as a phenomenon  of the mind, a 
specific human attitude, the rise of which from medieval traditionalism required a 
specific combination of circumstances, political, economic and among others 
religious. Accordingly, victimisation is constituted and conditioned by of socio-
economic conditions which are distinguishable into events and constellations of 
norms and institutions (Weber, 1949). These events and constellations of norms 
and institutions determine victimisation. Therefore, the events of everyday life are 
no less than the historical events of the higher reaches of political life, collective 
and mass phenomena (Weber, 1949: 69). In the same light, all critical conjectures 
within a historical context affect the mode and ideology behind any form of 
victimisation. That is their mode of stratification of society, the integration of 
interest groups and types of power exercised; consequently influence the path of 
victimisation (Weber, 1949).  
 
According to Weber (1930), the socio-economic conditions of a given society have a 
reciprocal influence on one another in determining victimisation (while being 
independent of the other) and, “the strength and direction of their influence 
varies from one historical situation to the other” (Kronman, 1993: 119). In certain 
instances, these socio-economic conditions have developed on independent lines 
propelled by forces of their own.33 In that regard, social formations should be 
recognised as a complex hierarchy of functionally organised levels and instances, 
which are articulated by a specific determination. 
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There three functional instances in a social formation, namely the political, the 
economy and the ideological (Althusser, 2006). The economic, political and 
ideological functions which hold society together are executed in a plethora of 
determinate institutional forms which are historically located (Weber, 1949). The 
levels of relative influence of these institutional functions vary from one given 
historical phenomenon to another. For example, the political level might be the 
dominant influence in the production of victimisation than the other institutional 
forms (economy, religious, legal, ideology) and then followed by the economy, and 
so on. The most influential institution that influences the victimisation of 
individuals and communities in a social formation within a particular historical 
period referred to as the “dominant level”, which dialectically changes as societies 
develop through history. Therefore “the complex whole in society has a unity of 
structure articulated in dominance” (Althusser, 1977: 202). This is the reason why 
Althusser (1977) averred that there is an uneven influence between instances in 
the development of a social phenomenon that is determined by its ever-changing 
complex.  
 
The following section shall look at how the instances that influence the 
victimisation of individuals and communities at a local level (within national 
geographical boundaries) transcend at an international level in further 
perpetrating domination and oppression.  
2.2.3. Gramsci’s conception of society as an international complex of instances 
 
Thinking globally, national (geographical) relations and international relations both 
passively and actively react on each other in producing and reproducing a 
phenomenon often burdened with victimisation. This happens when the economic 
interests of one group, transcend international interests to become interests of 
subordinate nations. In other words, the national interests of a group, propagate 
themselves into a political and economic ideology of domination and oppression 
thereby establishing a hegemony over various subordinate nations (Gramsci, 2000). 
At this instance, the state of the dominant group ceases to represent the interests 
of its geographical nation but it becomes a tool for the universal expansion and 




expansion surpasses national geographic boundaries thereby creating its own 
structure at an international level popularly known as the world economy 
(Gramsci, 2000). Political energies and sanctions become tools to secure monopoly 
rights over property (inclusive of traditional knowledge) and economic transactions 
in the world-economy.  
 
The world economy develops as a core (which is composed of industrialised 
nations) and peripheries (industrialising nations) from which the former extract 
surplus raw materials that fuel expansion of the world economy (Wallerstein, 
1974). Peripheries produce key primary goods like traditional knowledge “while 
their towns often wither and labour becoming coerced in order to keep down the 
costs of production. Technology is subsequently stagnated, labour remains largely 
“unskilled or even become less skilled and capital rather than accumulating, is 
withdrawn toward the core” (Wallerstein, 1974: 67). Prima facie, the differences 
between the core and the periphery are minute, but when the core exploits these 
differences through the misappropriation of primary products in return for 
manufactured goods, the gap between the core and the periphery expands. 
Uneven development immediately becomes the foundation for capitalist 
development in a world of unequal exchange of value.  
 
For instance, the commoditisation of traditional knowledge without assigning the 
proper benefits to its holders is a major indicator of unequal development and 
exclusion of certain groups and knowledge from the broader economic and political 
systems associated with globalisation (Arewa, 2006). Indigenous communities are 
not always appropriately rewarded for the capitalisation of their traditional 
knowledge, perhaps due to the deliberate  refusal of the exploiters to pay, 
difficulties in identifying the proper owners to whom payment is to be made, or 
simple mismanagement (Kuruk, 2007). Even where the communities are 
compensated, the benefits are often pale in comparison to the huge profits made 
by the exploiters (Kuruk, 2007). The knowledge revolution supported by the 
infamous legal infrastructure of the TRIPS agreement, which globalised intellectual 
property frameworks, has made the protection of traditional knowledge a 




advanced (See Section 2.1 of this Chapter for an examination of reasons provided).  
Globalisation has thus been strewn around as a convenient scapegoat for anything 
that seems unjust or disorienting about contemporary life (Brown, 2005). 
 
Therefore, globalisation enhances the interests of hegemonic groups (the core) to 
intertwine with the national relations of subordinate groups (the periphery), thus 
creating new unique and historic combinations (Gramsci, Nowell-Smith & Hoare, 
1971). For example, the introduction of an ideology created in industrialised 
countries, to subordinate countries, affects the interplay of the factors between 
the economy and superstructure of the subordinate nation (Gramsci, 2000) thereby 
contributing to the victimisation of marginalised groups in the periphery, 
specifically traditional knowledge holders. 
 
In light of the foregoing the institutions and structures that perpetuate the 
victimisation of traditional knowledge holders can be surmised as: 
a) Superstructure, the economy ideology and class formations, which are; 
b) relatively autonomous within a specific historical formation; 
c) influence each other within varying degrees  
d) influenced by other social systems, and 
e) they are ultimately conditioned by the economy  
 
Within a broader framework of the victimisation of traditional knowledge holders, 
the following discussion will focus on how institutions and frameworks function in 
perpetrating victimisation. 
2.3. ECONOMIC DETERMINISM  
 
The economic stratum to a larger extent is the primary mover of victimisation, 
because the social relations in society correspond with the level of development of 
the material productive forces (Callinicos, 1989). These productive forces explain 
the material conditions of existence functionally.34 Therefore, the relations of 
production are determined by the functional requirements of the material 
productive forces. For example, the 21st century’s development of material 
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productive forces is determined by intellectual capital, which “dominates as a 
means of production” (Granstrand, 1999: 9), thereby making it the prime 
determinant of social relations.  
 
Through the second enclosure movement, knowledge resources are becoming 
scarce which in turn increases their demand (Williams & McShane, 1994). The 
enforcement of politically protected monopoly rights to exclude others from using 
knowledge that has been defined as “private property while at the same instance 
misappropriating knowledge that is part of the common cultural heritage of 
humankind” (Evans, 2005: 86-87). Marx and Engels (2013) support this observation 
by arguing that the need to exploit raw materials extends to the intellectual 
creations of individual nations (traditional communities). This system operates on a 
disproportionate optimal scale of plundering and looting traditional knowledge 
resources while not recognising nor compensating the rightful owners. The looting 
takes different forms of misappropriation which includes, “the commodification 
and privatisation of traditional knowledge, the conversion of various forms of 
property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property 
rights; the suppression of rights to the commons and imperial processes of 
appropriation of assets (including natural resources)” (Harvey, 2005: 145). The 
logic of this process is not only meant to misappropriate and impoverish but to 
incorporate non-capitalist economies into capitalist relations of production 
(Harvey, 2005; Sassen, 2010). Force, fraud, oppression, looting are openly 
displayed without any attempt at concealment, and it does not require an effort to 
unravel structural and institutional victimisation within this tangle of political 
conflict, contests of power and the stern laws of the economic process (Harvey, 
2005). 
 
Consequently, the attempt to control traditional knowledge resources generates 
conflict between traditional communities and industrialised countries. The control 
of resources creates power and that power is used to maintain and expand the 
resource base of one group at the expense of the other (Williams & McShane, 
1994). Once dominance by one group over the other has been attained, the 




group so as to maintain dominance (Williams & McShane, 1994). Therefore, state 
coercion becomes a tool for oppression and subjugation of the marginalised groups 
(Marx & Engels, 1848). 
 
The economy is therefore “conceived as a basis for the social superstructure, 
which in turn serves as a mere instrument by corresponding at all times to it” 
(Coombe, 2005: xiv). In that regard, every single systematic change in the historic 
development of capitalism saliently contributes to the political advance of the 
bourgeois  class (Marx & Engels, 1848). The executive of the modern state thereby 
represents a “committee for managing the common affairs of the bourgeoisie” 
(Marx & Engels, 1848: 5). The bourgeoisie therefore construct a state (the 
superstructure) according to its “requirements bending it at will, to suit their own 
interests” (Poulantzas, 2000: 12). The “ruling class” (who control income, wealth 
and institutional leadership) is based upon “the national corporate economy and 
the institutions that the economy nourishes” (Domhoff, 1967: 156). 
 
Therefore, the superstructure should be perceived as an instrument that can be 
manipulated, “almost at will, by the capitalist class as a whole or, in certain 
moments, by particular fractions of capital” (Beirne, 1979: 379). Resultantly, the 
definition of laws, policy formation and everyday functioning of society is often 
manipulated by some conspiratorial and like-minded ruling class (Milovanovic, 
2003: 79). The absence of effective mechanisms to prevent traditional knowledge 
misappropriation is symbiotic of who controls the means of production and who is 
benefiting from such knowledge misappropriations. Skogan (1979) expands this 
point by observing that misappropriation is something that does not exist outside 
law and government but instead is, “a hidden but none the less integral part of 
government and the economic structures of society”. Within such a framework it is 
impossible to recognise justice for the traditional communities is Africa, as justice 
is an ideological and practical instrument that is tied to material forces of 
production and used to maintain the existing order of class subordination (Quinney, 
1977). This preposition reveals a dark secret, that if the bourgeoisie interests are 




Capitalism therefore provides the basic conditions for any social existence 
supported by politics35 that joins with the capitalist mode of production to create 
a fertile ground for the victimisation of individuals and groups who are outside the 
privilege and status of the bourgeoisie ruling class, specifically traditional 
knowledge holders. 
A critical appreciation of the foregoing posits more questions with regard to the 
traditional knowledge misappropriation discourse from an economic point of view. 
Thinking locally, one would question the objectives of economic infrastructure of 
African countries whose inferior technological advancements are largely incapable 
of transforming traditional knowledge into commodifiable goods (Arewa, 2006) vis 
a vis the portentous incapability of economically benefiting from the traditional 
knowledge. What is critical about this reality is the participation of African state 
enterprises in the victimisation of traditional knowledge holders, through neglect 
in providing protection mechanisms to the latter. Paradoxically the absence of an 
elaborate and effective traditional knowledge protection system Africa provides a 
lucrative incentive for the continued misappropriation of traditional knowledge.  
The reality that confronts traditional knowledge holders in light of the foregoing 
raises intriguing academic questions on the lack of a practical response by African 
governments on issues that affect traditional knowledge holders. The absence of 
legal sanction that reprimands the abuse of traditional knowledge holders can 
possibly be attributed to historical reasons of colonialism and the 
disenfranchisement of African population (Arewa, 2006). Furthermore, there is 
need to question whether the economic influence exerted on African governments 
by western has facilitated the misappropriation of traditional knowledge to remain 
outside the domain of justice and from the shelters of penal sanctions (Fattah, 
1992). 
The next discussion shall focus on the role played by the state in repressing the 
interests of marginalised groups in preference to those of the bourgeoisie.  
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2.4. REPRESSIVE STATE APPARATUS  
 
Marxist philosophy conceives the state as a repressive tool, is at the whims and 
caprices of bourgeoisies to subjugate and dominate the proletariat to ensure 
dominance (Marx, 1906). Resultantly, the state is an instrument that guarantees 
the implementation of the objectives of the ruling class, thereby making them 
repressive state apparatus. Government administration, the police, soldiers, 
courts, prisons, law and secret military and intelligence officers often constitute 
the repressive state apparatus. The functions of these institutions are 
organisational, coercive and connective in exercising direct domination on a social 
formation (Gramsci et al., 1971) which consequently perpetuates the 
victimisation. In other words, the repressive state apparatus execute the executive 
mandate36 of the government, i.e. the creation of laws, its interpretation and 
implementation. 
 
The repressive state apparatus operate as a function of state power. All political 
class struggle within every given social formation revolve around the state, for the 
seizure and conservation of state power (Althusser, 1971). Repressive State 
Apparatus have been known through history to have remained unchanged after 
state power had changed hands after revolutions (Althusser, 2006). A closer 
appreciation of this analysis presents a case whereof the post-colonial state in 
Africa has done nothing to change the core of relations that disenfranchised and 
marginalised traditional knowledge communities during colonialism but it has 
rather opted to manage them at the prejudice of the latter. Therefore, state 
power,37 is the ideological function of the government that ensures that the 
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2.5. IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS 
 
State power is composed of specialised institutions known as ideological state 
apparatus. These among others include “religious ideological state apparatus38, 
educational ideological state apparatus,39 family ideological state apparatus, legal 
ideological state apparatus,40 the political ideological state apparatus,41 trade 
union ideological state apparatus, the cultural ideological state apparatus42 and 
the communication ideological state apparatus”43 (Althusser, 1968: 143). The 
difference that perambulates between repressive state apparatus and ideological 
state apparatus is that the latter falls in the private sector of society and the 
former in the government domain.44 Both forms of apparatus are the same in their 
functionality, because the distinction between the public and the private is a 
distinction internal to bourgeois law and valid in the (subordinate) domains in 
which bourgeois law exercises its ‘authority’ (Althusser, 1971; Gramsci, 2000).  
 
Repressive state apparatus function by violence while ideological state apparatus 
function by ideology. The primary function of repressive state apparatus is 
oppression using coercion and that force operates through a predetermined 
ideology of the state. The ideological state apparatus predominantly operate on 
ideology while secondarily it functions by violence and repression. The ideology 
that functions through these institutional apparatus belongs to the capitalists 
(Althusser, 1971). It is impossible for one class to predominantly victimise a social 
formation through repressive state apparatus without having a hegemony over 
ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1968; Althusser, 1971; Althusser, 2006; 
Gramsci et al., 1971).  
 
Therefore, the ideology behind the victimisation of traditional knowledge 
communities should be unravelled within the operational hegemony of ideological 
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and repressive state apparatus. The reason behind such an assertion is that it is 
through the institutions that the abuse of state power is realised; through 
politically and economically immunising structured and disguised conspiracies of 
traditional knowledge misappropriation. For instance, traditional knowledge 
misappropriation is hardly recognised as a threat to human security, in comparison 
to issues like poverty, HIV and AIDS and terrorism that need immediate attention. 
Aid is thus provided as a package by affluent western nations towards the stated 
issues as a deviatory tactic to distract attention from the African countries while 
keeping profitable opportunities for knowledge misappropriation open. 
 
The main objective of the repressive and ideological state apparatus is to protect 
and maintain the political conditions for “the reproduction of relations of 
production  and in the last resort to maintain relations of exploitation” (Althusser, 
1971: 24). Through violence,45 the repressive state apparatus create and maintain 
the ideal political environment for the implementation of ideological state 
apparatus that ensure that traditional knowledge holders are gatekeepers of their 
own oppression (Althusser, 2006). 
 
Ideological state apparatus, on the other hand reproduce capitalist relations of 
exploitation behind a cloth concealed by the repressive state apparatus (Althusser, 
2006). The ideological state apparatus perform various functions in creating and 
reproducing conditions that oppress a social formation. For example, the political 
ideological state apparatus more regularly ensure that individuals and groups 
believe in the existence of a state political ideology, which more often than not 
assures them of a government made by the people and for the people. This 
ideology is entrenched through the creation of an ideological institutional 
parliamentary system while in the background it is a direct dictatorial ‘democratic 
ideology’ (Althusser, 1971). The functional efficiency of the political ideological 
state apparatus is complemented by the communication ideological state 
apparatus which subjugates individuals and groups by constantly and fervently 
conditioning them with doctrinal ideologies of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism 
and moralism by means of electronic and visual media (Althusser, 1968). Such an 
                                                          
45




approach facilitates the distraction of people from the real problems that oppress 
and subjugate them.  
 
The religious ideological state apparatus, by recalling in sermons and other great 
“ceremonies of birth, marriage and death, that man is only ashes, unless he loves 
his neighbour to the extent of turning the cheek to whoever strikes first” 
(Althusser, 1971: 28). These religious notions internalise the theme that when 
one’s traditional knowledge is wrongfully misappropriated, the victim of such a 
wrongful action should not retaliate but offer more, to enable their recognition as 
human among a community. Religion in that context often serves to distract grave 
abuses by urging the victims to forgive (Peacock, 2013a).  
 
The cultural ideological state apparatus, integrate the ruling class ideology into 
music, movies, plays and literature. The themes of the humanism of great fore 
fathers who produced the Greek miracle before Christianity and afterwards the 
glory of Rome, the Eternal City and the themes of interest and the particular and 
general i.e. nationalism, moralism and economism” (Althusser, 1968: 146), all play 
a significant role in  diminishing the spiritual and cultural importance of traditional 
knowledge. 
 
The dominant ideological state apparatus within a capitalist social formation is the 
educational ideological state apparatus, which drums into pupils, students and 
scholars of the current and old methods of ‘know-how’ which are clothed in the 
ruling ideology. Such an ideological state apparatus produces reserve labour for 
the capitalist system, “agents of exploitation (managers and capitalists), agents of 
repression (policeman, politicians, administrators and soldiers), intellectuals of 
collective labour, professional ideologists (priests of a sorts most of whom are 
convinced layman)” (Althusser, 1971: 29). The masses produced by this ideological 
state apparatus are inculcated with a particular ideology to fulfil a particular role 
within the social classes while at the same instance it demonises traditional 






it is by apprenticeship in a variety of know how wrapped in massive 
inculcation of the ideology of the ruling class that relations of production 
in a capitalist social formation, i.e. the relations of exploited to exploited 
and exploiters to the exploited, are largely reproduced. The mechanisms 
which produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are naturally 
covered up and concealed by universally reigning ideology of the School, 
universally reigning because it is one of the essential forms of the ruling 
bourgeoisie ideology: an ideology which represents the school as a neutral 
environment purged of ideology ( because it is lay) (Althusser, 1971: 30). 
 
The educative ideological apparatus impute that knowledge should be scientifically 
authenticated through rigorous experiments in laboratories and knowledge 
institutions. Its validations are contained in well-known standardised libraries of 
knowledge. Therefore, knowledge (traditional knowledge included) that is not 
validated by the dominant knowledge institutions and procedures is more often 
deemed superstitious and unauthentic. Consequently, traditional knowledge 
becomes a fertile ground for the extraction of raw materials, which are to be 
investigated through scientific experimentation, whereof the results and 
proprietary connotations of such lie within the scientific enterprises which have 
misappropriated the knowledge. 
 
Though ideological state apparatus are a set of disparate institutions, they are 
unified by the ideologies within which they function (Ferretter, 2006). The 
Ideological state apparatus be it the political, religious, school, communication, 
family are ideological discourses that are dominated by ruling class. Therefore,  
social formations reproduce themselves, through a network of apparatuses and 
daily practices (Balibar, 1990). 
  
Therefore, different vectors of causality implicitly, if not explicitly, “require that 
ideology, ideas, and non-materialist phenomena could be causal and constituent 
elements of the social order and culture” (Waller, 1999: 840).  
2.6. IDEOLOGY AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
During their conception of a social phenomenon that victimises individuals, Marx 
and Engels highlighted that the superstructure was composed of the political, legal 




articulates that “definite forms of social consciousness correspond to the economic 
structure, the real basis, the mode of production of material life conditions the 
social, political and intellectual life process in general, determine the  
consciousness of the social being” (Marx & Engels, 1848: 15). Therefore every idea 
is born and developed through the existent material mode of production; 
We set out from real active men and on the basis of this we demonstrate 
the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. 
The phantoms of the human brain are necessarily sublimates of men’s 
material life process, which can be empirically established and which is 
bound to material preconditions. (Marx & Engels, 1976: 36) 
 
Prima facie ideology is the totality of the forms which men and women are 
conscious of the relations of production and class struggle in which their society is 
in reality constituted (Ferretter, 2006). This historical materialist perception of 
ideology conceives that material relations of production determine the social 
consciousness of people within a social formation. Humanity therefore cannot be 
separated from material conditions of life for what is thought, believed and valued 
is based on the conscious existence because “as individuals express their lives, so 
they are” (McCarthy, 1979: 2). In other words, ideas, beliefs and ideology within a 
social formation are “determined by the existent material conditions and 
constituent social relations within society” (Augoustinos, 1999: 298). Section 2.5 of 
this chapter argued that, ideological state apparatus facilitate the reproduction of 
the material conditions of social relations. The imputation of such reproduction 
aligns society towards a particular form of thinking, which is structured according 
to the material relations of production (scientific and technological advancements 
in present society), a movement that largely categorically brands traditional 
knowledge to appear backward by virtue of its non-conformity to present day 
modes of knowledge production. 
 
Therefore, ideology is not a theory of ideologies i.e. religious, legal or political 
which express class positions (Althusser, 1971). Theories of ideologies are 
historically constructed; whose determination purely falls outside reality thereby 
making ideology is a pure illusion. Ideology is a pure dream, that is constituted by 
the day’s residues from the reality history of material individuals reproducing their 




non-historical reality into an omni-historical reality (Althusser, 1968). The turning 
point in the conception of ideology is that it is not real and thereby operates as an 
instrument that interpellation of communities into a system that oppresses and 
marginalises them.  
 
Hence, the consciousness of men within a social formation is false. In his letter to 
Franz Mehring (14 July 1898), Engels observed that: 
 
Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously; it is 
true but false consciousness. The real process impelling him remains 
unknown to him; otherwise, it would simply be not an ideological process. 
Hence he imagines false or seemingly, motive forces (Marx & Engels, 1976) 
 
The relationship between false consciousness and ideology is conceived in terms of 
the relations between “who one is (objectively) and what one thinks (subjectively) 
and is applied primarily to the bourgeoisie” (Eyerman, 1981: 44). The illusionary 
role of ideology is deemed to operate within a format that conceals social conflicts 
and victimisations by “embodying ideas, values and language which justify social 
and economic inequalities” (Augoustinos, 1999: 298). The consequent effect is that 
people within a social formation fail to realise the political and economic interests 
of the bourgeoisie, thus internalising the values of their oppressors. The cause for 
such an imaginary transposition of the real conditions of existence is based on a 
small number of cynical men who base their domination victimisation and abuse of 
the people on a falsified representation of the world (world outlook) which they 
have imagined in order to enslave other minds by dominating their imaginations.46 
For instance, such a reality is imputed through deviating the impact of traditional 
knowledge misappropriation through magnifying the direct and immediate fears 
that the affected communities have concerning issues like poverty, and 
victimisations of crimes of physical nature. The non-personification of the 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge is used as a tool to avert detection of 
such a crime while in actual instance the same conglomerates bear the largest 
brand of victimisation. 
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Such a form of domination (which is imaginary) creates an alienated society, which 
in turn creates an impression that traditional communities belong to the lower 
echelon of society. Therefore, it is not the ‘real conditions’ of humanity that 
construct ideology but it is their relation to those conditions of existence, which 
are represented to them that they construct their ideology (Marx, 1906). It is then 
this relation that is the cause which explains “the imaginary distortion of the 
ideological representation of the real world” (Althusser, 1971: 38).  
…the representation of the real conditions of existence of the individuals 
occupying the posts of agents of production, exploitation, repression, 
ideologization and scientific practice does not in the last analysis arise 
from relations of production but from relations deriving from relations of 
production.” (Althusser, 1971: 38) 
 
Ideology is thus an imaginary relationship of people within a social formation, 
which is related to their material relations of production. This imaginary 
relationship is constituted and executed by ideological state apparatus (carved to 
suit the whims and caprices of the ruling ideology). Ideological state apparatus 
ensure that ideology is inserted into people through practices, which are regulated 
by rituals “in which these practices are inscribed within the material existence of 
the ideological state apparatus” (Althusser, 1968: 158).  
 
An individual’s actions are therefore material actions inserted into material 
practices governed by material rituals, which are themselves defined by material 
ideological state apparatus from which he/she derives the ideas. The central 
function of ideology according to Marx and Engels (1976) is ensuring that that 
society becomes subject to the interests of the bourgeoisie. Ideology constructs 
that relations of social production are normal and obvious,47 (that is the way life 
is) while recruiting individuals to become subjects. The system of oppression 
survives by virtue that it does not only reproduce social relations but also the 
reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology or practice of that ideology 
(Althusser, 1968; Ricoeur, 1994). 
 
In light of the foregoing, ideology should be recognised as a tool that is used by 
bourgeoisie to maintain and preserve relations of power and dominance over 
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traditional knowledge holders within a social formation. The basis of this assertion 
is derived from the fact that ideology is a construct of the ruling class that creates 
physical, non-material conditions and instruments for the victimisation of 
traditional knowledge holders 
the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the 
class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its 
ruling intellectual force. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal 
expression of the dominant material relations (Marx & Engels, 1976: 59). 
 
Consequently, the class that owns the material productive forces determines the 
dominant ideology that victimises traditional knowledge holders. By virtue of the 
fact that the material relations (means) of production are owned by the 
capitalists, society adopts the ideas and interests of the ruling class as their 
consciousness48 (Stoddart, 2007). In turn traditional knowledge holders participate 
within their own means of oppression and subordination (Milovanovic, 2003). In 
other words, people become gatekeepers of their own oppression. The ideological 
infrastructure together with its associated systems integrates traditional 
knowledge holders into social networks of subordination and oppression.  
 
This form of social power is more often referred to as “hegemonic power”, which 
works to convince individuals and social classes to subscribe to social values and 
norms of an inherently exploitative regime (Stoddart, 2007). It produces a 
theoretical consciousness, which is implicit in its application, adopted from the 
past, uncritically absorbed and often powerfully produces a condition of moral and 
political passivity (Gramsci, 2000; Gramsci et al., 1971). Ideological State 
Apparatus are usually institutional alternatives that create and maintain 
hegemonic power through ideology. Therefore, through ideology traditional 
knowledge communities are integrated and interpellated as social subjects thus 
ensuring that they remain politically passive and neutral to the victimisations they 
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 This process is achieved through the process of commodity fetishism whereof the products that are 
produced through economic processes such as manufacturing are divorced from the labourer. This has been 
referred to as the alienation of the proletariat from the fruits of their production. This process is then 
entrenched through the transmutation of labour into wages which in turn creates a false reality for the 
labourers. This is explained through the fact that workers are rewarded by money for their labour in producing 
goods which they themselves cannot own, whereof in turn they use the money that they have been paid to 
buy the same products they have made. Therefore money the commodity form and money play an ideological 




suffer. The following shall discuss how discursive formations through ideology 
contribute to the victimisation of marginalised groups in society. 
2.7. DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS  
 
As previously noted, the superstructure operates through state power, which 
reciprocally influences the economy to create an environment that victimises 
marginalised communities. However, the economy and the superstructure require 
a support function to facilitate the implementation of their objectives, but the 
question is who carries out that function. The base and superstructure define the 
support functions but it is the individuals within a social formation that discharge 
that function in pursuance of the objectives of the former and the latter. In that 
regard, ideology interpellates individuals by constituting them as subjects 
(ideological subjects and therefore subjects of its discourse) and “providing them 
with the reasons for being a subject through the assumption of the functions 
defined by the super structure and the economy” (Althusser, 1995: 51). 
 
The reasons why an individual should be a subject to carry out such a support 
function are clandestinely and perversely incorporated within the ideological 
discourse that relates to the subject thus making the subject a signifier of the 
discourse (Marx & Engels, 1976). Therefore, for an individual to be constituted as a 
subject he or she must recognise him or herself as a subject in the ideological 
discourse. Ideological discourse should not be comprehended as an order or 
commandment but it must be recognised as constitutive ‘pure force’ that is 
manipulated by persuasion and conviction which in turn provides guarantees for 
the interpellated subject (Althusser, 1995). Therefore: 
the subject function which is the characteristic of ideological discourse in 
turn requires, produces and induces a characteristic effect, the unconscious 
effect that is peculiar which makes the discourse of the unconscious 
possible (Althusser, 2003: 53) 
 
The consequence of the unconscious effect of ideological discourse, underwrites 
the recruitment and the establishment of individuals as subjects. This is achieved 
through the provision of answers to future questions, which the interpellated 
subject may ask about the rationality of the system. Therefore, all questions in 




pre-exist the question (Althusser, 1995). The preposition that would follow this 
analysis advances the notion that the, “the interpellation of human individuals as 
ideological subjects produces as specific effect in them, the unconscious effect 
which enables these human individuals to assume the function of ideological 
subjects” (Althusser, 1995: 56). The unconscious effect of the ideological discourse 
creates a lack of awareness of the harm suffered by traditional knowledge 
communities, thereby ensuring the success of traditional knowledge 
misappropriations. Therefore, the ideological reasons behind the neglect of victims 
of traditional knowledge misappropriations should be investigated within the 
parameters of an ideological discourse that is feigned by the structures of a social 
phenomenon. 
 
Such an approach is imperative because discourses assign a set of signs which 
traditional knowledge holders experience and live in setting up frameworks, which 
impose structures that determine what is to be experienced while at the same 
instance influencing what is barred from being said or done. Therefore, discourse 
“focuses attention on the terms of engagement within social relations by insisting 
that all social relations  are lived and comprehended by their participants in terms 
of specific linguistic or semiotic vehicles that organise their thinking, 
understanding and experiencing” (Purvis & Hunt, 1993: 476).  
 
The construction of individuals as subjects is formulated through the engagement 
of the latter with a multitude of discourses where such a “construction of the 
subject positions and shapes the peoples’ acceptance of unequal social relations” 
(Stoddart, 2007: 203). The effect of this is reordered and extended by the 
subjects, because discourse “invests in them, is transmitted by them and through 
them” (Foucault, 1977: 27). This power goes to the roots of society. The 
acceptance of social inequality is facilitated by the adoption and incorporation of 
hegemonic discourses by individual social actors into their lives while on the other 
hand discourse produces hegemonic effects across a multiplicity of social locations 





The central focus of this analysis is peculiarly hinged on systems and procedures of 
exclusion and prohibition which are constituted by the ‘will to know’ (Hook, 2001). 
These systems and procedures comprise of a discrete realm of discursive practices 
within a terrain of knowledge production. Therefore, through the firmament of 
knowledge production, discourse translates itself into systems in which domination 
and power are exercised on the interpellated subjects. For example, during the 
middle ages, the averments of the so-called mad person were deemed to be null 
and void, neither having truth or importance and worthless of evidence in a court 
of law (Foucault, 1971). Nevertheless, from the 18th century to present day doctors 
and psychologists deemed to be on the other side of reason have been capacitated 
to verify the meaning of the mad man’s words. It is important to note that because 
certain professionals are capacitated to study ‘insanity’, does not remove the 
divide that existed during the middle centuries. There is a need to look at the 
whole body of knowledge, the institutions that are set in place to permit certain 
individuals to listen or study such insanity and not forgetting the procedures that 
have been put in place that allow a mad man to speak (Foucault, 1971). Therefore, 
the division is far from removed, working in a different format through new 
institutions, systems and procedures though the effects of such a division are not 
the same. The exclusion of traditional knowledge from the intellectual property 
regime has been achieved through the imputation of procedural barriers of patent 
examination, which have no technical or cultural relation to the cultural 
traditional heritage of the African continent.  
 
Another example that sets out the real functionality of discourse is based on the 
difference between truth and false, which is a discourse that was constituted 
historically. In 6th century B.C, true discourse inspired respect and terror, one had 
to submit because he or she was ruled , where prophesies never only allowed the 
prediction of future events to happen, but also ensured that activities of men 
made it happen, carrying men’s minds with it weaving itself into a fabric of destiny 
(Foucault, 1971). However, this will to know the truth changed in the 16th century 
when sophists were banished and scientific truths were established (Foucault, 
1971). The history of truths changed to a history of objects to be known of the 




instrumental investments. Therefore, the verification of the truthfulness of 
knowledge was determined by research and development of scientific institutions, 
controlled by the bourgeoisie. The system of exclusion imputed into the whole 
process, institutional support reinforced and renewed by a strata of practices – 
system of books, publishing, libraries and laboratories (Foucault, 1971). Hence, 
“power and knowledge directly impute one another and there is no power relation 
without a correlative field of knowledge” (Foucault, 1977: 27). 
 
Now it is important to note that knowledge cannot merely arise, as an effect 
separate from its cause (power relations). Knowledge should be understood as 
being immanent in the “materiality of practices and apparatuses” (Montag, 1995: 
73). Its production is dependent on an ideology formulated and dispensed by 
ideological state apparatus. Hence, such knowledge becomes rituals and practices 
within which subjects are interpellated, thereby making act within the realm of 
ideological discourse that exploits traditional knowledge holders. 
 
This constituent part of discourse makes it virtually impossible for people to act or 
think outside the box, as doing so one would be characterised as being ‘mad’ and 
unreasonable (Young, 1981). Consequently, unwanted or socially undesirable acts 
are labelled as crimes. Because, the economy is outside the power of the state, 
“the weak state becomes more visible by governing the lower classes, who to a 
large extent are controlled through their minor infractions (at the expense of 
effectively addressing corruption and organised crime)” (Peacock, 2008: ii). The 
reason behind such an understanding is based on the view that the production of 
discourse in society is controlled by a number of procedures  whose role is to ward 
off powers and dangers; to gain mastery over its chance events to evade its 
ponderous, formidable materiality (Foucault, 1971).  
 
Therefore the exercise of discursive rule is linked to the use and exercise of 
power: discourse ensures the reproduction of a social system through factors of 
selection, exclusion and domination (Young, 1981). These practices therefore work 




between knowledge, power and the protection of traditional knowledge is 
determined by those who are economically and politically powerful. 
 
These structures of inequality inevitably lead to the formation of a few identifiable 
cohesive social groups (classes) which can be distinctively recognised as ‘actors’ in 
historical development of a particular historical formation (Stephens, 1979). One 
of the common characteristics that is evident during the interaction of these social 
groupings is one of domination and oppression. 
2.8. CLASS FORMATIONS 
 
The history of the victimisation of all hitherto existing societies is the history of 
class struggles (Marx & Engels, 1848). To clarify this synopsis Marx and Engels 
(1848), provided examples which include, freeman and slave, patrician and 
plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman. They surmised this 
relationship as one of the oppressor and oppressed, villain and victim of which the 
latter and former stood in constant opposition to one another in a revolutionary re-
constitution of society. Marx and Engels argument pronounced that modern day 
society breathes life from the  capitalist system, which borrowed the way it 
operates from past and has not changed anything but has “established new classes, 
new conditions of oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones: 
Bourgeoisie and Proletariat”(Marx & Engels, 1848: 15).  
 
This rendition clarifies that inequality, status and privilege, all concomitant to 
victimisation is not a new phenomenon. It has been developed and borrowed from 
a dark history where its form, nature and appearance have been defined by the 
corresponding mode of production. The notoriety of this preposition is visible in 
“ancient Rome where there were the patricians, knights, plebeians, slaves; in the 
Middle Ages, feudal lords, vassals, guild-masters, journeymen, apprentices, serfs; 
and “in almost all of these classes, again, subordinate gradations existed” (Marx & 
Engels, 1848: 3). Warren Buffet during an interview with the New York Times 





“There’s class warfare but it’s my class, the rich class, that’s making war, 
and we’re winning”(Stein, 2006).  
 
What is apparent from Warren Buffet’s statement is that, social classes demarcate 
every social formation. These classes are distinguished on the basis of who owns 
the means of production and those who do not whereof the latter are exposed to 
the whims and caprices of the bourgeoisie. However, the interaction between 
these two classes leads to contradictions or conflicts, which Warren Buffet’s calls 
‘war’ and he confirms that it is them; the bourgeoisie that is causing that war and 
they are winning.  
 
A practical appreciation of such an assertion would question the conditions that 
ferment conflict within a given society. A preliminary answer to this question is 
the economy, i.e. “a historical prius which determines all creations of the human 
mind” (Weber et al., 1954: xxix). Therefore, the possible prime mover of the 
victimisation of traditional knowledge holders is deemed economic expedience 
that transcends its self to all institutions and structures in society. The stated 
rendition prescribes for a further investigation of how economic determinism 
propels the victimisation of traditional knowledge holders, through the question of 
class struggles. 
 
Although, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are pursuing different interests 
within a singular context, contestations are bound to ensue. These contestations 
determine the modus of victimisation, based on the likelihood of a social 
revolution that might transform the economic mode of production and its 
corresponding superstructure. The ultimate but ever evolving result of such a 
social revolution is the creation of a new social order and social classes together 
with its new economic structure (i.e. from feudalism to capitalism). Therefore, the 
development of society that victimises traditional knowledge holders can be 
understood not through the consciousness of men within the particular mode of 
production but through an analysis of the contradictions of material life in which 
conflicts between the social reproductive forces and the mode of production exist 




These contradictions are known as dialectical materialism; a concept of the self-
movement of the things; the principle of the unity of opposites and the transition 
of quantity into quality.49 Dialectical materialism assists in comprehending that a 
phenomenon is not a complex of readymade things, but is a set of complex of 
processes which are apparently stable and go through uninterrupted change of 
coming into being and passing away, “which in spite of all temporary regression, a 
progressive development asserts itself in the end” (Brush & Stabinsky, 1996: 543).  
This process allows for the production and reproduction of the conditions that 
determine the environment in which victimisation is perpetrated. The next section 
developed a theoretical framework that was applied in the historical analysis of 
traditional knowledge victimisation. This framework borrows its elements from the 
discussions in a dialectical manner, with specific focus on the factors that 
contribute to the development of a social phenomenon that facilitates 
vicitimisation. 
2.9. THE SOCIAL RELATIONS PRODUCTION MODEL 
 
Having comprehended the factors that contribute to the development of a social 
phenomenon, the thesis developed a conceptual framework that was applied in 
understanding the factors that facilitate the victimisation of traditional 
communities. This conceptual framework was titled the ‘social relations 
production model’. 
 
 Althusser (2006), highlighted that one can easily conclude that the domination and 
oppression of a social phenomenon through an interaction of various factors that 
inter-determine each other while there are independent and separate of one 
another (See Figure 1 hereunder). 
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A society, which victimises traditional knowledge holders is located in a continuous 
complex set of historical systems together with their associated corresponding 
institutions. Therefore, understanding the factors that have contributed to the 
victimisation of traditional knowledge holders, one has to come to terms with the 
historical factors that created, developed and concretised the current order. 
These factors have to be dug out from the historical enclave of the development of 
society. An appreciation of such a historical prius would set the platform for the 
examination of the conditions that determine the victimisation of traditional 
knowledge holders. 
 
The primacies of social relations that perpetuate victimisation (through domination 
and oppression) are hinged on the correlative autonomous relation between the 
economy and the superstructure, which in turn mutually and unevenly over-
determine each other (Marx, 1906). Therefore, in defining the elements that 
influence the creation of a social formation, which victimise traditional knowledge 
holders it is important to understand the material forces of production together 
with the corresponding superstructure. While the economy and the superstructure 
are the prime movers of a social phenomenon, the latter as whole is articulated by 
a totality of instances (Weber, 1949). These are a set of structures, which are 
functionally organised by a specific mode of production and articulated by 
dominance and oppression.  
 
Dominance and oppression are discharged through ideological state apparatus (that 
are responsible for the reproduction of relations of production) and repressive 
state apparatus (responsible for oppression and repression through violence and 
interdictions). These institutional apparatus operate through state power 
(ideological function of the superstructure) (Althusser, 2006). Ideological state 
apparatus and repressive state apparatus are mutually constitutive of one another. 
Repressive state apparatus predominately operate with violence while secondarily 
they operate on ideology; ideological state apparatus predominantly operate on 
violence while they secondarily operate on violence and repression. Repressive 




of the ideological state apparatus while in the last resort it enforces repression 
within a social formation (Althusser, 1968).   
 
While a social formation participates in a process that victimises them, they form a 
consciousness (ideology) that is determined by the material conditions of 
production (Marx & Engels, 2008). However, the consciousness is a false 
representation of the world (world outlook). Such a pure dream is inculcated into 
the social formation by the ideological state apparatus through practices and 
rituals (marriage, funerals, and sport contests among others). The major objective 
of the latter is meant to enslave the minds of the dominated by colonising their 
imaginations thus ensuring that individuals are constituted as subjects. Such a 
system ensures the reproduction of the subjects to the ruling ideology. This form 
of social power is hegemonic as it creates a theoretical consciousness, which 
makes a social formation adopt norms, and values that are oppresive while 
creating a system of political and moral passivity. 
 
As individuals are constituted as subjects by ideology; they are however recruited 
and interpellated as subjects by ideological discourse to discharge the support 
functions of the superstructure and the economy. A more social form of discourse 
sets standards and benchmarks of what is deemed to be socially acceptable 
behaviour and what is not: that is how one should think, speak and understand. 
The power of this discourse goes to the roots of society thus establishing hegemony 
of social inequality, which society should subscribe to without questioning. The 
stated discourse operates through systems and procedures of exclusion and 
prohibition, which are constituted by knowledge. Such a system is sustained by 
ideological and repressive state apparatus, which ensure that actions that deviate 
from the main discourse are thwarted. 
 
As the material forces of production within a social formation are threatened by its 
own internal contradictions, the repressive state apparatus are used to maintain 
its own survival. It is through resistance to repression that transforms the material 







A social formation is a complex whole that is articulated by instances that 
perpetuate domination and oppression on traditional knowledge holders who come 
from the lower echelon of society. Unfortunately, current victimology approaches 
seek to understand the problems that have bedevilled victims in fragmentation. 
The perception of trying fix a piece of the problem has had its own challenges as 
the proffered solution will deteriorate and collapse because real problem (which 
emanates from the social whole) has been ignored. The particularised problem 
fails in its solution as it does not address the cause of the problem, but temporarily 
diagnosis the effects. The social relations model seeks to understand the 
challenges that have bedevilled traditional knowledge holders within a conceptual 
whole framework. The stated framework shall be applied in the analysis of the 
historical development of the intellectual property system so as to unravel the 
inner darkness of exclusion that has prompted the current victimisation of 














A CRITICAL HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE MISAPPROPRIATIONS AND 
VICTIMISATION 
“One precedent creates another. They soon accumulate and constitute law. What 
yesterday was a fact today is a doctrine.”(Juniust, 1968) 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The history of knowledge misappropriations and the victimisation of traditional 
knowledge communities in Africa; are largely determined by a hierarchy of 
complex intricate gated frameworks, which are constituted by inter-determinate 
dialectical contestations between the political, legal, technological, economic, 
religious and ideological networks. With issues of imperialism and colonialism, 
swelling underneath these frameworks, the marginalisation of traditional 
knowledge has been exacerbated by global capitalism, which has frequently denied 
traditional knowledge space in the knowledge arena. The remnants and ghosts of 
this complex intricate framework are apparent in modern knowledge regimes, 
which are a structured labyrinthine endowed mostly by systems and procedures of 
exclusion that have been borrowed from the past.  
The following discussion will show that the exclusionary procedures coupled 
together with the discriminatory and imperial attitudes, reproduced within the 
modern knowledge frameworks have become signifiers for the exclusion of 
traditional knowledge. It would be next to impossible to understand the historical 
exigencies that have contributed to the exclusion and marginalisation of 
traditional knowledge, “without understanding the limits of political power, subtle 
forms of domination and development constrains that are invoked by and structure 
of historical enterprise” (Benavides, 2004: 159). An appreciation of the 
development of these systems and procedures of exclusion would primarily assist 
in the explanation of current values that have led to the systematic victimisation 
of traditional knowledge holders and communities in Africa. This chapter unravels 
the forces that contributed to the development of the knowledge infrastructure 
while at the same instance it critically examines their relative contribution to the 




3.2 EARLY CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE MISAPPROPRIATION (525 BC – 1000AD) 
 
The history of knowledge misappropriation in Africa approximately began in 525 
B.C Egypt, where invading armies plundered and looted Egyptian knowledge as 
‘spoils of war’. Egyptian knowledge was a priced possession for the invading armies 
by virtue of the fact that, Egypt was the epitome of ancient civilisation. The 
priceless value of Egyptian knowledge is evidenced by the fact that it attracted 
renowned Greek and Roman scholars who inter alia included Aristotle, Plato, 
Pythagoras, Isokrates, who joined the Egyptian priesthood in a bid to attain the 
highest levels of sophia (wisdom).  
However, the invasion of Egypt by the Persians (525 BC), the Greek (332BC) and 
the Romans (30 B.C), exposed their knowledge to the misappropriation nemesis of 
war, where the invading armies looted libraries and temples that contained 
Egyptian sacred knowledge, texts and manuscripts (James, 2013). These texts and 
manuscripts relatively contributed to the philosophical foundations of the Greek 
and the Roman civilisation. Imperialism and territorial expansion can therefore be 
deemed to be the prime instigator of knowledge misappropriations (Naas, 2011). 
To put this assertion into perspective, after the invasion of Egypt by Alexandra the 
Great in 332 B.C, Aristotle made a library of his own with plundered books as his 
pupils converted the Royal Library of Alexandria, Menephtheion, Memphis and 
Heliopolis into a research centre (James, 2013). Aristotle furthermore, 
“transferred pupils from Athens to these Egyptian Libraries, who in turn received 
instructions from Egyptian Priests” (James 2013: 37).  This trend reappeared again 
after Athens was run over and conquered by the Romans in 84 B.C, where the 
library of books belonging to Aristotle were looted and taken to Rome (Turner, 
1903).  
The imperialist notions of knowledge accumulation and misappropriation are not 
far from Weber’s (1930) assessment, that looting and pirating against foreigners 
was exercised without any form of discretion for political and economic gains. 
Oppression and subjugation over the subject nation therefore created conditions 




3.2.1. ‘Ownership’ as a tool for knowledge misappropriation (332BC – 480 AD) 
 
At the time when Plato and Aristotle were stripping down the ancient texts of the 
Egyptians, a knowledge ownership regime was crafted whereof the ‘knowledge 
pirates’ assumed de facto ownership to misappropriated knowledge. For instance, 
Aristotle and his pupils misappropriated Egyptian classical works and passed it off 
as theirs. Plato is neither innocent of adopting such a practice. Krantor an early 
commentator on Plato’s work remarked that Plato was not the inventor of ‘The 
Republic’ because it was an idealisation of the Egyptian system (Bernal, 1987). He 
is criticised for having adopted the Egyptian story to be the narrative of the 
Athenians and the Atlantis, to make it as if the Athenians had lived under this 
regime at a certain moment in the past (Bernal, 1987). Karl Marx (1906) 
commented on Plato by highlighting that,  
Plato’s Republic, insofar as division of labour is treated in it, as a 
formative principle of the state, is merely an Athenian idealisation of the 
Egyptian system of Castes (Marx, 1906: 299). 
Furthermore, Socrates’ command, ‘know thyself’ is of Egyptian origin. Egyptian 
temples carried inscriptions on the outside addressed to Neophytes and among 
them was the injunction ‘know thyself’ (James, 2013). All mystery temples, inside 
and outside of Egypt carried such inscriptions. In addition, the four cardinal virtues 
of ‘justice, wisdom, temperance, and courage’ as ascribed by Plato are 
misleading; for the Egyptian Mystery System contained ten virtues from which 
Plato derived his four cardinal virtues (James, 2013).  
The de jure concept of knowledge ownership developed in 1 B.C. Rome, through 
the creation of authorial rights in literary and artistic works. The recognition of 
authors was a direct response to mass theft and plagiarism of ancient works which 
were being passed off as works of modern writers (Long, 1991).  For instance, 
Vitruvious a renowned Roman architect expressly condemned individuals, “who 
relied on writings which is not their own notions but boast with odious behavior, 
doing violence to the works of others who lived in an impious way, for they must 
not only be censored but must be punished” (Vitruvius & Cesariano, 1969: 41). In a 
bid to curtail plagiarism and theft, individuals claiming authorship to works began 




2002). This practice was stratified by students (i.e. the sophists) of great 
philosophers and masters of craft, who ensured that the works of their teachers 
were not passed off as belonging to individuals who had not expended intellectual 
labour in the work or the craft (Long, 1991). 
The Roman government endorsed and institutionalised the stated customary 
practice of authorial rights, “through punishing faulty workmanship” (Leeds, 1956: 
1456). Recourse to the criminalisation of defective workmanship of knowledge 
products resulted in the civilisation and institutionalisation of conflict, thereby 
embedding it into the cultural fabric of society (Peacock, 2008). The 
determination of defectiveness was subject to the discretion of Roman officials. 
Therefore, instead of addressing the problem knowledge misappropriations in its 
constitutive nature, the new practice embedded the problem of plagiarism as 
plagiarisers sought to evade creating knowledge products that were divergent to 
the government policy through the reproduction of unknown works.   
The approach adopted by the Roman government permitted the individualisation 
of knowledge that was the common heritage of humankind. This approach created 
conditions for the pursuit of personal aggrandisement in knowledge production, 
which in turn facilitated rent seeking on the monopolised knowledge products 
(Aoki, 1998). Consequently, the claim to knowledge ownership through authorial 
rights became problematic  as monopolies over intellectual works were inequitable 
and were always a failure due to mass plagarism (Prager, 1952). Resultantly, in 480 
A.D Emperor Zeno outlawed knowledge ownership by decreeing that: 
“No one shall exercise monopoly over any …material whether by his own 
authority or under that of an imperial rescript heretofore” (cited in Prager, 
1952: 115) 
The impact of the decree meant that any artistic or literary work had no 
authorship or ownership rights attached thereto.  However, after the invasion of 
Rome by the northern Barbarians, “political thinking was impoverished by the 
physical destruction of books, demonstrations of brute force, dogmatism, 
intolerance and intimidation . . . for industrial arts the Middle Ages were Dark Ages 




3.2.2. Origins of religious exclusionary polemics to traditional knowledge (6 
A.D) 
 
The historical implications of religion in the exclusion of traditional knowledge 
from the knowledge frameworks are far reaching. Ideological religious state 
apparatus through the inseparable role-played by the state and the church in 6 AD 
facilitated the marginalisation of African knowledge. Justinian, closed all the 
Egyptian schools of mysteries and philosophies that were existent in Europe and 
Egypt through the establishment of the Roman Catholic Church (James, 2013). 
James (2013) aptly surmised the factors that contributed to the abolition of 
African knowledge in Europe when he highlighted that,  
The higher metaphysical doctrines of those Mysteries could not be 
comprehended; the spiritual powers of the priests were unsurpassed; the 
magic of the rites and ceremonies filled the people with awe; Egypt was 
the holy land of the ancient world and the Mysteries were the one, ancient 
and holy Catholic religion, whose power was supreme. This lofty culture 
system of the Black people filled Rome with envy, and consequently she 
legalized Christianity, which she had persecuted for five long centuries, 
and set it up as a state religion and as a rival of Mysteries, its own mother. 
This is why the Mysteries have been despised; this is why other ancient 
religions of the Black people are despised; because they are all offspring of 
the African Mysteries, which have never been clearly understood by 
Europeans, and consequently have provoked their prejudice and 
condemnation (James, 2013: 109). 
The alliance between the church and the state that emerged facilitated the 
abolition of African traditional knowledge from the domains of formal knowledge. 
As a consequence, “intellectual darkness spread over Europe and the Graeco-
Roman world for ten centuries; during which time, knowledge disappeared” 
(James, 2013: 31). The Greeks and Romans showed no creative powers, and were 
unable to improve upon the knowledge which they had received from the Egyptians 







3.3. THE EMERGENCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1400 – 1800) 
 
The abolished concept of knowledge ownership re-emerged from the intellectual 
wilderness in 14th century Venice. The protection of knowledge against knowledge 
pirates; guaranteed by the state became a necessary factor for the instigation of 
knowledge misappropriations and manipulation by the bourgeois.  The effects of 
the reintroduction of knowledge ownership under the flagship of the intellectual 
property regime were far reaching to both knowledge producers and the 
knowledge end users. The nemesis that haunted the latter and the former in the 
history of knowledge production and protection are synonymous to the 
reverberations that have currently caused irreparable harm to traditional 
knowledge communities in Africa (See Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion to how 
these factors have been reproduced in the current traditional knowledge 
protection discourse). This section shall critically explore how the concept of 
knowledge ownership together with its associated framed structure of intellectual 
property developed thereby contributing to the knowledge victimisations and 
misappropriations. 
3.3.1. The Venetian moment (1400-1500) 
 
Knowledge ownership in Venice emerged through a community-oriented model of 
the Guilds,50 who were renowned for their craft of producing the finest glass in 
Europe. The skill and knowledge of Venetian glass makers was intrinsic to the 
success of their products and as word spread across Europe of their sophistry so did 
their specialised knowledge attain increasing value (Long, 1991). The increasing 
significance and value of knowledge of the Venetian guilds prompted the Commune 
to promulgate regulations that governed the use and dissemination of knowledge 
by the guilds.51 Consequently, the guilds were reduced to, “state supervised 
administrative agencies” (Prager, 1944: 713), where the guilds were subjected to 
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communal resource of the guild’s governance structure of their activities while ensuring the protection of their 
craft secrets through apprenticeship and non-disclosure (May, 2007). 
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governmental control, while in return they were accorded an economic monopoly 
over knowledge production, use and value maximisation, which was guaranteed by 
the Commune.  
On that basis, political and ideological relations of society found their expression 
in class powers (Guilds and the Commune) that articulated the process of 
knowledge production and value maximisation (Poulantzas, 2000). The established 
system was preconfigured to recognise the economic value of knowledge subject to 
conditions of ownership (Long, 1991; May, 2002).  This development became the 
foundational basis for the determination of awarding certain types of knowledge 
protection at the exclusion of others. Traditional knowledge would suffer at the 
hands of such an economic discriminatory procedure latter in history (See Section 
3.5. of this chapter). 
However, the community oriented knowledge model struggled to attain legitimacy 
in all societal structures because the lucrative sales and demand for Venetian 
products in Europe prompted artisans to leave the Guild community framework to 
establish their workshops independently in foreign countries.52 These actions were 
contrary to standing regulations on knowledge ownership, whereof export of the 
craft itself attracted a death penalty for Venetian glass-blowers who tried to 
practice their art abroad (Frumkin, 1945; Yu, 2009). The harsh punishment that 
awaited the defectors did not deter nor stop such deviation, as the mass migration 
of artisans to foreign lands.53  The continued migration of artisans from the Guilds, 
despite the existence of harsh regulations served as a signifier to the Venetian 
Commune of the non-rivalrous nature of knowledge. The trickle-down effect of the 
migrations increased foreign economic competition, as their artisans become the 
functional knowledge producers accorded privileges by the foreign governments 
(Prager, 1952).                   
In light of the increasing foreign competition, the Venitian Commune in 1420 
introduced the previlegi system where artisans who brought valuable foreign 
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Chapter 4 which discusses the problems that are associated with the community oriented model. 
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technology, where accorded privileges to solely make, use and sell that technology 
without third party interference. In its functional capacity, the previlegi permitted 
the misappropriation of foreign knowledge without assigning the proper benefits to 
the real knowledge producers, in the name of economic development. It achieved 
the latter through encouraging the importation of valuable foreign technologies, 
explicitly for the purposes  of “strategic economic development underpinned by a 
proto capitalist accumulation strategy” (May, 2007: 215).54 
However, the new previlegi system directly infringed the existing economic 
knowledge monopoly that was enjoyed by the Guilds55 (Finlay, 1980). Resultantly, 
contestations between the Guilds and the Commune ensued, as the former 
challenged the Commune over the introduction of the previlegi but the political 
powers of Venice did not support their cause. Politics largely determined the legal 
system in Venice (Stern, 2004), as the law making process was dominated by the 
oligarchy (the nobility) who are believed to have been the embodiment of the law 
and frequently attacked any form of economic muscle that threatened their hand 
in power (Stern, 2004). The Guilds of Venice became pawns to the power struggles 
perpetrated by Commune, as they were sacrificed for the economic development 
of the geographical jurisdiction of Venice.  
The schematic development of the knowledge ownership regime in Venice became 
a contested political process, which “altered the rules of the game, constituted 
new actors, and altered opportunities for others thereby redefining winners and 
losers” (May & Sell, 2001: 468). The Commune clipped the economic wings of the 
Guilds, through undermining the community-oriented model by establishing an 
individual monopolistic knowledge ownership regime. The ‘rules of the game’ in 
knowledge ownership and protection changed through the adoption of first known 
Patent Act of 1474. Consequently, individual technology entrepreneurs became the 
new winners while the Guilds became structural victims of governmental policies, 
which sought to undermine their functionality by perpetuating marginalisation and 
inequality. In that regard, the development of the knowledge protection regime 
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was more of a political imposition rather than the recognition of creative 
capabilities of knowledge producers. 
3.3.2. The Venice Patent Act of 1474 
 
The Venetian Patent Act of 1474 is the first known piece of legislation that granted 
private property monopoly rights to knowledge importers and producers to prohibit 
third parties from making, using or selling the invention without their consent 
within a specified territorial jurisdiction of Venice. In other words, the Patent Act 
created an institution of the right to exclude others (Mundich, 1960). The 
exclusionary dynamic of the Patent Act, created a regime that did not protect 
certain types of knowledge deemed not to be economically viable. This ideological 
premise became the foundation for modern day intellectual property frameworks, 
which has largely, contributed to the marginalisation and exclusion of traditional 
knowledge (See Chapter 1.4.1.). The basis of this argument derives its veracity 
from the preamble of the Statute of Venice, which clearly spells out that 
knowledge protection was afforded to “devices of great utility and benefit to our 
common wealth” (cited in Mandich, 1948: 176).  
From this auspice, the development of the patent institution rather followed than 
preceded the economic system in Venice (Frumkin, 1955; Yu 2009). The foundation 
of the Patent Act was based on economic determinism supported by the structural 
imperialism of the Venetian government, which created a discriminatory 
environment of inequality between different types of knowledge that could be 
protected and that could not be protected. 
At the end of the 15th century, European governments and monarchies adapted the 
Venetian model of knowledge protection to meet their own political and 
ideological ends. However, the subsequent grant of intellectual property rights to 
knowledge importers and producers, became “subject to the vagaries of political 
power and personal relationships” (May & Sell, 2006: 80). The backcloth of the 
development produced and reproduced oppression, monopoly, cartels and the 
personal and economic victimisation of authors whose intellectual ingenuity was 




this development permits one to understand the exclusionary polemics that have 
continually haunt the current traditional knowledge discourse in Africa.  
3.3.3. Historical development of the patent regime (1500 -1800) 
 
The fact that knowledge ownership rights were granted subject to the vagaries of 
political power inconsequently made them an object of abuse. For instance, 
patents were issued to obtain, “favours from courtiers, to procure money for the 
crown or to assert a national economic policy against some local previlegi” 
(Mundich, 1948: 168). This approach of awarding knowledge rights was bound to be 
problematic, as the awarded patents delegated the crown’s power to the 
patentee, to search and seize goods that infringed his or her patent (May & Sell, 
2006), with no appropriate measures in place to ascertain the reasonableness of 
such actions. Resultantly, the delegated power of the crown was abused as the 
patent holders began to hire private police for the purposes of harassing 
competitors with virtual impunity (Walterscheid, 1994). Supported by an extreme 
and severe punishment system, infringing such monopoly grants attracted serious 
punishment, which was described by Adam Smith as follows: 
Like the laws of Draco, these laws may be said to be all written in blood . . . 
the exporter of sheep, lamps, or rams, was for the first offence to forfeit all 
his goods for ever, to suffer a year’s imprisonment, and then to have his left 
hand cut off in a market town upon a market day, to be there nailed up; and 
for the second offense to be adjudged a felon, and to suffer death 
accordingly (cited in Smith & Nicholson, 1887: 701). 
On the economic front patent grants became enormously unpopular as most of 
them were being granted for basic necessities like salt, paper, starch, and glass 
(May & Sell, 2006). The consequent effect of this practice saw an abrupt increase 
in the prices of basic commodities. As a result, ordinary citizens became victims of 
a policy that was bended and used to meet the illicit ends of political expediency 
and to service the pockets of the court stewards of the monarchy.  
Furthermore, the non-regulation of the issuance and revocation of patents plunged 





Patents were granted, routinely revoked (frequently because they had 
become overly burdensome), and re-issued to someone else. James granted 
broad supervisory control over whole industries and with it broad powers to 
search and arrest infringers. These powers were predictably subject to 
frequent and profound abuse by the patentees, who were commonly 
unpopular favorites of James and allies of George Villiers (Duke of 
Buckingham), further fomenting public scorn for both the monopolies and 
the monopolists. (Nachbar, 2005: 1346) 
With no regulatory framework in place, the use of patents was left to the 
machinations of the patentees. Patents became economically burdensome and 
politically unpopular because of poor administration. The unpopularity of 
“monopoly patents and the consequent attack upon them was symptomatic of an 
economic depression and an increase in the number of range of monopolies” (Kyle, 
1998: 1263). The development the Patent regime in Europe should to act as a 
learning curve in the development of a regime that protects traditional knowledge. 
The current non-regulation of traditional knowledge in Africa has placed 
traditional knowledge holders in a compromising position as the intellectual 
property system has been used a tool for the disenfranchisement of traditional 
knowledge communities (See Chapter 1.4.1). 
The unpopular nature of the patent regime gradually created contestations 
between the monarchy, patent holders and the community. In 1624 England, a 
political settlement was reached, through the enactment of the Statute of 
Monopolies. The statute was crafted as an economic exception against royal 
indiscriminate grant of monopoly patents (Cornish, 1993). However, MacLeod 
(1988) argues that in as much as the statute sought to “proscribe the crown’s 
abuse of dispensing powers, the statute’s role as a legal basis for the patent 
system was a curious side effect, a quirk of history” (1988: 15). The law permitted 
the continuation of the grant of patents despite their general dislike by the 
populace. Therefore, the recognition of patents by the statute was more of a 
compromise rather than an allowance of monopolies (May & Sell, 2006) because of 
their unique character of inventiveness rather than the abandonment of 
monopolies.  
It is imperative to note that the rise of the patent system in Europe had nothing to 




institutions of the capitalist mode of production. The recognition of man’s 
inventiveness played a role in the justification of the overall system, though such 
recognition needs to be located in a broader political economic shift of time (May 
& Sell, 2006). Therefore, any assertion that knowledge protection is based on the 
novelty and an inventive requirement is not only misleading but it ought to be 
recognised as a discursive practice that seeks to justify the unequal power 
relations that created the intellectual property regime. 
Regardless of the apparent political, economic and ideological influences that led 
to the formulation of the Statute of Monopolies, the doctrine of novelty and 
inventiveness have been taunted as a basis for the exclusion of traditional 
knowledge within the current intellectual property framework. The impact and 
effect of the Statute of Monopolies was open for everyone to see.  In 1641, the 
Parliament of England disgruntled with the patent regime argued that patents: 
…  a nest of wasps―a swarm of vermin which have over crept the land. Like 
the frogs of Egypt they have gotten possession of our dwellings, and we 
have scarce a room free from them. They sup in our cup; they dip in our 
dish; they sit by our fire. We find them in the dye-fat, wash-bowl, and 
powdering-tub. They share with the butler in his box. They will not bait us 
a pin. We may not buy our clothes without their brokage. These are the 
leeches that have sucked the commonwealth so hard that it is almost 
hectical (Mossoff, 2000: : 1272). 
The oppressive nature of the patent grants that haunted England was indeed a 
tragedy and they have continue to disentomb the same tendencies in present day. 
For instance, traditional knowledge misappropriations have continued and the 
United States patent system permits and encourages such misappropriation to the 
extent that “it fails to recognise foreign prior art unless it is published, enables 
broad patents on minor modifications, syntheses, and purifications” (Coombe, 
2001: 281) while cognisant of the fact that traditional knowledge is not 
documented.   
17th Century Europe institutionalised knowledge protection through the adoption of 
systems and procedures that excluded knowledge, which did not meet the 
economic and scientific functionality of the State. For instance in France, 
scientific knowledge became the only form of knowledge that could protected 




to procedurally and substantively examined by the Académie des Sciences (Prager, 
1944). Therefore, any knowledge that did not pass the scientific test as ascribed 
by the Academy was not awarded protection. However, despite the knowledge 
having gone through a rigorous scientific substantive examination, the political 
forces of the day  had the final determination of which knowledge was subject to 
protection, as the recommendations of the Académie des Sciences were not 
binding on the King or Parliament in the determination of whether or not to grant 
a patent (Isoré, 1878). Therefore, the validity or grant of a patent remained as a 
purely political function despite the existence of the academy.   
Therefore, once a patent granted was issued, a barrister was instructed to present 
it to parliament, which would in turn appoint technical examiners whom would 
determine the economic value of the invention in consultation with the officers of 
the crown who were responsible for Guilds, commerce and taxes (Prager, 1944; 
Isoré, 1878). While Académie des Sciences was interested in the originality of the 
invention, Parlement de Paris was interested in the “future commercial success of 
the invention” (Prager, 1944: 726). Ina as much, as the competing interests 
between the Academy and Parliament were different, the economic value of the 
patent was real determinant for the award of the patent.  
The impact and effects of such an approach were far reaching because “learned 
bodies and fiscal aids controlled the system which necessarily led to corruption” 
(De Boufflers, 1790: 60). The implication of this system was that it created a 
structure of whereof certain forms of knowledge where recognised to the exclusion 
of other contesting knowledge forms. Therefore, the existence of the Académie 
des Sciences was purely an exclusionary institution, though the final determinant 
of which knowledge was protected was determined on economic grounds, which 
Althusser (1968) and Marx (1906) argued was the prime mover of any social process 
of victimisation. 
3.3.4. Development of copyright law under mercantilism (1500 – 1800) 
 
Copyright law “emerged close on the heels of patents in Venice” (Mandich, 1948: 
168). These rights arose through the extension of patent protection to printed 




no distinction between patent privileges and proto-copyright privileges because 
the granted patent monopolies, extended to the rights of exclusive use to exploit 
new technologies of printing and the books so printed by the technology. However, 
they were no appropriate procedures, which determined which printed works were 
entitled to protection. 
As a result, in the year 1500, copyright monopolies were  granted indiscriminately 
for both new and old texts (Prager, 1944). The copyright system plunged all 
existing literary and artistic works into the public domain thereby facilitating an 
enclosure movement that permitted anyone to misappropriate and claim 
ownership to any text, which they did not expend intellectual labour. Therefore, 
publishers began to frequent their respective governments to reserve well-known 
book titles in their stead (Prager, 1948). A rat race to assume proprietary rights on 
literary works within the public domain ensued. Resultantly by virtue of the 
shrinking number of books in the ‘public domain’, counterfeiting and piracy 
ensued56. To compound the already chaotic nature of the indiscriminate grant of 
monopolies on literary texts, magistrates lost track of book titles that were 
protected under the monopolies system (Kostylo, 2010). The environment that 
existed was sufficient for the misappropriation of the author’s knowledge, a 
scenario which is not far removed from the current context of traditional 
knowledge misappropriations, whereof all traditional knowledge is deemed to fall 
within the public domain (Dutfield, 2000) and free for anyone to claim title to 
through the intellectual property system. 
At the turn of the mid-16th Century, a group of opportunistic individuals in the 
form of cartels sought to manipulate the copyright system by establishing 
publishing houses. To ensure efficiency in their approach, the cartels merged their 
interests with that of the State and the Church57. The ensuing agreement between 
these intermediate structures was that, copyright would be a domain regulated by 
the publishers (cartels) who could claim perpetual property rights on all literary 
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and artistic works and the government would in turn use the cartels as an effective 
tool of for policing censorship under the guise of copyright infringement. In that 
regard, “a perpetual copyright was a much more effective tool for this purpose 
than a term copyright” (Patterson, 2002b: 36). Examples of the Cartels that 
emerged in the mid-16th Century was  the Guild of Printers and Book Sellers of 
Venice (Prager, 1944), The English Stationer Company of England and the Paris 
Corporation of Printers and Publishers in France (Kostylo, 2010). The ideological 
schema of the governments and monarchies behind this system was that it was 
easy to censor any material that was to be published by the printers. The 
publishers would then act as the repressive state apparatus of the government and 
church to punish and victimise any knowledge producer who wrote anything that 
criticised the government or the church. In turn, the publishers were incentivised 
by the state to claim economic priviledges in all the literary and artistic works that 
were published. 
The cartel run copyright regime became popular across Europe not because of the 
economic incentives it provided but because of the censorship features it 
presented (Prager, 1952). This censorship model was meant to keep “heretical, 
schismatical, blasphemous, seditious and treasonable books out of the hands of 
subjects” (Patterson, 2002: 43). Therefore, the cartels were mandated to police 
the circulation of ‘dangerous’ books and in return the Cartels through their own 
charter allowed themselves to exert de-facto copyrights over books58. The 
formation of the copyright involved the circulation of cultural products as 
commodities where private rights were subsequently claimed upon (Rose, 2003) at 
the expense of knowledge producers.  
However, the newly introduced exclusionary cartel system also had its own adverse 
effects especially on the authors. It became extremely difficult for individual 
authors (as they were non-members of the cartels) to claim privileges and retain 
control over their own works. In short, authors found it problematic to control the 
commercial and artistic utilisation of their own works (Kostylo, 2010). The author 
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of the work was left at the whims and caprices of the publishers who were at the 
liberty of printing the formers’ work with impunity without recognising their 
intellectual contribution (May & Sell, 2006).  
The operational scope of the publishers’ monopoly dominated by the Cartels 
created a shortage of texts, which in turn contributed to an increase in the price 
of books. Resentment against the printing monopoly ensued and illicit trade in 
books and printing sprouted as demand for literature rose. The resultant wide 
spread piracy was a dangerous condition, as seditious material began to circulate 
(Patterson, 1965). The exclusionary inter-determinate relation between the 
Monarchy and the Guild Cartels created an environment that perpetuated piracy, a 
practice that become embedded in society because of the structural exclusionary 
conditions that existed. As such, the victimisation of knowledge producers was 
embedded in the contestations that emerged between the authors, the publishers 
and the monarchy. 
As contestations, heckling and bundling between the Guild Cartels and the authors 
became the order of the day, most governments in Europe though at different 
periods in time intervened. For instance, in 1624 England monopolies over all 
books were abolished and printers were forbidden to print or reprint books without 
the author’s permission (Rose, 1993). The implication of the revocation of the 
monopolies on books translated into the authorial recognition but it was purely 
meant to ensure that, “that libelous or blasphemous literature could be traced to 
the author, with anonymous works being the responsibility of the printer” 
(Patterson, 1968: 147). Authors were not recognised for the intellectual 
contributions to literary arts but they were viewed as “possible producers of 
scandalous materials59” (Rose, 2009: 133). In 1641, John Milton protested that: 
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The author appeared in print like a punny (child) with his guardian (the 
printer) and his censor on the back of his title to be his bail and surety that 
he is no idiot or seducer. Such compelled infantilism cannot be but a 
dishonour and derogation to the author, to the book, to the previledge and 
the dignity of hearing (Milton, 1886: 735). 
Instead of recognising the fruits and labour of the author, the government was 
more interested suppressing the dissemination of slanderous materials. The main 
reason for the adoption of such a position was that the government was not 
interested in the private ownership copyright, but it was more concerned of 
libelous material proliferating into the public (Patterson, 1965). Nevertheless, this 
was a matter of self-interest, not logic. The law did not alleviate the injustices 
that saw knowledge producers losing value of their works, through 
misappropriation of it by the Guild Cartels but it was used as a blunt weapon for 
silencing dissenting voices. 
Resentment and opposition to the oppressive Guild Cartel monopoly increased over 
the years with John Locke joining the attack on the system in 1693 when stated 
that: 
I wish you would have some care on book buyers as well as the book sellers 
and the company of Stationers, who having got a patent for all or most of 
the ancient latin authors (by what right or pretence I don’t know) claim the 
text to be theirs and so will not suffer fairer or more correct edition that 
any they print here or new comment to be imported without compounding 
with them, whereby these most useful books are excessively dear to 
scholars and a monopoly is put into the hands of ignorant and lazy 
stationers (Locke, 1927: 366). 
The lethal attack on the guilds never ceased with Lord Comden, referring the to 
the Stationers Guild Cartel as a “a gang of notorious pirates who seek to 
accumulate economic proceeds to works that they never sweated for”(Cobbett, 
Hansard & Britain, 1966: 319). As the fight against the monopoly held by the 
Stationers Guild Cartel in England increased, in 1695 the Parliament abolished the 
monopoly that was held by the Cartels on the basis that; 
The Stationers are empowered to hinder the printing of all innocent and 
useful books and have the opportunity to enter a title to themselves and 





However, in 1710 a Copyright Act known as the Statute of Anne was adopted, 
which introduced four notions of modern copyright law; namely the recognition of 
the natural right to fruits of labour, just reward for authorial labour, stimulation of 
creativity, social requirement for accessibility of texts to the public (Davies, 2002). 
Authorial recognition was at the center in the protection of literary and artistic 
works. The author was made equal to the publisher, the only difference being that 
the author did not need to pay the publisher to get a right but it was vice versa, 
which was significant move towards the “commodification of intellectual property” 
(May & Sell, 2006: 93).  
However, the Statute of Anne accorded rights to the authors with one hand and 
took them away with the other, as it was very clear that the author upon 
completion of his work would require the services of the Publishers who had held 
an oppressive hegemony on the authors for more than one hundred and fifty years. 
Thus, the ideological premise of an equal footing between the author and 
Publisher was a fallacy, as no such equality ever existed. Clearly, the absence of 
provisions that prohibited unfair practices by publishers upon the authors ensured 
that the latter retained their original status quo of domination.  Therefore, the 
fundamental impact of the Statute is on issues that the Act did not legislate. The 
de-jure copyrights were paper based rights because on the ground they were 
useless as the structures and institutions that had victimised authors previously 
were not dismantled.  
To explicate this observation, the express allowance for the continuance of 
existent patent monopolies on already existing books for a period of 21 years form 
the date of the promulgation of the Act (May & Sell, 2006; Patterson, 1968) was a 
representation of the reproduction of oppressive relations within the publishing 
industry. The Statute of Anne literary borrowed and codified the complexities that 
had bedeviled and haunted the copyright system while at the same it introduced 
ineffective rights for the authors to be capable to control their works60.  
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From the foregoing one can deduce that the distributional consequences of the 
ability to own and control knowledge, intellectual property was frequently used as 
an instrument of power and once captured it become the basis for further 
accumulation of power. This power goes to the process of who defines what 
constitutes intellectual property, “effectively reinforces particular perspectives 
that may benefit some at the expense of others, rendering some things as property 
while others remain freely available”  (Sell & May, 2001: 468). It is within this 
power praxis that traditional knowledge holders have been disenfranchised through 
the reproduction of conditions that initially contributed to its marginalisation and 
exclusion of knowledge producers. 
3.4. RELIGIOUS EXCLUSIONARY POLEMICS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1500 – 
1800) 
 
The unholy alliance that was established between the State and the Church in 6 
A.D. continued to reproduce the conditions that marginalised traditional 
knowledge. As a result, religion became an independent variable concerning the 
pheripherisation of traditional knowledge in Africa. The ideology underlying the 
abolition and exclusion of African knowledge was tenaciously reproduced by the 
Roman Catholic Church which labeled any rival religion or practice as pagan.  
For instance, in 16th century Europe there was a radical shift from the reliance on 
traditional practices to scientifically authenticated methods of knowledge 
production. Supported with the knowledge infrastructure of the ballooning 
intellectual property system (see section 3.3.3. of this chapter), different forms of 
knowledge, which did not fall within the politically recognised knowledge 
institutional structures were excluded, banished and taunted as witchcraft. This 
form of knowledge was excluded from the rubric of the intellectual property 
system, as it was contested knowledge and deemed to represent rebellious 
attitudes of the peasants against the Church and the State (Day, 1992). The State 
in support of the Church unleashed its repressive state apparatus, to descend upon 
the continental ‘pagan’ religion, “forcing them to close their temples and 
suppressing their priesthoods. Upon its destruction European pagan traditions 




Even after the suppression of ‘pagan’ religion, the Church unleashed a reign of 
terror on traditional healers through what was known as the ‘Maelleus 
Malificarum’ (The Witches Hummer), which was officially endorsed by Pope 
Innocent VIII (Ehrenreich & English, 2010). Based on the Maelleus Malificarum, the 
Church in collaboration with the State instigated witchcraft persecutions as an 
ideological and repressive mechanism for destroying any traditional practice and 
knowledge that was contrary to Catholicism. In her analysis of the way this reign of 
terror was unleashed, Christ (1987: 44) observed that, “witchcraft persecutions 
were instigated at the instance of the educated elite who saw themselves as 
defenders of canonical tradition”. The Maelleus Malificarum set a standard so 
great that western civilisation is still influenced by its hateful ideas.  
Throughout the witch persecutions, the practice of using herbs in healing illness 
became the basis of charging61 and convicting ‘witches’ (Day, 1992). The 
persecution of traditional healers was based on the ideational understanding that 
the traditional medicines they used during the healing process contained power 
over life and death (Day, 1992). The State and the Church viewed that power as a 
source of life, which threatened the hegemony of the Clergy and the State. 
Therefore, to render that power ineffective, the Clergy unleashed a campaign that 
denigrated the practice of traditional healing through witchcraft trials. Such a 
practice, sought to entrench and assume control of the human mind and 
knowledge through an ideological practice that marginalised traditional 
knowledge, while enforcing such an ideology through the repressive state 
apparatus of the State. 
When faced with the misery of the poor, the church turned to the dogma 
that the experience in this world was fleeting and unimportant62. But there 
was a double standard at work for the church was not against the medical 
care for the upper class. Kings and Nobles had their court physicians who 
were priests. The real issue was that of control. Upper class healing under 
the auspices of the church was acceptable, peasant healing under the 
shaman was unacceptable (Ehrenreich & English, 2010: 14) 
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As a means to truncate fear into the hearts of people, the Maelleus Malificarum 
became the basic book of instruction for religious rituals and academic study. 
Universities represented standard institutions for knowledge production and any 
rival knowledge produced outside the parameters of the university was banished 
and tainted as witchcraft. The Maelleus Malificarum made it very clear, “that if 
any person dare to cure without having studied medicine then he or she is a witch 
and must die” (cited in Day, 1992: 10). Recourse to herbal medication in the 
development of a puritan culture by the church was referred to as backward and 
archaic (Day, 1992).  
Special mention needs to be made to the fact that, during the period of 
‘witchcraft’ persecutions’, for a patent to be granted it ought to have been 
substantively examined by Académie des Sciences and approved by parliament 
(Prager, 1944). Therefore, any form of knowledge that did not have its origins in 
science was fanatical and heretical, and its contents highly likely to be formulate 
the basis of a witchcraft charge. Supported by the Maellus Malifacarum, the 
intellectual property system effectively gave more preference to scientifically 
generated knowledge rather than traditionally constituted knowledge. This 
analysis confirms the observations of Skinner (1978) who highlighted that the 
development of law follows pre-meditated axioms of religious law and naturalism. 
In conceptualising this analysis Drahos (1998), stated that: 
The norms of positive law had to converge with the divine design which 
natural law communicated to men. The rules of positive law then met the 
test of validity, not by being a mirror reflection of some metaphysical 
counterpart, but rather by whether or not they contributed to the overall 
divine plan (Drahos, 1998: 3). 
This devine plan that reified traditional knowledge as witchcraft regenerated itself 
primarily clothed as an ideological discourse during the conquest and colonisation 
of Africa by European nations63. The stated approach as was adopted by the 
missionaries during the colonisation of Africa and centralised around the objective 
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that was meant to integrate Africans into a web of symbolic transactions that 
would bind the latter securely into the colonising culture (Fabian, 1990).  
As a result, African religions and practices were treated as an ‘evil’ that had to be 
destroyed to enable the cultural and political domination of the Africans by the 
Europeans. In the process, institutionalised religion marginalised traditional 
knowledge by disputing the existence of spirituality within the norms, practices 
and values of the African community. The African people were advised to abandon 
the tradition of worshipping their ancestors and to avoid the use of traditional 
knowledge, as the practice was ungodly (Magaisa, 2007). 
For instance, over three-quarters of a century after the London Missionary 
Society established the first mission in 1857 in what would later become 
colonial Zimbabwe, one of its employees wrote the Society's Foreign 
Secretary about the problem of attracting African men to the mission. He 
lamented that polygamy and beer-drinking seem to be the two great 
attractions, as the country is steeped in customs which centre around 
witchdoctors and other medicine men (Waite, 2000: 236) 
Therefore, the direct attack of African traditional knowledge under the auspices of 
religion “changed the body of knowledge, beliefs and customs of African 
communities thereby resulting in the neglect and peripherisation of traditional 
knowledge, values, norms and practices” (Trosper, 2011: 379). 
The ideological imputation of such an approach was bent on ensuring that 
domination and abuse of resources extended to all realms of social life of the 
Africans. The denigration of African traditional knowledge was achieved through a 
successive regeneration of an ideology that had been formulated by Justinian 
during the 6th century A.D, which was meant overthrow the mastery of African 
knowledge. The dominant ruling class influenced the ideological discourses, which 
in turn created a context of cultural preferences that seem to support the 







3.5. THE DIALECTICAL IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON AFRICAN TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE (1800 – 1960) 
 
The imperialist notions of knowledge misappropriation reproduced themselves in 
the 19th and 20th Century during the colonisation and conquest of Africa by 
European states, who had the aim of looting anything that was within their scope 
of influence. In essence colonial Africa, “became a laboratory of caprice where all 
sorts of clinical trials (political, social, and cultural) were performed, causing 
untold suffering to African communities, whose effects still remain visible to this 
present moment” (Wanda, 2010: 4). The riotous dialectical inter-phase of 
colonialism to a larger extent destroyed Africa’s intellectual, while leaving a 
legateship that foisted western thought and cultural realities of Africans (Wanda, 
2013b: 4). African resources including their traditional knowledge were 
misappropriated under the auspices of them being raw materials for scientific 
exploration in European orientated laboratories (Hountondji, 1997).  
The regeneration of the imperialist notions of knowledge misappropriations in 
Africa can be traced back to Napoleon Bonaparte,  who in 1799 accompanied with 
the French army embarked on the Egyptian expedition with the aim to collect 
scientific information and artifacts from the ancient land of Egypt (Jordan, 2003). 
With his army was a party of 300 men of science and letters whose objective was 
to record the culture of Egypt (Russell & Russell, 2003: 1). Though the Egyptian 
expedition was a military failure for Napoleon, the accompanying scientific 
expedition uncovered the Rosetta stone in Rashid, an artifact that became the 
foundational basis for the study of Egyptology. After the discovery of the Rosetta 
Stone, a knowledge imperialist rivalry ensued between Britain and France which 
opened up Egyptian knowledge and culture to looting and plunder. The zenith of 
such misappropriations reached their greatest heights during the uncovering of the 
tomb of Tutankhamen in 1922 (Reid, 1985). It has been argued that deciphering of 
the Rosetta stone in 1822 by Jean Champollion, represented the first victory of the 
West in its cannibalisation of African knowledge and civilisation (Hassan, 2003). 
Therefore, the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte was essential for the new 
colonial paradigm of victimisation as possession of the antiques of Egypt by 




Furthermore, the colonisation of Africa saw the westernisation of African 
knowledge systems. For instance, when the British invaded Egypt they were: 
 Initially not concerned principally with military and economic power over 
Egypt but the knowledge of the orients…the objective was to have such 
knowledge about the “distant other” in order to able to dominate it (exert 
authority over it). This in effect meant denying the autonomy of knowledge 
over the object of domination since to do so would have recognised the 
existence of knowledge over object itself. The objects existence could only 
be recognised in the world of colonial representatives in as much as we 
know it (Said, 1992: 87). 
As consequence, western knowledge tried to establish hegemony within an African 
cultural set up dominated by African religions and practices. Such an approach had 
scathing implications to traditional knowledge because the imposition of a 
knowledge system that is alien to the other is bound to cause harm (Magaisa, 
2007). Immediately contestations between the two knowledge regimes flared, as 
traditional communities fought to maintain the place and relevance of their 
knowledge (Magaisa, 2007). The ideological battle between the two knowledge 
regimes manifested itself through the wars fought between the traditional 
communities and the early European settlers.  
African traditional practices represented a source of power and resistance to 
European colonisation. Traditional healers and Spirit mediums played the dominant 
role against the intrusion of European culture within their communities. As a 
means to suppress such resistance besides the use of repressive means, the 
religious doctrine as developed during the witchcraft craze was reproduced to 
label African traditional practices as devilish and the traditional healer as the devil 
incarnate. However, traditional knowledge was consequently side lined or 
marginalised not because it was archaic or backward, but because western 
knowledge was propped up and supported by other factors that sought to establish 







3.5.1. Role of colonial laws in marginalising traditional knowledge 
 
Colonial legislation as a repressive and ideological state apparatus played a 
significant role in suppressing the significance of traditional knowledge in colonial 
Africa. Ideologically the law facilitated the process of assimilation and integration 
of the subject nations into the overall ideological realms of the oppressive 
intellectual property regime.  The Berlin Act of 1885 formalised the Europe’s 
scramble for Africa (Peacock, 2013b) and the liberation of the ‘Dark Continent’ 
which consequently resulted as Keevy (2008) put it “in the European 
cannibalisation of Africa” (cited in Peacock, 2013b: 5) 
Accordingly, upon the ratification of the Berlin Act, imperialist European nations 
declared through their respective national legislation that the operational ambit of 
their intellectual property laws and treaties would extend to all their colonies. As 
a result, “non-western societies, principally Africa were swept under the aegis of 
the international intellectual property system through the agency of colonial rule” 
(Okediji, 2003: 316). The effect and consequence of such an approach meant that 
all the ills associated with patents or copyright (See Section 3.3. of this chapter for 
an in-depth discussion of the challenges associated with the intellectual property 
system) were automatically extended to “his majesty’s colonies and plantations 
abroad” (Bently, 2011: 163). In French colonies, African natives were treated as 
subjects of French colonial rule, a policy which included political integration 
through the direct application of French law within French territories (Betts & 
Asiwaju, 1990).  
Two ideological objectives dominated the integration of imperial intellectual 
property law in Africa. Firstly, it was to safe guard the interests of the metro-pole 
right holders who wanted to control knowledge production in colonial markets 
(Peukert, 2012) and secondly, to exclusively exclude and marginalise traditional 
knowledge from gaining prominence over western knowledge. Early on in this 
chapter (see Section 3.4) it was discussed that religious factors played a dominant 
role in exclusion and subjugation of European folklore and traditional knowledge in 
preference for scientific based evidence that was supported by the intellectual 




Africa was meant to secondarily reproduce the witchcraft trials that haunted 
Europe, in a bid to suppress the practice of traditional knowledge. 
The repressive state apparatus of the colonial governments enacted oppressive 
laws that criminalised the practice traditional knowledge. These laws found their 
expression in the notorious Witchcraft Suppression Acts64, enacted across the 
African continent.  The general running ideology of the witchcraft legislation 
aimed to punish anyone who claimed to have knowledge about healing herbs 
through labeling that practice as witchcraft, despite the fact that most herbs had 
nothing to do witchcraft. Furthermore, the definition of witchcraft was vague, as 
it was defined as “the throwing of bones, the use of charms,65 and any other 
means or devices adopted in the practice of sorcery” (Chavunduka, 1980). In the 
definition there was nothing that referred to witchcraft, thus the enacted 
legislation had the prime objective to witch-hunt those who practiced traditional 
knowledge. The severity of the legislation did not only affect the practitioners but 
also people who consulted and patronised the ‘witchdoctors’ for their services66.   
The operational ambit of these laws, included the consistent inferiorisation of 
traditional cultures, concerted efforts to erase existing systems of knowledge and 
their replacement with western-driven belief and knowledge systems(Osman, 
2010). The implementation of these laws  “successfully culminated in, the absolute 
submission of the communities and stigmatisation of their knowledge systems with 
the consequence that most of the communities were trapped in a design that 
perpetuated their own subjugation” (Progler, 1999: 1) through “western 
education, christianisation, and degeneration of relatively self-sufficient 
economies into dependent consumers” (Eyong, 2005: 131). Briefly, the laws were 
the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of the power of an alien state and 
an instrument of coercion, which conceptualised new relationships and power 
against African traditional communities and their associated knowledge. 
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3.5.2. Impact of the western educational systems on african traditional 
knowledge 
 
The educational ideological state apparatus of the colonial governments played a 
significant role in the exclusion of traditional knowledge from the main 
institutional structures of knowledge production. Through the institution of 
education, the colonisers managed to inoculate the African population with the 
notion that traditional knowledge had no practical application in the real world 
because it lacked scientific backing (a structured process that was used to exclude 
certain types of knowledge from the realms of intellectual property). For instance 
in 1938 a cleric called Father Shropshire highlighted that,  
Not until a truly Christian and scientific education has corrected the 
balance of the present native psychological complex and enabled the 
Africans to meet their phobias with critical mind ... will they throw away 
the beliefs in magic and sorcery (cited in Chavunduka, 1994: 7).  
The colonial education discourse supported by religious institutions undermined 
the importance of traditional knowledge and practices as the youth were taught 
that “their parents religious beliefs, cultural practices and traditions were 
superstitious, backwards, inferior and lacking supporting scientific empirical 
evidence” (Trosper, 2011: 379).   
The colonial education system hampered and interfered with the traditional 
education systems as it sought to replace African traditional knowledge with 
European knowledge. The system excluded the traditional ways of learning and 
much of the content was foreign to the traditional communities (Magaisa, 2007). 
The net effect of the colonial educational discourse created new African elite, 
whereof most of them were educated at mission schools, consequently expressed 
disdain of in African traditional culture as they were deeply seated in the European 
way of doing things (Waite, 2000). However, the risk of them reverting to their 
traditional norms and values was so high to the extent that the missionary 
educators ensured that they do not relapse back to the traditional system. In 
commenting in their 1934 Southern Rhodesia’s Annual review, a Salvation Army 




to prevent their people [African converts], when sick, being doctored by the 
heathen67” 
3.5.3. Cultural violence   
 
In a bid to sanctify western knowledge as the preferred form of knowledge over 
traditional knowledge the colonial governments, denigrated traditional knowledge 
as an embodiment of witchcraft and the devilish practices (Chavunduka, 1994). 
The colonial governments presented western knowledge as “scientific” and 
attached the “unscientific” tag to traditional knowledge as it was deemed not be 
verifiable through western procedures of knowledge production. To put this 
argument into perspective, reference ought to be given to one of the 
Parliamentary debates that were made in colonial Zimbabwe, whereof a motion 
was introduced to recognise African traditional medicine as a legitimate form of 
knowledge. The response from the then Speaker of Parliament left a lot to be 
desired as he averred that, “we should not encourage the use of these primitive 
remedies . . . either in the local market or in an export market68”. 
Such notions where derived from the basic premise that the traditional African way 
of life was uncivilised, barbaric and primitive (Arewa, 2006). These statements 
were not merely descriptive of the nature of the subject matter but were 
assertions of power and superiority of those making the descriptions” (Magaisa, 
2007: 10). 
The knowledge and power nexus … generates inequalities and domination 
by the way such knowledge is generated and structured, the way it is 
legitimised and alternatives are delegitimised, and by the way in which 
such knowledge transforms nature and society. Power is also built into the 
perspective which views the dominant system not as a globalised local 
tradition, but as a universal tradition, inherently superior to local systems  
(Shiva, 1993: 2) 
The western knowledge system sought to establish a monopoly whereof it was to 
be the only recognised system of knowledge while it relegated and denigrated 
African traditional knowledge as a superstition. Ultimately, “western scientific 
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knowledge breeds a monoculture of the mind by making space for local 
alternatives disappear … very much like monocultures of introduced plant varieties 
lead to the disappearance and destruction of local diversity” (Shiva 1993: 83).  
The dominant monoculture in which the western knowledge system sought to 
establish hegemony extended to all spheres of society. In commenting on the 
exclusionary polemics of western knowledge over traditional knowledge, a 
commentator mentioned that:  
Opposition to traditional medicine was very strong among the missionaries, 
colonial officials, doctors and nurses who laid the foundation of western 
medical services in colonial Africa. The champions of western, medicine 
took various measures against traditional medicine, such as seeking to 
undermine its legitimacy through the mission schools, organizing their own 
professional organizations which could censure colleagues who referred 
patients to traditional doctors, and insulting patients who used traditional 
medicine. People could be fired if they missed work while undertaking 
traditional medical treatment, but those who were treated by western 
doctors could submit certificates and letters attesting to this (Waite, 2000: 
238). 
Consequently, colonial institutions participated in the segregation of traditional 
knowledge. As Althusser (2006) highlighted that ideology transcends all 
government and private institutions, thus making them ideological state apparatus 
of the bourgeoisies. The ideological nemesis of the ‘dominant western knowledge’ 
infiltrated all institutions from religion, parliament, medical institutions and 
schools in a well-orchestrated agenda to marginalise traditional knowledge.  
5.3.4. Linguistic imperialism 
 
The exclusion and marginalisation of traditional knowledge within colonial Africa 
even extended to discursive practices of the institutional apparatus of the colonial 
governments. The imperialist governments attacked African indigenous languages, 
as language was recognised as the main repository for traditional knowledge 
systems, whereof traditional knowledge was stored and transmitted by oral 
means69 (Magaisa, 2007).  
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Colonial African communities through duress were coerced to master the languages 
of the imperialist European nations and apply same in their studies and 
communication. Ngugi (1986: 6) put this argument into perspective when he stated 
that, “one of the most humiliating experiences was to be caught speaking Gikuyu 
[local language] in the vicinity of the school. The culprit was given corporal 
punishment – three to five strokes of the cane on bare buttock”. European 
language became a dominant language and while the indigenous languages were 
only limited to domestic use.  
The net effect for the marginalisation of indigenous language in every day social 
life ensured that the latter lost its space thereby restricting its use, which 
consequently affected the transmission of traditional knowledge orally from one 
generation to another. An analysis of this phenomenon made African communities 
to, “see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement thereby making them 
want to distance themselves from the wasteland. It makes them want to identify 
with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance with other 
people’s languages rather than their own” (Ngugi 1986: 5).Language imperialism 
thereby became a way of marginalising traditional knowledge from the lives of the 
African communities.  
5.3.5. Notions of colonial traditional knowledge victimisation 
 
The introduction of the western knowledge system in Africa was more of an 
ideological construct rather than as a structural imputation. It sought to domineer 
over the knowledge and cultural heritage of traditional communities while at the 
same instance replacing the former with its own cultural preferences. The need to 
identify traditional knowledge misappropriation and victimisation of its holders 
within the domains of colonisation is very imperative as it allows one to 
understand the context within which current traditional knowledge victimisations 
apparently exhume themselves. The victimisation of traditional knowledge holders 
in Africa transcends beyond the intellectual property system, as the question for 
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knowledge imperialism is more of a question of cultural domination. The words of 
Hall (1994) would put this argument into perspective:  
All I could think of was the arrogance that had gone unnoticed. It had been 
taken for granted not only that our system as the best and the most 
sensible one in the world, but that we had a right to impose it on anyone in 
our power. I now know, however-lest I appear to be unnecessarily hard on 
my fellow countrymen-with the benefit bestowed by years, that it isn't just 
my own culture but all cultures that act in these ways. Each culture has its 
own reasons and rationalizations for forcing its way on others. (Hall, 1994: 
70) 
It would be misleading therefore to argue that the origins of the victimisation of 
traditional knowledge communities are purely associated with colonialism and 
integration of intellectual property into Africa during the 19th century. The 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge and the victimisation of the possessors 
of the knowledge is one that originated when the Persians invaded Egypt in 525 
B.C.  
Colonialism and intellectual property are merely an extension and reproduction of 
the forms knowledge imperialism. Colonialism is but a structure of the imperialist 
ideology. In that light, colonialism created conditions that furthered the 
imperialist agenda of knowledge misappropriations in Africa, while intellectual 
property set up the frameworks, which facilitated the former. The institutional 
framework meant to serve the ballooning commercial interests of the Europeans 
within colonial Africa while at the same instance segregating traditional 
knowledge. It is however, difficult to understand the role intellectual property 
plays within the overall knowledge imperialist notions without a historical 
perspective on how it was introduced into Africa. 
Therefore, the victimisation of traditional communities within the intellectual 
property realm is one that cannot be purely understood at a local level. It is one 
that ought to be explored from a regional and international perspective, as the 
latter and the former determine the material conditions of their existence at a 
local level (Gramsci, 1971). In trying to grasp this reality there is need to see how 
Africa in its totality was interpellated into the overall hegemonic international 




3.6. POST-COLONIAL EXCLUSIONARY POLEMICS OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
(1961 – 1994) 
 
After the independence of most African states in 1960, the dominant imperialist 
ideology regenerated itself within post-colonial Africa. Despite the independence, 
most African are still reliant on “ western political constructs, socio-legal ideas 
and judicial and epistemological philosophies” (Wanda, 2013b: 4).  
3.6.1. Robust integration of africa into the international knowledge economy 
 
After the independence, most African states were automatically integrated into 
the international intellectual property system without even negotiating for their 
participation in such. For instance, international intellectual property treaties such 
as the Berne and Paris Convention had declaratory clauses which provided for the 
continued adherence of countries to the Convention despite change of government 
(Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005). Furthermore, the Berne Convention did not have a 
mechanism that distinguished independent states from colonial states. Therefore, 
International law set the: 
… conditions of application, it being left to the former colonial states to fit 
them within the framework of their national laws. When the present state 
separates from the colonies or overseas territory and grants its 
independence, continuity must be normally assumed, the new state must 
continue to benefit from the advantage provided by the convention in 
question and remain bound by the obligations derived from it…This 
continuity is all the more necessary as the right acquired by third parties 
must be safeguarded (Ricketson & Ginsburg, 2005: 806). 
In other words, African states were subjected to obligations of adherence, which 
consequently contributed to the inheritance of an intellectual property system 
that did not service the interests of African traditional knowledge. On the 
converse, it protected the interests of former colonial masters. Formalism glossed 
over the purpose and functions of the intellectual property system in Africa 
legitimised a process by which African countries inherited colonial legislation, 
firmly secured under the guise of international law divorced from the domestic 




Congo Brazzaville raised such concerns in 1960 during the 11th session of the United 
Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organisation whereof it highlighted that 
the intellectual property system never met the needs of Africa, as “the legislation 
that was derived from European Countries did not reflect the problems [the real 
existential conditions] of Africa.70 The continued adherence of newly independent 
African states to the intellectual property system that supported the western 
knowledge model amounted to inheriting a system that had marginalised 
traditional knowledge during the colonial era. However, dismantling the ghosts of 
the colonial regime was a complex process as reproduction of the knowledge 
imperialist ideology was facilitated by the “classical international legal system 
that consolidated the state sovereign as the only subject of international law and 
extended a proceduralised order to the universal application of civilisation as an 
expression of European enlightenment” (Kennedy, 1997: 569). Consequently, the 
recognition of individuals and communities together with their associated 
traditional knowledge at a local level was impugned by such a doctrine that only 
recognised states rather than traditional communities and their values. 
Furthermore, after the independence of most African states in 1960, traditional 
knowledge remained in the peripheries of western knowledge because colonialism 
assimilated African systems and institutions into the exploitative western model. 
Therefore, de-colonialisation literary restructured the context of engagement 
between Europe and Africa as the transition from subjects to independent states 
was mediated by western created international institutions (Anghie, 2001). To 
surmise the foregoing the words of Crabb (1970: 32 -33) are worth noting: 
To a substantial degree, independence in Africa has involved principally a 
formal change of leadership at the top rather than a reordering of the 
structure of the society. It has not altered the fundamental structures of 
these legal systems or the nature of the relationship between their 
European and customary parts. Colonial laws governing the juridical 
systems were merely replaced by national institutions and statutes 
containing similar dispositions. Still, this transition has caused varying 
degrees of disruptions and difficulty. 
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The words of Althusser (1977) are relevant in this assessment where he highlight 
that, every social revolution does not ipso facto transform the ideology and 
structures of the previous order because they have their own consistency and 
history that allows them to transform, recreate and establish secrete conditions 
beyond their immediate context. Gramsci (2000) supported this observation when 
he highlighted that the establishment of hegemony over subject nations is a 
continuous process, facilitated by an international structure. Therefore, the 
transition from colonialism to political independence did not alter the instruments 
that perpetuated structural and institutional victimisation of traditional knowledge 
communities in Africa. On the converse, these institutions and structures 
reproduced oppression and social imbalances that previously haunted traditional 
knowledge communities. 
3.6.2. Dependence on the western ideational education system 
 
The major objective for the integration of independent African States into the 
intellectual property system was designed to meet the interests of Western 
countries that were the net exporters of intellectual works.71 On this backcloth, 
the recently de-colonised African States were struggling to invest “heavily in 
education, and especially in the training of scientists and technicians” (Merson, 
2000: 283). However, the education systems that the countries had inherited from 
their former colonial masters largely followed western notions of academia. 
Accordingly, the newly independent African States thus became heavily reliant on 
western methods and textbooks of education thereby making them consumers of 
imported academic literature. Research institutions sprouted all over the continent 
which too relied on the import substitution schemes for the transfer of industrial 
technology (Merson, 2000).  
The hegemony of Western knowledge systems entrenched itself into the roots of 
learning in Africa together with all its associated ravages of the contemporary 
knowledge imperialism and the capitalist globalisation (Zeleza, 2006). One scholar 
highlighted the extent of the proliferation of western knowledge system: 
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…it is everywhere, dominating the disciplinary and interdisciplinary 
discourses and departments, paradigms and publications, academic politics 
and practices (Zeleza,2006: 197). 
The western ideologies were entrenched into the academic world, to the extent 
that some African scholars, “who were exposed to Eurocentric education denied 
the existence of African philosophy during the great debate of the 1960’s and 
1970’s” (Nwala, 1992: 5). It was their argument that Africa could not create any 
tradition of philosophy if they did not integrate it into western philosophy.  
A further challenge was that, access to textbooks was inhibited by the copyright 
regime, which made these literary and artistic texts very expensive. Instead of 
addressing the challenges, African states internalised and further entrenched the 
Western model of learning during the African Copyright Symposium held in Congo 
Brazaville from the 5th to the 10th of August 1963 where they recommended to 
Western nations that 
African countries be permitted to respect their own folklore on the 
other hand and permitting on the other the free use of protected works 
for educational and school purposes (emphasis of the author). 
The internalisation of western knowledge system by African States provided a 
minimum opportunity for traditional knowledge ways of knowing to find their way 
into the academia curricula. In other words, the newly independent African States 
adopted the colonial discourse that labelled traditional knowledge as inferior and 
invaluable to knowledge production and dissemination. The adoption of the 
western knowledge regime can be viewed as a bid to “turn an illiterate African 
from someone who is illiterate from the alphabet, to an absolute ignorant, pitting 
what is not written to be thoughtless and primitive, a theme which has been 
central to the disempowerment of traditional knowledge” (Hountonji, 1997:33). 
To surmise the foregoing argument the words of Hoppers (2002), are central in 
appreciating the extent to which the post-colonial education system segregated 
and marginalised traditional knowledge while at the same instance the African 
population was made a victim to such a policy. The reliance on western ways of 
knowing by and large rendered African knowledge irrelevant by colonialism and 




3.6.3. Culturally rootless African state 
 
Most post-colonial governments in Africa are not rooted in the cultural traditions of 
the communities from which they assume legitimacy. They are driven by modernity 
and cultural benchmarks of western societies. Such cultural alienation of African 
governments, is as a consequence of western imperialist ideology which instils an, 
“allergic instinct or reaction against African cultural rootedness, which is 
castigated as backward, ignorant, superstitious, primitive, and parochial” (Wanda, 
2013b: 6). Resultantly African governments have become non-organic thereby 
making them more incapable of addressing the traditional knowledge needs of 
their communities. 
Mandaza (1999), confirms these assertions when he argued that African states have 
become a mere extension of Europe. The basis of his argument is that the 
emergence of the petit or the compradorian bourgeoisie through the politics of 
reconciliation allowed the latter to forgive their oppressors in exchange of state 
power without the fulfilment of social justice and social transformation of the 
majority (Mandaza, 1999). As a result, the African state became a hostage state, 
as “old relations of exploitation and unequal structures remained in exchange of 
state power” (Mandaza, 1999: 81). 
Resultantly, within the premises of traditional knowledge the African post-colonial 
state creates an enabling environment for traditional knowledge exploitation, 
whereof the former imperialists “implant higher technologies to supplant local 
based traditional inventions thus destroying home grown technology” (Coetzee, 
2001: 624). In the process, the dominant international capital strips former 
colonial states of their resources and uses them to their own development. 
Such a phenomenon explains the current traditional knowledge misappropriations 
that have hogged most African states, where the abuse of traditional based 
innovations have been used to profiteer international based corporates. Cases of 
misappropriation and patenting of the Hoodia cactus in South Africa and that of 
the Rose Periwinkle in Madagascar immediately come to mind (See Chapter 1 for 
an extensive discussion on how this traditional knowledge has been 




The misappropriation of these traditional remedies was to some extent facilitated 
by the silence of the respective governments despite widespread outrage against 
such misappropriations. The ideological prejudices against traditional knowledge 
further facilitated the neglect of the importance of traditional knowledge. 
 3.6.4. Ideological prejudices to traditional knowledge 
 
Traditional knowledge in post-colonial Africa has remained in the margins of 
western knowledge as it has been constantly been referred to as informal 
knowledge (Hountondji, 2002a). This process has contributed to the stifling of 
traditional knowledge by the law. For instance in 1965 Benin a law was passed to 
prohibiting the production of locally produced Palm Oil wine purely on the basis 
that the processes of making such wine included cutting down palm trees 
(Hountondji, 2002a).  
These prejudices have also been produced at an international level whereof the 
protection of traditional knowledge is regarded imperative yet it is undermined by 
the international institutional ideological frameworks. For instance, questions 
about how to protect of traditional knowledge in post-colonial Africa came to the 
fore in 1960 during the 11th session of the United Nations Economic Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation. At this conference, it was recognised that the intellectual 
property system never met the needs of Africa as “the legislation that was derived 
from European Countries did not reflect the problems of Africa”.72 Based on such 
an agenda African Countries pushed for the recognition and protection of 
traditional knowledge in the Berne Convention, which is an international treaty 
that protects copyright in literary and artistic works. 
However, Ringer (1967) a participant in the Berne Revisions observed that the 
latter: 
Paid a great deal of lip service to the interests of developing countries … 
the attitude of developed Berne members was full of apathetic resignation 
and futility. They exhibited a notable lack of leadership and of affirmative 
actions (Ringer, 1967: 1067) 
                                                          
72
 See Report on the Working Party on the Development of United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation activities in Tropical Africa. 11 C/PRG/20. 5 December 1960. Paris. Page 9. Document also 




The Berne Revisions resulted in an obscure Article 15(4) of the Stockholm Act, 
which allowed a member country to secure some international protection for its 
unpublished works of folklore by filing a declaration with the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (Ringer, 1968). The practical effect of this provision is by no 
means clear, but it would presumably not require a country to protect foreign 
works that it would consider in its own public domain (Ringer,1968). The vagueness 
of the resultant article effectively did not have any binding effect on Berne Union 
Countries, thus making the folklore provision as proposed by Africa states a brutum 
fulmen (paper bulldog). Therefore, the Berne revisions of 1967 were used as a 
platform for the alienation of the African interests in traditional knowledge 
(Spinello, 2009) as they re-organised the way within which industrially developed 
nations assimilated the creative labour of traditional knowledge communities from 
African countries. The glaring vagueness of the folklore provision was an act of 
imperialism within the knowledge domain, which was meant to give an impression 
that something had been done to cater for the African interests while in reality it 
maintained the status quo.  
The same ideological prejudices towards the non-protection of traditional 
knowledge can also be seen within article 8 (j) Convention of Bio-Diversity (CBD) 
which mandates member states to provide protection to knowledge that is 
associated with genetic resources and bio-diversity. Clearly the Convention does 
not expressly call for protection of traditional knowledge but it generally proffers 
tools which are driven by the underlying objective (Muller, 2013). Therefore, the 
protection of traditional knowledge is inferred. Furthermore, the protection of the 
knowledge that is associated with genetic resources and biodiversity has a qualifier 
that subjects it to state protection, a state that is non-organic to the cultural 
preferences of African society. 
The ineffectiveness of the CBD becomes more apparent upon a cursory analysis of 
Article 16 (5) of the Convention, which highlights that, “…patents may have an 
influence on the implementation of this convention”. The curious side effect of 
this provision is, considering the immense role that is played by intellectual 
property in the Biotechnology industry in genetic resources, why would the 




comes from the background that there is research that has confirmed that patent 
regime is  intrusive and exploitative with regards to traditional knowledge 
(Kadidal, 1993; Roht-Arriaza, 1995). Deductive reasoning would advise that the 
inclusion of the provision in the Convention, “clearly shows that the drafters of the 
Convention deliberately subordinated the interests of conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity to the often competing interests of industry.” (Mgbeor, 2001: 
168). 
The marginalisation of traditional knowledge became more apparent within the 
Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPs), adopted 
in 1994. It established global minimum standards on the protection of intellectual 
property world over. Supported by global capitalism the TRIPs agreement 
reproduced gross inequalities between the rich nations and the poor nations (May, 
2013). In light to the question traditional knowledge the TRIPs agreement created 
structures that permitted corporate ethno botanists to rifle through the shaman’s 
bag in search for pharmaceutical miracles (Aoki, 1998). For instance Article 27 (3) 
(b) of the TRIPs Agreement permits member states to protect plant varieties either 
by patents or any other sui generis means. This provision allows for the 
misappropriation of traditional based genetic resources that lie within traditional 
communities. Therefore, instead of protecting traditional knowledge the TRIPS 
permits piracy of such traditional based genetic resources through the use of 
intellectual property. 
It is from this basis that the TRIPs agreement has been attacked as one of the 
international treaties that does not respond to the innovative trends of indigenous 
communities (Weeraworawit, 2003) because it reflects and represents western 
knowledge values (OseiTutu, 2011). The globalised protectionist model as is 
introduced by the TRIPs  agreement has further been criticised for its ability to use 
intellectual property law to expand into other societal domains and cultural 
objects that permit the subjection of the latter to misappropriation and use it at a 
global scale without paying benefits to the knowledge generating communities 
(OseiTutu, 2011).  
However, attempts were made in the year 2001 to reconcile the brazen 




Convention for Bio-Diversity73 through the adoption of the Doha Declaration (2001. 
However, since the declaration was passed in 2001, no progress has been made in 
the amendment of the TRIPs Agreement to accommodate the protection of 
traditional knowledge. While a plethora of proposals have been submitted for the 
protection of traditional knowledge under the TRIPs Agreement, such proposals 
have met fierce opposition from countries like the Republic of Korea, the United 
States, Japan, Canada and Australia who have been arguing that the issue should 
be discussed at WIPO (Adede, 2003). Ironically, these are the same states that 
refused during the TRIPS negotiations, for trade related intellectual property 
issues to be discussed at WIPO. 
The way the TRIPs Agreement is structured makes it difficult for traditional 
knowledge communities to claim any intellectual property rights over the 
unmediated products of their traditional knowledge. As a result, traditional 
knowledge is consigned to the global commons. This produces a striking imbalance 
whereof the ‘creations of the mind’ of modern science are considered property 
and eligible for the full panoply of TRIPs protections, while the ‘creations of the 
mind’ of traditional communities are not (Bratspies, 2007). When goods and 
services are made possible by combining traditional knowledge with western 
science, the contributor of the western scientific thinking is entitled to patent 
protection; a recognition of his or her property interest in creations of the mind 
under the TRIPs Agreement while the contributor of traditional knowledge is 
entitled to nothing (Bratspies, 2007). At its worst, the TRIPs legitimises the 
transfer of exclusive ownership and control of biological resources and traditional 
knowledge from traditional innovators to western ones, with no recognition, 
reward or protection for the contributions of the traditional innovators (Bratspies, 
2007). Thus, in the definitional moment itself, the TRIPs Agreement excludes 
indigenous innovation about biological diversity from what will be property in this 
new globalised legal world.  
By defining property to exclude the resources of traditional communities while 
including what is developed from those resources, this vision of property 
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reconstructs the cycle of victimisation that was at the heart of colonialism. The 
TRIPs Agreement has to date proven itself resistant to accommodating and 
protecting traditional knowledge within the hyper-owned world it has created. The 
fate that apparently seems to have been suffered by traditional knowledge holders 
through the TRIPS Agreement concerning the protection of traditional Knowledge 
seems to have influenced proceedings regarding the protection of genetic 
resources, traditional knowledge and folklore at the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO IGC). The impasse that has been reached at the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation Intergovernmental committees is clear 
reflection of the imperialist notions on the non-need to protect traditional 
knowledge. The conflicting positions between “industrialised countries and 
industrialising countries is based on the utility of addressing the concerns of 
traditional knowledge holders by creating new legal rights” (OseiTutu, 2011: 174). 
Developing countries tend to support traditional knowledge protection while the 
industrialised countries are more hesitant. For instance, in its response to a 2007 
WIPO questionnaire, the United States conveyed its reluctance to move forward on 
international legal protection for traditional knowledge (Kuruk, 2006). 
3.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The misappropriation of traditional knowledge in Africa is one that that needs to 
be understood with a historical context of knowledge imperialism and colonial 
capitalism. The clash of cultures between the traditional knowledge and western 
knowledge systems, has contributed to the victimisation of traditional knowledge 
holders not only in a colonial context but also in a post-colonial framework. The 
intellectual property system supported by ideological state apparatus has further 
entrenched the marginalisation of traditional knowledge with the knowledge 
realm. The next chapter shall explore whether the factors that contributed to the 
exclusion and marginalisation of traditional knowledge, are existent with the 
traditional knowledge frameworks in Africa. Such analyses will assist in developing 
a conceptual framework that is better suited to address the needs of traditional 






TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION IN AFRICA: A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
CARTELS 
When plunder and looting becomes a way of life for a group of men living in 
society, they create for themselves in the course of time a legal system that 
authorizes it and a moral code that glorifies it (Bastiat, 1873) 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The regional institutional apparatus for the protection of traditional knowledge in 
Africa were crafted in response to the misappropriation nemesis which is 
estimated to be at more than US$ 5 billion per year (Visser, 2004). The response 
has more often been characterised by ‘laws’ and ‘incentives’, which resemble ‘a 
carrot and stick dichotomy’ that reigns in on those who misappropriate traditional 
knowledge while at the same instance creating an enabling environment for 
traditional knowledge value maximisation and equitable access benefit sharing of 
the proceeds. The steps adopted for the protection of traditional knowledge in 
Africa are commendable as they represent an initiative in the field. However, the 
encroachment of intellectual property rights74 and western epistemologies within 
the perceived ‘new’ regulatory framework raises concerns that it might 
consequently contribute to the commodification and fetishisation of traditional 
knowledge.75 The approach adopted towards the protection of traditional 
knowledge in Africa represents a ritualisation of the law where it is systematically 
used to create a false consciousness, under the guise of addressing the needs of 
traditional knowledge holders.  
In addition, the history of knowledge protection has demonstrated that regardless 
of how detailed, specific, monitored or enforced the rules and incentives are; 
knowledge misappropriations flare the ideological prejudices that have haunted 
knowledge producers. These ideological prejudices are entrenched in the 
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perceived ‘new’ institutional apparatus thus perpetuating and internalising the 
subjugation and victimisation of knowledge producers. As a consequence the 
current traditional knowledge framework in Africa represents a case where 
traditional knowledge holders are “exploited and mystified to the extent that they 
have been made accomplices for their executioners” (Hountondji, Evans & Rée, 
1996: 170). 
4.2. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE PROTECTION IN AFRICA 
 
The framework for the protection of traditional knowledge in Africa is constituted 
at two levels, notably at a national level and at a regional level. At a national 
level, only two countries have adopted legislation that expressly protects 
traditional knowledge, namely Ethiopia and Zimbabwe. However, such national 
legislation does not expressly confer protection to traditional knowledge, as it is 
more concerned with matters relating to the preservation of biodiversity and its 
associated community knowledge.  
At a regional level, the African Union (A.U),76 African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organisation (ARIPO),77 and the African Intellectual Property Organisation 
(OAPI),78 adopted regional instruments that protect traditional knowledge in 
Africa. The A.U established a model law to maintain the customary relationship 
between traditional knowledge, genetic resources and various cultural protection 
including rights that are attached to indigenous creations and inventions 
(Frommer, 2002). ARIPO adopted the Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore (Hereinafter referred to as the 
Swakopmund Protocol), which protects traditional knowledge and cultural 
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expressions. On the other hand, the Bangui Agreement governs the protection of 
traditional knowledge under OAPI. 
The highlighted regional instruments are fundamentally incoherent concerning the 
protection of traditional knowledge in Africa. For instance, the ARIPO and OAPI 
legal infrastructure for the protection of traditional knowledge, respectively 
reflect the historical political legacies of the Anglophone and Franco-phone 
institutions of imperialism. Resultantly the ideological formulations of these 
organisations together with the established protectionist mechanisms of traditional 
knowledge do not strictu sensu reflect African realities and conditions about 
traditional knowledge protection. One can therefore assume that the regional 
initiatives towards the effective protection of traditional knowledge tend to fail on 
the basis that its formulation is a transposition of colonial heritage and intellectual 
imperialism; factors that have been at the core of the peripherisation of 
traditional knowledge in Africa. 
On that basis, a critical examination of the regional measures that have been 
adopted for the protection of traditional knowledge is imperative as activities at a 
regional level more often than not, “influence the development of  national laws 
in most African States” (Arowolo, 2009: 2). Therefore, for the purposes of this 
thesis, this chapter shall critically analyse and examine whether the historical 
factors that contributed to the marginalisation of traditional knowledge in Africa 
are manifest within the current institutional regimes that protect traditional 
knowledge in Africa. In pursuance of the stated objective, the following section 
shall explore the factors that contributed to the establishment of the ARIPO 
Swakopmund Protocol and critically examine whether or not it addresses the needs 
and interests of traditional knowledge communities. 
4.3. THE SWAKOPMUND PROTOCOL  
 
The Swakampund Protocol is one of the most detailed regional instruments on the 
protection of traditional knowledge in Africa. The Swakopmund Protocol came into 
effect on the 11th of May 2015, after six member states ratified it in terms of 
Article 27 (3) of the Protocol. However, the development of the Swakopmund 




a process facilitated by WIPO. The consequent structure of the Protocol reflects an 
intellectual property framework, which was adapted to protect traditional 
knowledge. However, the framework was developed without a clear understanding 
of the development of the intellectual property system and the repercussions that 
it inflicted on traditional knowledge communities in Africa. 
To confirm, the veracity of the fore going statement, the following section shall 
explore the factors that contributed to the development of the Swakopmund 
Protocol while critically examining whether or not those factors reproduce the 
vestiges that contributed to the historical marginalisation of traditional knowledge 
in Africa. 
4.3.1. Background of the Swakopmund protocol 
 
The 8th Session of the ARIPO Council of Ministers adopted a resolution for the 
development of regional instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge in 
member states (ARIPO, 2002a). The philosophical foundations for this resolution 
were derived from the research findings of the  Fact Finding Mission of Intellectual 
Property needs for Indigenous Communities, that was conducted by WIPO between 
September 1998 and February 1999 (ARIPO, 2000).  One of the results of the WIPO 
Fact Finding Mission was to “develop an intellectual property framework  for the 
needs of indigenous knowledge holders in order to promote the distribution of the 
intellectual property system to their social, cultural and economic developments” 
(ARIPO, 2000: 1). Based on the generic findings of the WIPO Fact Finding Mission, 
ARIPO resolved to link its initiative for the protection of traditional knowledge 
with that of WIPO, through an active involvement in WIPO’s activities in the field 
of traditional knowledge (ARIPO, 2000).  
The findings of WIPO’s fact-finding mission adopted by ARIPO as the basis for the 
establishment of a regional framework were oblivious to the overall interests and 
needs of traditional knowledge communities within the ARIPO member states. For 
instance, only three countries out of an aggregate number of 21 ARIPO member 
States, namely Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda where visited during the WIPO Fact 
Finding Mission. As such, the findings in these three countries were translated to 




states, which are culturally, politically, socially and economically diverse. 
Furthermore, the adoption of WIPO’s agenda on the protection of traditional 
knowledge by ARIPO translated into the integration of intellectual property 
principles into traditional knowledge protection mechanisms in Africa.79 
Ideologically such an approach is symbiotic of the expansion of the knowledge 
imperialist agenda through the integration of intellectual property, an instrument 
that has been fundamental in the marginalisation and misappropriation of 
traditional knowledge in Africa. This integration is representative of what had 
transpired during the colonisation of Africa; that is the extension of intellectual 
property in colonial territories was primarily to extend the knowledge market and 
secondarily to marginalise traditional knowledge (See Chapter 3.5.1).  
ARIPO failed to take into consideration the historical local conditions underlying 
policy objectives that contributed to the introduction of intellectual property into 
colonial Africa (Adewopo, 2002). In that regard, ARIPO omitted to identify whether 
their approach towards the protection of traditional knowledge as a regional body 
was compatible with the existential conditions in member states. The former 
Prime Minister of Swaziland raised these concerns during the 7th session of the 
ARIPO Council of Ministers when he stated that: 
Where the issue of protection relates to human beings, failure is generally 
the result of conflict and oversight rather than systematic arrangements. 
With such issues as trade, increasing globalization and the benefit of trade 
liberalization has led to moving away from protection as a general rule 
(ARIPO, 2000: 3) 
The Prime Minister of Swaziland inferred that a globalised approach towards the 
protection of traditional knowledge questioned the general notions of the 
traditional knowledge protection, as concepts of trade liberalisation and 
knowledge commercialisation,80 would gradually infiltrate the traditional 
knowledge protection discourse. Therefore, failure by ARIPO to circumscribe to the 
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jurisprudential divergence between traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property signals how the hegemonic ideological dominance of western knowledge 
had a hold during the conceptualisation of the Swakopmund Protocol. 
In that regard, the drafting and development of the Swakopmund Protocol pursued 
WIPO’s intellectual property approach,81 towards the protection of traditional 
knowledge. For instance, in 2006 the Heads of Intellectual Property Offices within 
the ARIPO member states recommended that the draft Protocol should incorporate 
the positions and recommendations of the WIPO IGC (ARIPO, 2006). The focus of 
the WIPO IGC was to explore how intellectual property can be applied to promote 
and protect traditional knowledge and folklore (ARIPO, 2004b). The adoption of 
such a resolution institutionalised the negotiation positions that were being 
advocated within WIPO IGC thereby limiting ARIPO’s ability to adapt to the ever-
changing environment within the field of traditional knowledge. This 
recommendation ensured the alignment of the regional instrument to the 
international discourse of the protection of traditional knowledge while negating 
the interests of traditional knowledge holders who were being victimised. The 
development of the traditional knowledge infrastructure in Africa was thus 
embedded in intellectual property solutions, “which separated traditional 
knowledge from the cultural and spiritual values that establish its collective 
ownership” (Swiderska, 2007: 5) 
Boxed within the general running ideology of the protection of traditional 
knowledge as advocated at the WIPO IGC. WIPO’s influence in the development of 
the Swakampund protocol grew as it was appointed as the technical advisor to 
develop the legislative infrastructure that would facilitate the promotion 
development and use of traditional knowledge (ARIPO, 2004b). Resultantly, WIPO 
developed a policy framework, which extended intellectual property rights 
towards the protection of traditional knowledge (ARIPO, 2005b) 
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The conceptual framework that was developed by WIPO became the basis for the 
development of the legislative framework of the Swakampund protocol (ARIPO, 
2005b). Despite the progressive development of Protocol at a conceptual level, the 
views, interests and aspirations of traditional knowledge holders and communities 
where neither solicited nor taken into consideration. The process that developed 
the Swakopmund Protocol was externally driven, thereby impugning upon the 
rights of self-determination and self-governance of traditional communities. The 
neglect of the views of traditional knowledge holders amounted to victimisation, 
which can only be recognised when identified from the inside. 
Neglect victimisation has its source in institutional apparatus which appropriate 
marginalisation, to create an innocence by locating oppressors outside the body 
politic of victimisation thereby creating a less complicated political image laden 
with internal oppressors and victims (Mackey, 2002). Such an assessment is 
synonymous to the development of the Swakopmund Protocol, which sought to 
identify the oppressors of traditional knowledge holders as western conglomerates 
while in essence its construction entrenched the same concepts of victimisation at 
an ideological level. Consequently, the development of the Swakopmund Protocol 
involuntarily made traditional knowledge holders, the bearers of structures that 
they did not choose to create. 
Furthermore, the dominant role that was played by WIPO in the creation of the 
Protocol allowed the proliferation of western ideologies and epistemologies into 
the protection discourse of the Swakopmund Protocol. The words of Reichman 
(1997) within this context become relevant; whereof he argued that the; 
protectionist appetites of powerful industrial combinations seek to 
successfully capture the legislative and administrative exponents of 
intellectual property policies and holding the interests of traditional 
knowledge holders hostage (Reichman, 1997: 17, 25).  
The role of WIPO in the drafting and development of the Protocol should be 
questioned as the former represents transnational intellectual property regimes 
that erode traditional territorial and political notions of sovereignty (Aoki, 1998). 
Furthermore, WIPO’s sincerity in assisting in the development of the traditional 
knowledge framework casts doubt into the process because it is a collector of 




per cent of its budget does not come from member governments but from patent 
revenues paid through patent applications under the Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(Tauli-Corpuz, 2005). Therefore, WIPO’s independence and neutrality to the issue 
of the protection of traditional knowledge is questionable as its main obligation is 
to ensure that member states adopt and implement intellectual property rights.  
Therefore, the development of the Swakopmund Protocol in its constitutive nature 
leaned towards protection of the intellectual property aspects of traditional 
knowledge and folklore (ARIPO, 2009). The development process of the 
Swakopmund Protocol failed to take into consideration the impact of the legacy of 
colonialism and the power of multi-lateral organisations that have to a significant 
extent created a highly unequal knowledge system. A system where the ‘haves’ 
cling to a legal framework of any knowledge institutional structure to manipulate 
associated knowledge products rather than recognise the need to protect the 
interests of the developers of the knowledge. Consequently, influences of the 
western epistemologies as propagated by WIPO during the development of the 
Swakopmund Protocol weigh in heavily on the content of the Swakopmund 
Protocol.  
4.3.2. Scope and subject matter of protection 
 
The purpose of the Swakopmund protect is to protect traditional knowledge 
holders against any infringement of their rights; to protect expressions of folklore 
against misappropriation, and unlawful use of traditional knowledge beyond their 
traditional context (Martens, 2014). The Protocol recognises the intrinsic value of 
traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore; acknowledges the need to 
respect traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore; and to reward and 
protect the authentic tradition-based creativity of traditional and cultural 
communities. 
The operational scope of the Protocol only applies to the protection of traditional 
knowledge and expressions of folklore. In that, regard the Protocol consciously 
separates traditional knowledge from expressions of folklore as the latter and the 
former are deemed to raise different legal policy issues. The rationale behind the 




different forms of misappropriation thus necessitating specific solutions 
(Wendland, 2006; Zikonda-Kraus, 2012). Hence, the distinction seeks to emphasise 
that the protection of traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore must be 
‘tailored’ to the specific characteristics of such knowledge and expressions (Hinz, 
2011). 
Resultantly, the distinction incorporates different policy options that seek to 
protect traditional knowledge from infringement and misappropriation; misuse and 
unlawful use for expressions of folklore on the other. This distinction suggests that 
expressions of folklore are incapable of being infringed or misappropriated, and 
traditional knowledge is incapable of being misused or exploited (Munyi, 2008). 
The implications of such a distinction are far reaching to the general ambit of the 
protection of traditional knowledge. 
The separation of traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore is contrary to 
the basic notions of traditional knowledge which is deemed to be holistic and 
inextricably linked the life of traditional communities and thus cannot be 
separated (See Paragraph 1.1. of Chapter 1 for an in-depth discussion on the 
definition of traditional knowledge). African traditional communities have 
expressly highlighted that the compartmentalisation of their knowledge into 
distinct categories as is advanced by the Protocol is incongruent with their 
material and spiritual interests: 
Our knowledge cannot be separated into component parts. It should be 
regarded as a single integrated, interdependent whole. We do not award 
different values to different aspects of our heritage and we do not classify 
them into different categories such as ‘scientific’, ‘spiritual’, ‘cultural’, 
‘artistic’ or ‘intellectual’, nor separate elements such as songs, stories, 
science, etc. We also do not differentiate levels of protection to the 
different aspects of our heritage. All aspects are equal and require equal 
respect, safeguarding and protection. (Tauli-Corpuz, 2005: 4) 
The non-responsive nature of the Swakopmund protocol to the needs of traditional 
knowledge communities in Africa represents a case of secondary victimisation 
whereof institutions and laws have adopted discriminatory attitudes and practices 
which do not conform to the interests of victims (Wolhuter, Olley & Denham, 
2008). The Swakopmund Protocol seeks to emphasise on distinct intellectual 




biological and customary law context which sustain them” (Swiderska, 2007: 3). 
This presents a picture which creates a victimisation mode of adaption, which can 
be viewed as an outcome of the imperialist and colonial, “experiences of recurrent 
indignities and multiple deprivations that are associated with capitalism and class 
struggles” (Peacock, 2013a: 346).  
Furthermore, the influence of the intellectual property system, which does not 
necessarily protect the interests of traditional knowledge holders, is apparent in 
operational scope of the Swakopmund Protocol. Intellectual property pursues a 
policy, which distinguishes knowledge into compartments of patents, copyright, 
trademarks and industrial designs among others to ensure that each form of 
knowledge is protected according to its constituent nature. This distinction 
resonates within the Swakopmund Protocol in distinguishing traditional knowledge 
from expressions of folklore.  
In addition, the subtle ideologies of intellectual property are recognisable from the 
fact that the protection of traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore shall 
not be subjected to any form of formalities.82  Therefore, for the purposes of the 
Protocol, protection towards traditional knowledge and expressions of folklore 
shall arise automatically; a conceptual mechanism that is derived from copyright 
law (See Chapter 3 which discusses how copyright protection emerged). The policy 
rationale behind this provision is that the imposition of formalities will create 
boundaries and barriers to access the protection of traditional knowledge. 
In addition, the term ‘protection’ in the Swakopmund Protocol was loosely used, 
because reference to the word ‘protection’ with regards to knowledge products 
refers to the grant of exclusive and exclusionary rights to creators of knowledge 
through intellectual property tools (Muller, 2013). On this basis of the Swakompund 
protocol creates property rights in traditional knowledge and expressions of 
folklore, “a notion which is diametrically opposed to the traditional African 
concept underlying those types of creativity” (Adewopo, 2002:753).  
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The systematic scientific realisation of traditional knowledge as ‘it’, ruled by laws 
influenced by intellectual property to makes its behaviour predictable is contrary 
to the philosophical realisation of traditional knowledge. Traditional knowledge 
should be realised as ‘thou’, imbued with a character of an individual, a presence 
known only in so far as it reveals itself . By virtue of its protean character, 
traditional knowledge thereby becomes more versatile with the capability of being 
applied in different contexts with specialised competence 
4.3.4. Rights awarded to traditional knowledge holders and communities 
 
The Swakopmund Protocol’s rights based model for the protection of traditional 
knowledge borrowed its substance from the global intellectual property 
frameworks. The causative value of the model was facilitated by the development 
praxis of the Swakopmund Protocol whose content was largely influenced by WIPO 
(see section 4.2. of this chapter, which highlights how the intellectual property 
model infiltrated the framework of the Swakopmund Protocol).  
The substantive influence of WIPO is evidenced by Article 7 of the Swakampund 
Protocol, which awards the beneficiaries of traditional knowledge protection the 
exclusive rights to authorise and prevent the exploitation of their knowledge 
without their prior informed consent.83 These rights represent a positive and 
defensive approach to the protection of knowledge, a concept that is a linchpin 
within the conventional intellectual property system. The similarities in the 
wording of article 7 of the Swakopmund Protocol and the rights awarded by the 
intellectual property system become apparent when juxtaposed with Article 16, 26 
and 28 of the TRIPs agreement. These sections generally state that the owner of a 
an intellectual product or process shall have the right prevent third parties not 
having the owner’s consent to make, use, offer for sale, sell, or import the 
product or process.  
The incorporation of ‘intellectual property’ oriented rights in the Swakopmund 
framework is prejudicial to the interests of traditional communities because 
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intellectual property has been identified as the prime mover in the vicitmisation of 
traditional knowledge communities in Africa (See Section 3.6.4. of Chapter 3, 
where it is discussed how the intellectual property system had facilitated the 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge in Africa). Such an approach is contrary 
to the needs and interests of traditional communities who have took exception to 
the use of an intellectual property based archetypal for securing the interests and 
needs of traditional communities. They have argued that; 
instead of traditional communities getting benefits … we have seen 
experiences where indigenous peoples who entered into some kind of an 
intellectual property partnership with biotechnology or pharmaceutical 
firms, ended up as the gatherers of the raw materials for the corporations 
(Tauli-Corpuz, 2005: 8). 
Turning the screw further, an introspection into Article 19,84 reveals that the text 
of this provision is fundamentally inspired by rules relating to copyright law 
(Ngombe, 2011). Article 19 of the Protocol obligates contracting States to provide 
adequate and effective legal and practical measures to ensure acknowledgement 
of the source community, prevent distortions, mutilations, modifications or 
derogatory treatments,85 of expressions of folklore. It further mandates for the 
prevention of false, confusing or misleading indications or indications which would 
suggest an endorsement or linkage with a community and ensure equitable 
remuneration or benefit sharing where use is for gainful intent (Zikonda-Kraus, 
2012). Therefore, the Swakopmund Protocol mandates that member States to 
provide legal and practical measures to prevent certain acts such as reproduction, 
publication, adaption, unauthorised disclosure or public performance86 of 
expressions of folklore without the community’s prior informed consent. 
In reproducing the operational ambit and functionality of the intellectual property 
system, the Swakompund protocol creates exceptions to protection of traditional 
knowledge. Article 11 of the Protocol highlights that the “protection of traditional 
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knowledge shall not be prejudicial to the continued availability of traditional 
knowledge for the practice, exchange, use and transmission of the knowledge by 
its holders within the traditional context”. The rights and exceptions that are 
awarded to the custodians and holders of traditional knowledge are synonymous to 
ones that arise within a conventional intellectual property system. The award of 
these rights amounts to the propertisation of traditional knowledge because the 
definitional scope of property is in most instances accompanied by a “set of rights 
which consist of claims, privileges, powers to exclude and immunities” (Honoré, 
1961: 107).  
The propertisation of traditional knowledge translates into the commodification 
African knowledge resources, a process that alienates traditional knowledge from 
its cultural context. To put this argument into perspective, the protection of 
traditional knowledge through rights which are alien to African culture amounts to 
the disenfranchisement of customary practices that protect traditional knowledge 
within a cultural context. Consequently, the practice of traditional knowledge will 
not be governed by the customary norms that bind society together but it will be 
governed by abstract intellectual property principles that are not culturally rooted 
within the African context. This contributes to the fetishisation of traditional 
knowledge because objects rather than the relational obligations between the 
knowledge and the community will determine relations within that context.  
Therefore, the inclusion of the intellectual property provisions within the Protocol, 
largely permits to the reproduction of discursive practices that contributed to the 
marginalisation of traditional knowledge during the colonial period. An 
understanding on this phenomenon can only be comprehended in the terms of 
Foucault (1977) and Althusser (2006) who argued that it is through discourse that 
oppressive subject positions are formed, invested and reproduced over history to 
allow society to voluntarily participate within a sphere that reproduces unequal 
power relations. Marx (1906) confirmed this phenomenon when he highlighted that 
every revolution does not necessarily create something that is new, as it borrows 
its language, structure and nature from the ghosts of the past that it sought to 




discourse that reifies intellectual property over traditional knowledge, while 
acknowledging the inferiority of traditional knowledge to intellectual property. 
In that light, one would therefore realise that the extension of intellectual 
property law within the Swakompund Protocol is largely destructive to the very 
spirit of traditional knowledge protection as it promotes knowledge imperialism 
and reinforces colonial capitalism. The objective of traditional knowledge 
protection as advocated by the Protocol translates into a false consciousness as the 
framework, “embodies ideas, values and language which justify social and 
economic inequalities” (Augoustinos, 1999: 298). By virtue of the fact that the 
established alien dominant legal regime is not capable to address the material, 
spiritual and cultural needs of traditional knowledge, the “subordinated knowledge 
system will be exposed to all forms of piracy and extraction which prejudices its 
holders” (Magaisa, 2007: 8). A new form of information capitalism will emerge 
whereof all “hitherto socially-owned knowledge, culture and information is 
accumulated into the hands of private corporations, whence repackaged as 
informational goods and sent around the world through the networks of 
information flow” (Kundnani, 1998:  51 - 52).  
Traditional knowledge is non-rivalrous within its traditional context and the use of 
intellectual property principles to protect it “ceases it to be non-rivalrous through 
the creation of private monopolies that yield rents in global markets” (Wendland, 
2006: 894). This will contribute to the capitalisation of traditional knowledge by 
knowledge property entrepreneurs who have the capacity to pressure traditional 
knowledge communities to assign and waive their rights over that knowledge for a 
fee. As critical legal theorists have aptly warned, “there is need to be ready to 
openly question when and how ‘rights’ might work to the disadvantage of the poor 
rather than to the poor’s benefit” (Kennedy, 2009: 334). 
From a human security point of view, the rights that are awarded under the 
Protocol represent the neo-liberal conception of individual security, which focuses 
on, “liberal notions of competition and possessive individualism of private power 





inflame cupidity, excite fraud, stimulate men to run after schemes that 
may enable them to levy a tax on the public, beget disputes and quarrels 
betwixt inventors, provokes useless lawsuits, bestows rewards on the wrong 
persons, makes men ruin themselves for the sake of getting the privileges 
over traditional knowledge (Mgbeor, 2001). 
All these machinations may result because the ARIPO framework for the protection 
of traditional knowledge, assigns sole and despotic dominion over knowledge 
assets, owned by various traditional communities across Africa. Therefore, instead 
of alleviating the injustices suffered by traditional communities; the Swakopmund 
Protocol administratively burdens and creates conditions for conflict in traditional 
communities thereby limiting their ability to emancipate themselves from the loins 
of knowledge capitalism. 
4.3.5. Beneficiaries of the protection of traditional knowledge 
 
The recipients of the rights established by the Swakopmund Protocol are 
traditional communities and individuals who preserve and transmit traditional 
knowledge within an intergenerational context.87 A similar specification applies to 
expressions of folklore, whereof the Protocol nominates local and traditional 
communities that are custodians of expressions of folklore as pre-determined by 
their customary laws and practices. The progressive nature of these provisions is 
that the selection of the beneficiaries of traditional knowledge protection is 
governed by customary law. This process largely prevents the possible award of 
rights in traditional knowledge to people who are not indigenous to the community 
in question. 
After assessing the beneficiaries of traditional knowledge protection as prescribed 
by the Swakopmund Protocol, one would deduce that a community oriented 
property regime governs the protection of traditional knowledge in ARIPO member 
states. However, such an approach runs parallel the communal property model 
that is currently used by traditional communities in Africa (UNESCO, 2014). In that 
regard, it can be argued that the development of the communitarian model within 
the Swakopmund Protocol responded to the challenges that are associated with 
communal property model. One of the challenges, concerning a communal 
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property model is that it results in the tragedy of the commons (Heller, 1998), 
whereof no one had the right to exclude the other in the external use of 
traditional knowledge. This phenomenon contributes to the overuse of knowledge 
resources; an occurrence that fosters conditions for the misappropriation of 
traditional knowledge without any form of liability attaching to misappropriates. 
Therefore, the Swakopmund Protocol addresses these challenges associated with 
the tragedy of the commons by introducing a community oriented property regime. 
Individual members in the community become multiple owners of traditional 
knowledge, each endowed with a right to exclude others members when the 
knowledge is to be used for purposes that are not conglomerate with the 
community’s interests. Furthermore, the community-oriented model assures that 
no one has exclusive privilege to use the traditional knowledge. 
Yet the communitarian model addresses the challenges of the tragedy of the 
commons, the transition from a communal model to a communitarian one comes 
with an embedded crisis. Gramsci et al. (1971: 276), warns that during every 
transition the, “crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the 
new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms 
appear”. History has its lessons that a legal transitional phase is more likely to be 
trapped to the conventional trappings of affluence, misuse or abuse by those who 
control the means of production (Bauman, 2012).  
To put these assessments in context, the Swakopmund Protocol allows individuals 
of traditional communities’ rights that prevent the selling or use of the traditional 
knowledge held by the community without their collective consent.  However, 
when too many people hold the right to exclude; the knowledge will be prone to 
under use thus culminating into what is known as the tragedy of the anti-commons 
(Heller, 1998). By virtue of the fact that multiple parties hold the same rights 
collectively against the external use of traditional knowledge, the external use of 
traditional knowledge would require the agreement of multiple parties. However, 
if one party opposes its use, that party effectively interdicts other members of the 
community from exercising their rights.  The net effect of such a legal smog will 




. . . informal and corrupt norms will emerge to routinise the bundling of 
rights as property entrepreneurs will bully their way into control through 
negotiating with individual community members. Overtime these corrupt 
channels will be routinised to replace legal transactions (Heller, 1998: 641).   
Consequently under development will ensue within the field of traditional 
knowledge, as it will be constituted by a combination of badly specified formal 
rights and their ex post facto rearrangement through illegal contracts (De Soto, 
1990). The resultant conceptual framework, is a legal system that allows the 
commodification of traditional knowledge through capitalist accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey, 2005). Hence, the collection of rights into private property 
as prescribed by the Swakopmund Protocol becomes brutal and slow. 
From a social context level, the privatisation of traditional knowledge will lead to 
the emergence of a social stratification, as better-informed or educated 
individuals linked to traditional communities will use the system to create cartels. 
Not to mention the creation of a property regime will spurn individuals in 
traditional communities into a rat race where anyone would want to claim rights 
on any knowledge that has not being documented or assigned ownership. This 
phenomenon is not new; reference is given to the events that transpired during the 
developmental phase of copyright right law, which saw a book rush whereof 
individuals competed to assign copyright privilege to every text that was not 
protected. The results of such a rush led to the creation of cartels, which 
consequently began to victimise knowledge producers (See Chapter 3.3.4.). The 
same can likely be realised within the traditional knowledge context as the legal 
framework reproduces the same phenomenon that transpired in history. It is 
therefore likely that overtime communities will lose their knowledge to cartels as 
it will be sold off for commercial benefits. Through this process of accumulation by 
dispossession; a social cleavage between the elites and ordinary people will 
emerge as the assignment specific rights which are tainted with intellectual 
property to communities, might restrict people’s freedoms, entrench the powers 






4.3.5. Administration and enforcement of traditional knowledge protection 
 
The regional legal instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge within 
ARIPO member states hardly provides for a comprehensive framework for the 
administration of justice concerning matters of traditional knowledge 
misappropriation. Article 14 (2) of the Swakopmund Protocol highlights that; 
National competent authorities shall be entrusted, in particular, with the 
task of advising and assisting holders of protected traditional knowledge in 
defending their rights and instituting civil and criminal proceedings, where 
appropriate and when requested by them 
In that regard, the administration of justice for traditional knowledge 
misappropriations is dependent on a governmental institutional apparatus, which 
shall guarantee the rights of traditional communities through the application civil 
and criminal law. However, the administration of justice through the application 
civil and criminal law, translates into the entrenchment of a juridical processes 
that hardly addresses the interests of justice in traditional communities in Africa. 
To explicate, recourse to criminal law in addressing the injustices perpetrated 
against traditional communities amounts to the use of pain as punishment 
(Peacock, 2008). However, the use of pain as punishment in addressing conflict in 
a democratic society amounts to the institutionalisation and civilisation of conflict 
(Peacock, 2008). Therefore, instead of ameliorating the challenges faced by 
victims of crime, the system reproduces the victimisation through secondary 
victimisation. For instance, the criminal justice system intensifies rather than 
diminishes crime as a problem because it “reinforces dominant ideological 
constructions of crime, reproduces social divisions and distracts attention from 
crimes committed by the powerful” (Sim, 2012:5).  
Christie (2005), argued that making the government a custodian for the 
administration of criminal justice creates a ‘gardener state’, which eliminates 
‘weeds’ (social undesirables and street thugs) in preference of social order, a 
phenomenon which has failed to improve human conditions (Peacock, 2008). 
Furthermore, the institutionalisation of justice within the state creates a superior–
dependent relationship (Christie, 2005) that makes traditional communities 




This process permits the incorporation of justice for the victims for traditional 
knowledge misappropriation into institutional state apparatus; a case of 
assimilation, were “everyone should be like everyone else; everyone should follow 
a basic pattern” (Christie, 2005: 9). However, is it justice if people who are 
different from most people have it like most people have it? Such, a phenomenon 
does not eliminate the conditions that have contributed to the marginalisation and 
victimisation of traditional communities because the latter will be included or 
integrated into a system that has contributed to their victimisation. The 
consequent effect of such an integration coupled with the un-eliminated 
exclusionary conditions slowly but surely relegates these communities to the 
fringes, “making them observers rather than participants, unless they take on the 
role of class clown or troublemaker: Assimilated, but alone at the bottom of the 
pecking order” (Christie, 2005: 9). As such, the assimilation modus of incorporation 
of traditional communities into a justice model dictated by state institutions 
destroys diversity because it creates a monolithic structured justice system that 
does not respond to the elastic and heterogeneous nature of traditional 
knowledge. 
The failure of institutionalised justice remind of the conditions that existed during 
the colonial period where criminal law was referred to 
pain law when observing how the criminal justice system, yet it continues 
to systematically deliver pain so that people should suffer? Those who are 
punished are supposed to suffer (the very meaning of punishment) but what 
kind of society do we wish to create with the systematic punishment of 
different groups of society? In our analyses of conflict, we need therefore 
to transcend comparative and at times absorbing conceptualisations in 
relation to criminal justice. If not, we risk being caught up in a network of 
supporting oppositions of the criminal justice model rather than to truly 
challenge the ideologies of social defence, resulting in more pain and more 
violence (Peacock, 2008: i-ii). 
Furthermore, the use of the criminal justice in addressing the question of 
traditional misappropriation is highly likely assign the latter action to the criminal 
law of theft. Theft is when a person unlawfully and intentionally appropriates 
movable, corporeal property which belongs to, and is in the possession of, the 
other with the intention to deprive him of that property permanently (Miller, 




that it is non-rivalous. That is to say that the misappropriation or possession of 
traditional knowledge by another person does not dispossess the owner of his 
knowledge. The dispossession of traditional knowledge by one from another, which 
is practically impossible to dispossess, raises fundamental philosophical questions 
that require further research. For instance, under what circumstances can one be 
deemed to dispossess knowledge from another permanently considering that the 
process of knowledge accumulation and acquisition is permanent (Kirshin, 2014; 
Basurto, Gelcich & Ostrom, 2013). A person or individual cannot be mandated to 
forget the knowledge that he or she acquired. 
Furthermore, the Protocol does not provide for victim rights for communities that 
have suffered traditional knowledge misappropriation. The non-inclusion of victim 
rights in the Swakopmund Protocol refers to the express non-recognition 
traditional knowledge holders as victims of traditional knowledge 
misappropriation. A regional framework that purports to protect traditional 
knowledge should set a precedent that allows member states to recognise 
traditional communities as victims of marginalisation and traditional knowledge 
misappropriation. This approach will allow for a comprehensive application justice 
that addresses the needs of traditional communities. 
4.3.6. Traditional knowledge digital library (TKDL) 
 
Besides the operation of the Swakopmund Protocol, ARIPO intends to establish a 
database that will store all ‘public domain’ traditional knowledge that is existent 
in ARIPO member states (ARIPO, 2002a). The TKDL is deemed to be the appropriate 
remedy for preventing the grant of patents in respect for inventions based on 
traditional knowledge (ARIPO, 2002a). The ideological events transpiring at an 
international level influenced the development of the database. For instance, in 
line with the WIPO IGC deliberations, ARIPO believes that the development sub- 
regional registries and databases on public domain traditional knowledge as well as 
undisclosed traditional knowledge is very imperative for defensive protection 
(ARIPO, 2004b; 2004a). However, the documentation of traditional knowledge is 
not being done to promote or preserve it but it is being documented for 




Furthermore, ARIPO’s approach towards the establishment of a TKLD to protect 
traditional knowledge fails at a conceptual level. The documentation of traditional 
knowledge within a database that is held by an inter-governmental organisation 
makes it fall within the public domain. The concept of ‘public domain’ is one that 
has its roots in intellectual property, which refers to knowledge that is not owned 
by any one. The public domain argument has been used in the justification of the 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge as it is deemed to have no specific 
owner (Heald, 2013; Hansen, 2011). Therefore, assigning the public domain value 
to traditional knowledge, to some extent amounts to the entrenchment of a 
discourse that has facilitated traditional knowledge misappropriation and 
victimisations. What compounds the TKDL conceptual framework is the objective 
that it seeks to achieve. Its objective is governed as a response to addressing the 
illicit patenting of traditional knowledge based products. However, it does not 
focus on the cause that has led to the misappropriation nemesis that seems to 
haunt traditional communities. In any event, traditional knowledge does not fall 
within the public domain as it is established and held by traditional communities 
despite the fact that it may be widely shared across traditional communities in 
different jurisdictions. 
In addition, traditional communities have objected to the documentation of 
traditional knowledge under the TKDL system as it argued that the documentation 
of traditional knowledge is likely; 
To cause the disappearance of traditional knowledge as ceremonies, 
rituals, songs, storytelling and other processes that are used to transmit 
traditional knowledge might not be done anymore, thus contributing to the 
erosion of culture and the apprenticeship, which forms the very nature of 
traditional knowledge. Furthermore the centralization of traditional 
knowledge within a databases whereof traditional communities have no 
means for direct access or control their knowledge, will impair their ability 
to regulate how such knowledge shall be used (Tauli-Corpuz, 2005: 16). 
Because the documentation of traditional knowledge counters an illicit patent 
granted for traditional knowledge, the process unconsciously integrates traditional 
knowledge into the intellectual property system because for the documentation to 




classification standards of patents that is regulated by the International Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (Tauli-Corpuz, 2005). 
From an economic front, the creation of the TKLD will “perpetuate the unfair 
economic paradigm that conceptualizes indigenous peoples as mere producers of 
raw materials and importers of finished products” (Mgbeor, 2001: 172). The 
creation of a traditional knowledge digital library would encourage property 
entrepreneurs to create private databases of traditional knowledge, which will be 
accessed for a fee. In other words, the TKDL would allow the privatisation of 
traditional knowledge under the name of incentives. The problem with the TKLD, 
is that it does not examine the level of protection that is necessary for traditional 
knowledge holders and it does not weigh the benefits and costs that are likely to 
occasion traditional knowledge holders. 
Having noted the unfortunate consequences created by the Swakopmund Protocol 
it is imperative to examine whether the African Union Model Law addresses the 
factors that have contributed to the marginalisation of traditional knowledge 
communities in Africa. 
4.4. AFRICAN UNION MODEL LAW  
 
The African Union model law was crafted on a background that recognised that the 
TRIPs Agreement promoted the patenting and granting private monopoly rights on 
living organisms and traditional knowledge (Egziabher, 2002; Ekpere, 2000; Munyi, 
Mahop, Du Plessis, Ekpere & Bavikatte, 2012). Within an African traditional 
context, the TRIPS agreement was deemed to have profound repercussions on 
traditional communities especially after considering that its framework did not 
protect traditional knowledge. On this background, the African Union recognised 
that there was need to create a legal instrument that would protect the livelihoods 
of African traditional communities together with their associated biological 
resources and traditional knowledge (Munyi et al., 2012). 
In addition to the foregoing the African Union Model law was drafted in response to 
“the requirement of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) TRIPs Agreement for 




both, for the protection of new varieties of plants” (Munyi et al., 2012: 9). As a 
consequence, of the implications of the TRIPS Agreement, the African Union model 
law was adopted Ouagadougou in 1998,whereof it was recommended that it be the 
basis of African national laws on the protection of traditional knowledge 
(Egziabher, 2002). However, the foundations of the African Union Model law do not 
have footing in the interests and aspirations of traditional communities. Its 
ideological formulations are steeply entrenched and borrowed from the Convention 
on Bio-Diversity (CBD), which regulates the protection and access benefit sharing 
of genetic resources together with their associated traditional knowledge (See 
Chapter 3.6 for a brief overview of the CBD). 
4.4.1. Scope of Protection 
 
The African Union model law seeks to pursue a number of interrelated objectives 
which among others are to recognise, protect and support the inalienable rights of 
local communities over their biological resources, knowledge and technologies. It 
seeks to provide an appropriate system of access to biological resources, 
community knowledge and technologies subject to the prior informed consent of 
the State and the concerned local communities. Furthermore, it aspires to  
promote appropriate mechanisms for a fair and equitable sharing the use of 
biological resources, knowledge and technologies and provide appropriate 
institutional mechanisms for the effective implementation and enforcement of the 
rights of local communities, including farming communities and breeders, and the 
conditions of access to biological resources, community knowledge and 
technologies. 
The operational ambit of the African Union model law applies to biological 
resources in both in situ and ex situ conditions together with their associated 
derivatives of biological resources and community knowledge that is owned by 
local and indigenous communities.88 However, the African Union Model Law 
expressly excludes traditional systems of access, use or exchange of biological 
resources; access, use and exchange of knowledge and technologies by and 
between local communities and the sharing of benefits based upon the customary 
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practices of the concerned local communities from its scope of protection.89 This 
provision was applied to protect customary practices from being altered by 
legislation which is not grounded within the cultural traditions of traditional 
communities (Egziabher, 2002). 
Two provisions are worth noting within the African Union model law, concerning 
the protection of traditional knowledge.  Article 17 of the Model Law specifies the 
need for African states to recognise the role played by customary law and norms in 
the protection of traditional knowledge. Read together with Article 23, the 
protection of traditional knowledge should be facilitated within a context of local 
customs and traditions. This provision permits traditional communities to pursue 
their rights in the self-determination of an appropriate legal regime that is 
conglomerate to their interests and needs. Therefore, traditional knowledge 
holders are capable of collectively benefit from the use of their knowledge. 
However, the full realisation and implementation of these provisions are 
dependent on the state as discussed below. 
4.4.2. State Guaranteed Rights 
 
The model law provides that the regulation of access to traditional knowledge by 
personas not indigenous to the traditional community will be subject to the prior 
informed consent of the state and the traditional community concerned (Ekpere, 
2000). The AU model law mandates that the application process for access to 
communities that hold traditional knowledge be made to a competent authority 
that is administered by the state. Traditional communities are assigned no role in 
this process other than granting de-facto consent, which can be vetoed by the 
state. The state thus has the sole prerogative to allow access or decline it despite 
the fact that the traditional community has agreed in allowing such access.  
State protection of resources is by its very nature and structure problematic as it 
more often causes socially undesirable results.90 (See Chapter 3.3.2 which shows 
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how intellectual property rights in England where granted to the vagaries of 
political abuse thus subjecting the system to abuse).  
From a human security perspective, granting the state a responsibility to 
guarantee the rights and benefits of traditional knowledge communities, 
represents a scenario which furthers, “individual insecurity as it fails to respond to 
the more pressing threats of individuals” (McDonald, 2002: 277). In other words 
approbating the state with the mandate of protecting the interests of traditional 
knowledge holders and communities, increases the current level of their 
insecurity, as the State is more likely to use the existing structures of power to 
determine who shall and who shall not enjoy the benefits of traditional knowledge 
protection. 
Boyle (1997) recognised that the problem of relying on the state in protecting in its 
own citizens: 
It is a matter of rudimentary political science analysis or public choice 
theory to say that democracy fails when the gains of a particular action can 
be captured by a relatively small and well identified group of the state 
while the loses are low level spread over a larger more inchoate group 
(Boyle, 1997: 110). 
In addition to the foregoing government leaders, have failed in the application and 
implementation of the AU model law. Traditional knowledge misappropriation has 
continued unabated despite the existence of laws that seek to protect it, yet the 
same leaders are expressing their rage in a different international forums (WIPO 
and WTO) far removed from the context of traditional knowledge victimisations. 
The discrepancy of such an approach was highlighted at Earth Summit (2002), 
where it was stated that; 
Government leaders pledged to protect and respect the knowledge and 
practices of traditional communities through article 8 (j) of the CBD. 
Progress in this field has fallen short of expectation (UNESCO, 2002: 1). 
What further compounds the challenges of traditional knowledge holders relying on 
the state for the protection of its resources is that the state is not culturally 
rooted within the traditions of its geographical jurisdiction. It is on this basis that 
traditional communities have objected state protection of traditional knowledge 




Our claim to the right to control and manage our heritage, knowledge and 
biodiversity is based on our inherent right to self-determination. The 
success of our struggles to have our right to self-determination and to our 
territories and resources recognized will ensure the perpetuation, 
safeguarding, protection and further development of our heritage (Tauli-
Corpuz, 2005: 4) 
Placing the protection of traditional knowledge under the state exposes 
communities the whims and caprices of the dominant capital, which have more 
often been behind the misappropriation of traditional knowledge. This argument is 
hinged on the fact that the superstructure (State) is determined by the economic 
base which controls the modes of production (Marx, 1906). 
4.4.3. Prior Informed Consent 
 
In the preceding paragraphs, it has been argued that access to traditional 
knowledge shall be granted after the communities that hold the knowledge have 
granted prior informed consent subject to approval by the state. However, the 
challenge that is associated with the prior informed consent concept is that it is 
more likely to create information asymmetries between the state and the 
traditional communities during the negotiation processes (Muller, 2013). These 
asymmetries may possibly extend between the traditional community leaders and 
the community as whole. The  existence of such a possible risk factor will create 
informational loopholes that create an elite class that holds on to information that 
might be prejudicial to the community for the financial gain of a few.  
Another problem arises, within the context of shared traditional knowledge held by 
different traditional communities in different jurisdictions. The grant of prior 
informed consent by one traditional community to the exclusion of others may 
cause conflicts and contestations between different communities thus contributing 
to secondary victimisation. 
In a context of widely shared traditional knowledge, prior informed consent 
is complicated to achieve and most importantly friction and tension might 
begin to appear when certain traditional communities are excluded from 





Traditional knowledge is not confined or practiced in a single context or 
community. The same traditional knowledge may exist simultaneously in different 
communities, including communities located in different countries. Therefore; the 
operational validity of the prior informed consent principle becomes complex, as 
the grant of consent by one community might be prejudicial to the other 
community which holds the same traditional knowledge. Furthermore, the 
question of technically identifying the real owners of the trans-boundary 
traditional knowledge held by different communities is in itself a mammoth task.  
Another issue omitted by the African Union model law is how prior informed 
consent can be obtained from a plethora of traditional communities that hold the 
same knowledge. What complicates, prior informed consent under the African 
Union model law is the feasibility of negotiating a single contract that is mutually 
beneficial to traditional communities that hold the same knowledge and what are 
the economic advantage when the traditional knowledge in question is accessible 
from different sources. 
The African Union Model law represents a significant step taken by the African 
Union in a bid to address the interests of traditional knowledge holders. However, 
the approach that was adopted did not yield outcomes, as it was deemed not to be 
in conformity with worldviews of traditional communities (Munyi et al, 2012). 
There is thus need to explore whether the OAPI legal regime on the protection of 
traditional knowledge is context oriented and addresses the needs to traditional 
knowledge communities. 
4.5. OAPI TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE LEGAL REGIME 
 
The Bangui Agreement and the Africain Relatif a la Protection des Savoirs 
Traditionels governs the OAPI, legal framework for the protection of traditional 
knowledge. The following discussion shall discuss the factors that contributed to 
the development of these frameworks while critically analysing whether or not the 
frameworks address the interests and needs of traditional knowledge holders in 





4.5.1. The Bangui agreement 
 
The founding ideology for the protection of traditional knowledge within the OAPI 
regional framework is grounded in the Bangui Agreement. The objective the Bangui 
Agreement is to contribute to the protection and promotion of expressions of 
cultural and social values (Olembo, 1996). Annexure VII of the Bangui Agreement 
has a provision for the protection of cultural heritage,91 through the application 
and adaption of copyright law to meet the need and interests of traditional 
communities. However, this provision does not address other matters related to 
traditional knowledge with its associated genetic resources.  
In addition, OAPI member states are obligated to provide protection to their 
cultural heritage,92 and to inform traditional communities of their rights with 
regards to their cultural heritage. However, traditional communities are expected 
to notify their governments if they intend to protect or dispose of their traditional 
property. In that regard, the government has the sole responsibility over the 
administration of traditional knowledge within their geographical jurisdiction (See 
Section 4.4.2. of this chapter where the challenges associated with state 
guaranteed rights) 
4.5.2. The Africain relatif a la protection des savoirs traditionels 
 
The significant development in OAPI’s approach to the protection of traditional 
knowledge was achieved through the adoption of the Africain Relatif a la 
Protection des Savoirs Traditionels in 2007. Its foundations and constituent 
elements are similar to those of the Swakopmund Protocol. Such an ideological 
similarity is one that can be tracked back to 2005 when OAPI participated in its 
technical capacity during the 29th session of ARIPO Administrative Council where a 
proposal was tabled for the adoption of the draft legislative framework of the 
Swakopmund Protocol (ARIPO, 2005a). The representatives of OAPI present at the 
meeting showed a keen interest in the draft Swakopmund Protocol through making 
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a commitment to present the latter to its Council of Ministers to allow for the 
harmonisation of the traditional knowledge legal framework between the two 
organisations.  
In 2006, ARIPO held a regional consultative workshop on the ARIPO-OAPI draft legal 
instrument on the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. Heads and 
senior officials of intellectual property offices in ARIPO and OAPI member states 
attended this workshop. The meeting recommended that the draft legislative 
framework for the Swakopmund Protocol be formulated into a legal instrument 
containing substantive provisions for the protection of traditional knowledge and 
expressions of folklore (ARIPO, 2006). Interestingly, the views, concerns, and 
interests of traditional knowledge holders and communities were not taken into 
account and neither was their input incorporated in the formulation of the legal 
instrument.  
The alignment of the development of the OAPI legal framework with that of ARIPO, 
represented an infiltration of the international discourse of the protection of 
traditional knowledge in Africa while in negating the interests of traditional 
knowledge holders who suffered victimisation from the misappropriations. In that 
regard, the founding notions of the OAPI regional instrument was determined by 
those who occupied the top echelons of power within the intellectual property 
realm in Africa. 
4.5.3. Key provisions in OAPI legal instrument 
 
Most of the provisions in the OAPI legal instrument are similar to the ones existent 
in the Swakopmund protocol. The only difference between the two regional 
instruments is that the OAPI legal instrument does not address the question of 
expressions of folklore, as the Bangui Agreement (see section 4.5.1 of this chapter) 
addresses the latter. Its overall operative context stipulates that the access and 
utilisation of traditional knowledge should be based on the prior informed consent 
of traditional communities that own the traditional knowledge (See Section 4.4.4 
of this chapter for the challenges that are associated with the conceptual principle 




In its broad application, just like the Swakopmund Protocol, the OAPI legal 
instrument co-opts intellectual property principles within its framework, thereby 
allowing for the commercialisation of traditional knowledge (Munyi et al, 2008). 
The provision that exists within this legal instrument is that traditional 
communities that have authorised access to traditional knowledge shall enjoy the 
benefits of utilising traditional knowledge. However, the down side of the OAPI 
legal instrument, similar to its regional counterpart ARIPO, is that it separates 
traditional knowledge from access to genetic resources (For more on this, see 
section 4.4.1 of this chapter, which discusses the human security and victimology 
implications of compartmentalising traditional knowledge). 
The OAPI legal instrument on the protection of traditional knowledge represents a 
stark contrast to the indigenous worldviews of traditional knowledge. Such 
comments are born from the fact that the legal instrument commodifies traditional 
knowledge, a scenario that will gradually leads to the fetishisation of traditional 
knowledge (See section 3.4.4 for an in-depth discussion into the fetishisation of 
traditional knowledge). 
The following discussion shall, critically examine the implications of the African 
regional framework of the rights of traditional communities. 
4.6. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE FRAMEWORK IN 
AFRICA 
 
Having examined the traditional knowledge framework in Africa it is particularly 
imperative to conceptually highlight the pitfalls that are associated with the 
framework. The next section shall evaluate the impact of these frameworks from a 
victimology and human security perspective. 
4.6.1. Continuing violations to traditional knowledge communities aspirations 
 
The framework for the protection of traditional knowledge in Africa makes a pre-
theoretical classification by ascribing the misappropriation nemesis to incentive 
problems. It neglects the historical factors that contributed to traditional 




a finely honed sensitivity to misappropriation while ignoring the challenges and 
loses generated by the very rights that have been granted” (Boyle, 1997:97) 
One of the major challenges that beset the traditional knowledge framework in 
Africa is that it does not recognise the historical context of injustices. It casts a 
blind eye to the fact that traditional communities together with their associated 
knowledge “suffered the destruction of their societal community structures and 
their traditions because of colonialism”  (Yamamoto, 2009: 117). Their culture, 
knowledge and way of life were subordinated by colonial governments, which tried 
to force assimilation through the expansion of the western knowledge system 
together with the neo-liberal conceptions of private property at the expense of 
communal holdings. 
In light of such an oppressive past, the regional instruments do not seek to redress 
these social injustices. Questions concerning reparative entitlements and 
obligations are not addressed. As a result, the regional frameworks in their 
institutional totality fail to provide the necessary remedies to the victims of the 
stated violations. This is compounded by the fact no consultative processes was 
undertaken by the regional bodies with the support of the relevant states in 
understanding the spiritual, cultural and material aspirations of the concerned 
communities. Recognition of crimes or wrongs of the past wherever and whenever 
they occurred is essential to reconciliation and the creation of societies based on 
the concepts of justice, equality and solidarity.93 It is therefore imperative to 
recognise that, ‘historical injustices’ have undeniably contributed to the poverty, 
marginalisation and social exclusion, instability and insecurity of traditional 
knowledge holders in Africa. 
Thus, the failure of the regional frameworks to recognise the historical exigencies 
that contributed to the marginalisation of traditional knowledge translates into the 
institutionalisation of historical injustices thereby obstructing the due carriage of 
justice. These assessments might appear to be too farfetched, but the neglect of 
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in recognising the factors that contributed to the marginalisation of traditional 
knowledge is in itself appalling to the rights of traditional communities.  
To bring this argument into perspective the words of Yamamoto (2009:123) are 
imperative to reproduce: 
An event which happened in the past continues to have significance for our 
present time, as a piece of the past continues to have significance for our 
present time, as a piece of the past has its own contemporary 
effects…therefore such wrongs ought to be acknowledged and addressed to 
ensure that past wrongs are not repeated, while ensuring that the victims 
of the violations are addressed. 
4.6.2. Restorative justice 
 
The traditional knowledge framework on Africa failed to embrace the concept of 
restorative justice, which seeks to effectively respond, repair and undo the harm 
that is associated with the marginalisation and misappropriation of traditional 
knowledge. However, on the converse the framework treats the misappropriation 
of traditional knowledge as a crime, which requires state interference to 
determine guilt and punish accordingly. This notion is one that is borrowed from 
the western notion of the traditional justice system which focuses on (i) pain and 
punishment (Peacock, 2008); (ii) takes into account a small group of perpetrators; 
(iii) pays little attention to the causes of conflict and (iv) imposes western notions 
on other cultures without taking their peculiarities into account (Peacock, 2013b). 
A restorative justice approach would be imperative in the creation of a traditional 
knowledge framework because it would have sought to address the needs of 
traditional knowledge communities that have been victims of a legacy of 
colonialism. It would furthermore make perpetrators of traditional knowledge 
marginalisation responsible for repairing the harm caused. Therefore, a restorative 
justice approach would:  
Focus on the victims and their sufferings, look at the underlying cause of 
victimisation, the approach would have been culturally sensitive as it would 
focused on the harm caused by [misappropriation and marginalisation], 
while at the same instance meeting the needs of the victims redress and 





The adoption of such an approach would have been in conformity with African 
values and norms of justice which seek to “restore harmony as quickly as possible 
while restoring and maintaining the equilibrium of African communitarian 
societies” (Peacock, 2013b: 4). 
4.6.3. Economic determinism 
 
The traditional knowledge protection discourse in Africa has fallen prey to 
homologisation, whereof it is viewed as an economic good rather than as part of 
the traditional community. However, the problem with the privatisation of 
traditional knowledge is a conceptual one, an economic analysis beset by internal 
contradictions and uncertainty. The running argument of the protection regime of 
traditional knowledge in Africa is that, the propertisation of traditional knowledge 
would achieve market perfection by incentivising traditional knowledge holders 
and communities to bear rewards from their knowledge. However, each property 
right that is granted to protect traditional knowledge is a cost on the community 
when viewed from an efficacy perspective. 
In addition, founding the protection of traditional knowledge on the economic 
front is not an option as history reveals that  markets routinely fail, thus making 
economic factors to internalise their own cost, a cost that more often disrupts and 
destroys fragile knowledge systems with unpredictable and irreparable 
consequences (Boyle, 1997). An example is helpful to this analysis, (See Section 
3.3.3. of chapter 3) whereof the creation of the Statute of Monopolies did not 
transform the economic monopoly that was held by the Stationers Company. It 
merely reinforced their positions while at the same instance entrenching the 
victimisations the authors had suffered at their hands. There is need to adopt 
another view towards the protection of traditional knowledge which incorporates 
wider functionalities within a cultural context. 
Furthermore, the propertisation of traditional knowledge is contentious “with 
regards to distributional ideological and efficiency” (Boyle, 1997:87) as it destroys 
the social structure that constitutes it. The commoditisation of traditional 
knowledge is not only an incomplete solution but it is unethical, as the only 




economic discrimination. Furthermore, the problem with the African regime for 
the protection of traditional knowledge is that it seeks to see the challenges that 
are being suffered by traditional knowledge holders as technical. This in its form 
inhibits popular participation of traditional knowledge holders within their 
protection discourse. Relying on a regime that treats traditional knowledge as 
private property entails engineering a system that treats the world as simple, 
linearly related sets of causes and effects. The net effect of such a system erases 
the concept of communitarianism and to a larger extent subjugates the relevance 
of traditional knowledge and its communities. 
However, it would be naive to think that the challenges of the African framework 
on the protection of traditional knowledge can be corrected by twerking the 
dysfunctional discourse that is being advocated for traditional knowledge 
protection. A purely instrumental approach to traditional knowledge protection is 
not healthy as an attraction of economics conceals danger. The words of Aldo 
Leopold are relevant to this analysis, whereof he highlighted that  
One basic weakness in a conservation system based wholy on economic 
motives is that most members of the land community have no economic 
value. When one of these non economic categories is threatened  and we 
happen to love it, we invent subterfuges to give it economic imporatance. 
It is painful to read these circumlocutions today (Leopold, 1949: 210). 
4.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The African traditional knowledge framework ritualises the law in seeking to 
address the misappropriation of traditional knowledge. This ritualisation in part 
forms a false consciousness, as the law has become an instrument of oppression 
and fraud for traditional communities. This has been achieved through the 
trafficking of western notions of “individualism, entrepreneurialism and scularis” 
(Harvey, 2005: 4) into traditional communities thus affecting the very notions of 
communalism that are key to traditional knowledge protection.  The legal 
protection regime for traditional knowledge in Africa has created a structure that 
alters the distribution of “property rights of traditional communities while locking 
it in the power of market leaders (Boyle, 1997: 101). There is therefore a need to 




than from the neo-liberal conception of private property. The next chapter shall 
proffer an African victimological approach in the way traditional knowledge could 

























THE PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: TOWARDS A 
FRAMEWORK OF AFRICAN VICTIMOLOGY 
I experience awe at encountering philosophical language ever conceived by 
man and at the same time express sorrow at witnessing its debasement…it 
is so strange that so simple and evocative language as ancient Egyptian 
should be obscured by the very instrument of its discovery. Can someone 
who believes that Ancient Egypt was a primitive society, incapable of 
abstract thought transmit its wisdom? It is as if a sleepwalker were placed 




From the previous discussion, it is apparent that the protection of traditional 
knowledge in Africa is a contested discourse, inundated and tainted by a history of 
oppression, subjugation, colonialism, cultural violence and ideological prejudice. 
The marginalisation of traditional knowledge by the stated vestiges questions or 
denies the humanity of the disenfranchised (Teffo, 2011). Accordingly, these 
prejudices have largely contributed to the multiple victimisation and 
peripherisation of traditional knowledge holders and communities. The traditional 
knowledge framework in Africa hardly derives its legitimacy from the cultural 
traditions of communities, a factor that affects its efficacy in addressing the needs 
and aspirations of these communities. In light of these disenfranchising 
epistemologies, this chapter advocates for an emancipatory paradigm in African 
victimology for the protection of traditional knowledge in Africa. African 
victimology is informed by the political, social, spiritual and cultural context of 
traditional communities, as their context informs the approach that can transform 
or complicate the appropriate responses to traditional knowledge misappropriation 
and marginalisation.  
The philosophical underpinnings of African victimology are embedded in the 
African epistemological and ontological principles of Maat, Ubuntu and Afrikology, 
all which view society as being bound by a harmonious and ordered balance. This 
philosophical worldview further recognises that the disruption of the ordered 




consequently leads to inequality and oppression. A failure in addressing the 
imbalance over a period will amount to a reproduction of the conditions that are 
unequal and oppressive (Althusser, 2006; Marx, 1906) (see Chapter 2.1). In seeking 
to restore the societal balance that has been disturbed, African victimology adopts 
a restorative and declarative approach, which restores traditional knowledge 
victims back to their status quo through the reinforcement of humanity, selfhood 
and being. Reclamation and restoration reflect a new reality, which transforms 
traditional knowledge holders from a state of “victimhood, servitude and 
powerlessness to a state of victory, participant and agent” (Dastile, 2013: 96). 
Therefore, African victimology is not an abstract concept but a lived experience 
that allows for social transformation through supplanting injurious values with 
humanising values (Elechi, Morris & Schauer, 2010; Karenga, 2012b; Nabudere, 
2011; Ramose, 1999).  
5.2. AFRICAN VICTIMOLOGY 
 
The notion of an African victimology follows the epistemological paradigm of 
Afrikology which pursues “a true philosophy of knowledge and wisdom on African 
cosmologies that are inspired by the ideas originally produced from the universal 
system of knowledge originating in Africa” (Wanda, 2013a: 2). It recognises all 
sources of knowledge as “valid within their historical cultural and social contexts 
and seeks to engage them into a dialogue that can lead to better knowledge for 
all.” (Nabudere, 2011: 92). Therefore, each culture should be measured and 
judged on its own terms as human thought processes are “strongly social and 
cultural in terms of their origins and application, as they strive for universal 
principles and values that lead to a harmonious co-existence” (Teffo, 2011: 26). 
The denial of African philosophy as a major contributor for the development of 
knowledge systems consequently leads to the encapsulation of a dominant 
monolothic western epistemological world view which views the African context 
with a blinded eye whereof “it scans its ‘non-problems’ without seeing them, in 




In confirming this analysis Peacock (2013b), the progenitor of African victimology 
contends that victim oriented perspectives and mechanisms within Africa,94 omit 
the cultural and historical context of Africa. More often, victimological approaches 
fail to address the needs and aspirations of victims within an African setup. 
Peacock (2013) further propagates that mainstream victimology in Africa applies 
dehumanising concepts of victimhood, victim-producing cultures, hidden 
victimisation and repeat victimisation, which are abstract from an African 
historical reality. Consequently, victimology can arguably be fashioned to be 
conformist to the functional structural norms of a social phenomenon (see chapter 
2 for an in-depth discussion on the factors that contribute to the development of 
social phenomenon), that reproduce the conditions that facilitate victimisation. It 
is through this processes that an ‘ideal victim’ is created while negating the 
context  and specific conditions that have define a ‘real’ victim (Christie, 1986a; 
1986b). 
On that basis, it becomes imperative that victimology engages with; 
African philosophic practice in a critical and systematic exploration of 
indigenous forms of knowledge: practical and theoretical. It must be done 
by sifting through our legacies: retaining that which is alive, casting off 
that which is lethargic and critically fusing the heritage of the past with 
modern scientific conceptions (Serequeberhan, 2000: 55) 
From this auspices, Peacock (2013) advocated for an African victimology as an area 
of specialisation that affirms its specificity, scientific nature and own identity. 
Based on Peacock’s (2013) assertions, this chapter seeks to develop and affirm the 
relevance of African victimology within the realms of the marginalisation of 
traditional knowledge in Africa.  
Adopting an African philosophical approach towards victimisation becomes 
imperious within an African context that is bound by elements, which create 
harmony and an orderly balance (Martin, 2008). It affirms for a “connection with 
the composite cultural world, to undo past damage and make constructive 
contributions to ameliorations of evident evils” (Howard, 2005: 3). In other words, 
it seeks to “restore, reframe and theorise African existential experience, from 
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African lived experiences” (Teffo, 2011: 27).  In that light, this thesis proposes a 
framework that, “redresses the epistemicides [of knowledge] in Africa, while it 
grounds itself in the history and existential conditions and relations of African 
communities” (Dastile, 2013: 94). 
In pursuit of the stated, African victimology as an emancipatory framework 
dismantles the internal structures of knowledge imperialism through a rationalistic 
process that rejuvenates African renaissance. This is achieved by “conducting an 
investigation of the causes underlying African reality, detailing it in an accurate 
manner to what is true, right and useful to African communities” (Obenga, 2004: 
36). Through the latter African victimology squarely falls within reasonable limits 
because it operates through a balanced paradigm that pursues a truth, which 
avoids intellectual adventurism, knowledge inequity and degradation.  
By advocating for an African victimology within the domains of traditional 
knowledge, does not necessarily translate into isolating traditional knowledge from 
the vestures of western knowledge systems. Isolating traditional knowledge from a 
broader context of other knowledge systems places traditional knowledge into a 
cultural museum (Harvey, 2005). The framework should permit the transcendence 
of traditional knowledge from a level of inferiority to a region of equilibrium 
within the knowledge frameworks. This paradigm shift seeks to advance the 
decolonisation, revalorisation and appropriation of traditional knowledge. 
Questions regarding the applicability and viability of African victimology are highly 
probable, especially in a context where western cultural values have taken root in 
the name of modernisation. Ramose (1999) has argued that the post-colonial 
African state represents a symbol that alien culture has been imposed upon the 
African way of life, thereby becoming part and parcel of an African experience. As 
such, the African communities have been conditioned to accept western 
civilisation at the prejudice of their own culture.  
On the contrary, the fact that Africa suffered or is still suffering from the chains of 
unjust conquest, does not necessarily translate into Africa being without any 
foundational cultural determinism. Reverting to such questions amounts to 




misrepresent them but also leads to an underestimation of the role of reason in 
the life of traditional cultures” (Appaih, 2002: 271). The basis of this assessment is 
hinged on the fact that despite of modernisation or the conversion of Africans into 
various religious traits, they still believe in the ontology of their traditional 
cultures. This assessment was clarified by Amin (1974) who argued that, “the 
vestiges of African past cultures especially the survival of their configurations are 
still a living reality (i.e. tribal ties) which continually hide in the new structures 
created by capitalism” (Amin, 1974: 377). African societies have remained largely 
intact despite colonisation and modernity; 
the young nations rightly fear seeing their original world being swallowed 
up in the whirlpools of the industrial society and disappear forever, 
somewhat like an animal species we try with difficulty and often in vein to 
protect against the invasion of the technological man (Bigo, 1974: 23) 
Within the traditional knowledge realm, customary practices that govern 
traditional knowledge are still existent (Tauli-Corpuz, 2005: 5). In that regard, 
each society develops and adapts to internally generated innovation, therefore 
internally imposed change affects the natural local conditions thereby adjusting 
social structures and ideologies so as to ensure legitimacy is attained (Harvey, 
2005).  
African communities are still deeply embedded in the “practices, beliefs, and 
cultural traditions, and shaped by interaction among other communities 
(Finnemore & Toope, 2003: 743). The application of African victimology within an 
African context creates provisions for conceptual clarity that facilitate the 
operationalisation of its notions within a cultural context. Therefore, African 
victimology is not about ‘legalising’ a social practice through a political process, 
but it also subsumes other non-political issues such as legitimacy that enable it to 
be congruent to the social practices that are at a community level thus allowing 
legality to be derived from informal  to formal norms. Founding victimology in 
Africa within a cultural philosophical context of African values and ethics enables 
its legitimisation by virtue of its accustomed nature to the local conditions and in 
particular that of traditional knowledge. Having noted, the functional ideological 




basic primordial elements that would constitute African victimology for the 
purpose of protecting traditional knowledge. 
5.3. MAAT 
 
Maat, an ideal of ancient Egyptian philosophy is polysomic in nature as its 
conceptual elasticity transcends all spheres of an ordered universe (Tobin, 1987; 
Karenga, 2012b; 2014). It represents the “substance of human life whose objective 
is order in defence of chaos” (Helck, 1980: 1110ff). The centrality of Maat is the 
“conception and practice of virtue within a social and natural order of things” 
(Karenga, 2012b:5). It provides for a “framework of possibility of what it does, how 
it acts, and what it provides for society and human relationships” (Asante, 
2011:51). In Ancient Egypt, Maat was the revered goddess of law, order, truth and 
wisdom.95 Her duty was to maintain an ordered balance within society through the 
application of humanitarian principles. It is in that light, that Bou-Sada (1909) 
identified Maat as the truth of justice.96 Corroborating the latter, Budge (1906) 
conceptualised Maat as righteousness and integrity that lives upon truth. In the 
Coffin Texts97, Maat  is comprehended as balance, stability and order (Budge, 
1967).  
Based on these premises, Obenga (2004: 47) argued that Maat at a philosophical 
level represents “reality, a totality of all things,98 possessing actuality of existence 
or essence”. This totality represents a unity of being whose functions are 
determined through the “personification of law, order, rule, truth, right, 
righteousness, canon, justice, straight forwardness, integrity, uprightness, 
conscientious and perfection” (Obenga 2004:47). In a phrase Maat can be 
described as the “rightness of things” (Karenga, 2012b: 6). Rightness in itself is not 
sufficient; it is the interrelatedness order of rightness that creates a lawful and 
harmonious social order. From the foregoing one can deduce the seven cardinal  
virtues of Maat, namely “truth, justice, propriety, harmony, balance, reciprocity 
and the rightful order which inform and undergird the lightness and righteousness 
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of human practice and relations in the world and with the world” (Karenga, 2012: 
3).  
After having noted the constituent elements of Maat, in philosophical terms, Maat 
represents three theoretical pillars namely: 
a) The ideal of knowledge, that is the love of science, the aspiration for 
knowledge for the true ‘being’ of which is true, sure and certain;  
b) the moral ideal of truth, justice and rectitude and;  
c) the metaphysical ideal of love and of knowledge of being which is at the 
beginning of all being (Karenga, 2012b: 6-7; Bilolo, 1988). 
 
Therefore, Maat is a philosophical ideal, which is against systems, procedures, and 
institutions that seek to distort the balance and rightness of order, which exists 
within all spheres of life. The stated spheres of social life, ipso facto include, 
The political domain, where Maat is justice in opposition to injustice; the 
social domain which focuses on right relations and duty in the context of 
community and; personal domain in which following the rules of Maat to 
realise concretely the universal order in oneself, to live in harmony with 
the ordered whole (Obenga, 1990: 158 - 167; Anthes, 1954). 
The binding force that holds all these Maatian principles together to create a 
ordered harmonious balance is the human being. Therefore, the focus of Maat is 
on humankind, which should coexist in harmony with the ordered universe. In that, 
light humanity becomes the underlying value before any material objects.  
Adopting and applying these philosophical notions to the traditional knowledge 
discourse, one would understand that traditional knowledge is administered and 
operated in an ordered whole that is bound by elements and processes of the 
cosmic universe. Therefore, abstract laws not grounded in the philosophical 
notions of African philosophy cannot adequately address the needs of traditional 
communities. The more appropriate approach in protecting traditional knowledge 
is recognising traditional knowledge producers and communities at core of the 
cosmic universe defined by Maat. In that way, humanity and dignity forms the core 
of any discussion relating to traditional knowledge protection. The rights and 
obligations that immediately flow from such a framework are connected to the 
interrelated rightness of order in the cosmic universe within which traditional 




Consequently, the traditional knowledge discourse, “becomes more of a relational 
concept of what is perceived of one by the community and what one thinks of self-
based on the substantial part of this evaluation by the significant others” 
(Karenga, 2012b: 8). In that regard, humanness is centrifugal to any discourse that 
seeks to protect victims. The materialistic self-interest doctrine within such a 
framework ceases to exist as traditional knowledge protection will be more 
focused “on relationships, reciprocal obligations and related rightful expectations” 
(Assmann, 2003: 133-134). However, that is not to say individuality is not 
significant in social relations, it is recognised but within a framework that relates 
to other humans, the community and the entire ordered universe (Mabona, 1967: 
12). 
In that light, it is important to examine how the application of the virtues of Maat 
within the traditional knowledge domain in Africa would address the victimisation 
of traditional knowledge communities. 
5.3.1. Truth 
 
Maat is conversed as a signifier of truth, that is to say ‘the word’ that created an 
ordered and balanced world (Karenga, 2012b). Therefore, the word and truth are a 
“mechanism for re-establishing the order that was manifested in the reasoned 
creation of the universe” (Karshner, 2011: 52). The truth, “searches for harmony, 
balance, order, justice,  righteousness, and reciprocity which creates a society 
that is non-dominative and non-combative” (Asante, 2011: 46). Its connects with 
the higher realms of actuality which are structured in an intense epistemic 
interaction with other discourses which debunk the anti-foundationalism rhetoric 
of dominance and oppression (Karshner, 2011).  
Mediating disorder or chaos through the a close observation of being in a 
cosmological society facilitates the definition of truth (Assmann, 2003). The 
cosmos itself becomes a heuristic tool for revealing knowledge of the creative 
power of the ‘word’, which is concerned with building communities, reaffirming 
human dignity, reciprocal solidarity and enhancing the life of people (Karenga, 




event which established the order of existence manifest in normality of a 
phenomenon (Karshner, 2011; Wilkinson, 2003; Frankfurt, 1961). 
Maat facilitates for the universality of humankind in their ideals, knowledge and 
practices, which allow for a plural communicative humanitarian discourse despite 
the question of otherness (Asante, 2011). As such, truth abrogates the normative 
norms that seek to make communities to participate in social relations that 
perpetuate their own oppression (See Chapter 2.7 and Chapter 3.9, which 
discusses how unequal power relations determine social relations in the field of 
traditional knowledge) 
In that regard, truth provides for a framework to traditional knowledge holders in 
Africa to self-assert and affirm a dialogue with continuing apprehensions that 
affect their humanity. This process requires the critical questioning of every 
traditional knowledge discursive practice in Africa to understand whether it 
encourages or enriches human conditions. To comprehend the truthfulness requires 
the incorporation of the past in the critical examination of the present, to define 
the desires and strivings of the future.  
Therefore, in light of the historical and current oppression of traditional 
knowledge communities, truth becomes a reformative discourse that affirms 
Africans as bearers of “divinity and dignity, their right to a free and meaningful 
life, and their right to speak to a cultural truth” (Karenga, 2013: 213). It 
appropriates and restores the dignity and humanity of vulnerable populations. In 
other words, the aim of truth within the traditional knowledge discourse is always 
to overcome isfet, that which evil, difficult, disharmonious, and troublesome. It is 
all about good overcoming evil, harmony replacing disharmony, and order taking 
the place of disorder. This is an optimistic view of reality where one believes that 
justice would always rise to the top and that truth would outlast untruth” (Asante, 
2011: 52). The affirmation of truth permits traditional communities to pursue 
humanity and social justice within inhuman and oppressive conditions of traditional 
knowledge misappropriation and marginalisation.  Therefore, truth in Maatian 
terms represents power that challenges the dominant oppressive regimes thereby 
allowing for a transformative process which favours equal and non-dominant 




The efficacy of truth and justice within this context, requires respect for human 
dignity, economic justice, meaningful political participation, cultural integrity, 
mutual respect for all people and an uncompromising resistance to social forces 
and structures which deny or limit these (Karenga, 1995: 2). The attainment of 
truth necessitates the struggles of traditional knowledge communities to be 
constructed and addressed within a context grounded in African culture and 
philosophy. That process offers a purposeful framework to understand the deep 
cultural context within which traditional knowledge is enunciated. The practicality 
of a truth based approach allows for the interaction of traditional knowledge 
protection mechanisms with “shared experiences of a context which is 
understood” (Karshner, 2011: 55) by traditional communities. As such, traditional 
knowledge discourses grounded in the African conception of truth would produce 
something new intellectually, as it will provide a philosophical lived experience. 
Therefore, truth provides a space to build and advance alternative ways for a 
communal deliberative discourse that is grounded in ‘pragmatic and practical’ 
lived experiences of post-colonial Africa (Serequeberhan, 1994). The incorporation 
of an African centred truth within victimology empowers disenfranchised 
traditional communities by understanding their cosmological worldview that 
focuses on connectedness and balance. The sense of connectedness within a 
socially constructed historical reality enhances the positive impact of creativity in 
the truth, which allows for a recreation of norms and reciprocity between the 




It would be inconclusive to advocate for an African victimology without assessing 
the real existential conditions that currently define the global knowledge 
infrastructure. There is need to develop such an understanding within a practical 
paradigm which reconciles the ever relentless violent and oppressive knowledge 
capitalist regime and the humanistic African paradigm of truth. With such an 
objective in mind, Maat within African societies is achieved through the 




vivendi.99 Bridging that notion with the doctrinal concept of self-interest 
(individuality) that has been applied to the traditional knowledge framework in 
Africa, becomes key in addressing this conundrum. 
The doctrine of self-interest stipulates that social stability and justice are 
grounded on mutually advantageous arrangements that are deemed to be more 
stable (Becker, 2005). Therefore, self-interest is founded on settlements or notions 
deemed to be politically correct or politically stable. However, the challenges 
associated with this conception is that the ‘politically correct’ positions adopted in 
pursuit of justice can be easily subverted; as such political settlements are usually 
at the whims and caprices of those who control the means of production 
(Althusser, 2006; Marx, 1906). Therefore, justice becomes justice of those in 
power (Poulantzas, 2000).  
This scenario is often referred to as the ‘tough-crowd problem of justice’, because 
it is difficult to develop sustainable “commitments to justice from those who are 
powerful but evil, powerful but amoral, powerful but unreasonable, powerful but 
badly wrong in the conception of justice” (Becker, 2005: 14). What makes the 
tough-crowd phenomenon more complex is reconciling the interests of the “hard-
boiled political realists, opportunistic free riders, enthusiastic anarchists and 
resourceful sceptics” (Becker, 2005: 15). It is therefore the aim of this section to 
analyse whether “radically opposed paradigms [of African Philosophy and self-
interest] can be reconciled” (Ramose, 199: 134) with traditional knowledge 
protection. 
Before proceeding to address aforementioned complexity, it is important to 
understand the underlying values of deviance, violence and crime. Assmann (2003: 
215 -216), argues, “isfet lies not in human nature but in the nature of the human 
heart i.e. free will”. Accordingly, wrong or deviance in the world is a consequence 
of the use of free will in direct contradiction to the established harmonious 
balance. Such notions are similar to the ones advocated by Kant (1960) who argued 
that the determination of evil in the world is caused; on the subjective ground of 
possibility of the deviation of maxims of moral law (Kant, 1960: 24). 
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On the contrary African philosophy does not provide for an explanation of ‘evil ‘or 
deviance as being a constitutive nature of the human being. It locates ‘evil’ and 
oppression in the cosmological view of the pre-creation of the universe, which is 
represented by disorder and chaos. In Maatian  philosophical terms ‘evil’ therefore 
is a representation of disorder which manifests itself through confusion and crime 
(Te Velde & Te Velde, 1977). Therefore, ‘evil’ and disorder are interrelated 
(Baines, 1991). When the interrelatedness between ‘evil’ and disorder is 
juxtaposed against Maat (truth, justice and harmony), there is a realisation that 
the former means to deviate from the established societal harmonious balance. To 
understand this statement there is need to revert to the cosmological foundations 
of Maat, which stipulate that: 
he riseth with two heads, whereupon one beareth the feather of Maat and 
the other the symbol of wickedness. He besoweth wickedness on him that 
worketh wickedness and right and truth upon him that followeth 
righteousness and truth (Budge, 1967: 19) 
This means that a social phenomenon formulated on the contradictory notions of 
justice and oppression. As such, social relations are established on the doctrine of 
opposites i.e. good and ‘evil’ co-exist (Kamalu, 1990). Therefore, ‘evil’ and 
disorder are the opposite of the ordered balance that is created through Maat. 
This scenario creates conflict and contradiction within a social phenomenon. 
Within the African cosmological view, such conflicts are seen as being concomitant 
with the of duality of nature; 
Just as there is a phenomenal aspect of the world which is subject to 
experience, there exists a nominal aspect which is not, but in which we 
find a basis for the phenomenal world. The phenomenal refers to thingness, 
to matter whereas the nominal does not. Therefore we have the foundation 
of society in thingness and nothingness (Kamalu, 1990: 34) 
On that basis the phenomenal which is Maat (justice and truth) cannot be realised 
in the absence of the nominal or nothingness (disorder and evil). For example, one 
cannot conceive of justice in the absence of injustice.100 In that regard, 
nothingness is a threat,101 to the harmonious balance as it “represents the 
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disordered, the ‘evil’, the unjust and all things negative to being” (Karenga, 
2012b, 184). Hence, ‘evil’ or disorderedness becomes a field for active creation 
“for potentiality (nothingness) is the very structure and structure of existence” 
(Karenga,2012b :186) just as “darkness is light waiting to happen” (Allen, 1988: 34-
35). Therefore, evil is the unrealised and unstructured potentialities of doing 
justice. Hence, order, justice and harmony are always in a state of constant 
evolution, as there are always becoming another in response to the threat posed 
by the disorder and evil. Disorder exists as a necessity for order and justice to be 
conceptually possible (Kamalu, 1990).  
Reverting to the discussion at hand, ‘evil’ and deviance (nothingness) becomes 
both a challenge and a necessity, “as it constantly calls for the administration of 
justice for the very purpose to end the confusion” (Kákosy, 1964). Therefore the 
Essentiality of conflict, its subjugation and resultant equilibrium is what 
the process produces. What is projected here is a necessary dialectical built 
in the very structure of being i.e. a process of order and disorder, conflict 
and resolution, Maat and Isfet, Maat seen as inevitably triumphant 
(Karenga, 2012b: 206). 
Therefore, the coexistence of the two leads to an interaction of contradictions 
between the good and the evil; a co-existence of reality defined by Maat is 
realised. Out of this interaction, a life force (truth) is developed, which is the 
author of change in relation to constancy, order and uniformity. This does not 
necessarily mean that one force (phenomenal and nominal) is superior to the other 
but both work mutually in becoming another. The process of becoming from the 
contradictions gives rise to a motion that brings order out of chaos (Kamalu, 1990). 
Within African philosophical thought the bridge between a violent capitalist system 
and a humanitarian is one that can be achieved through a pragmatic action of 
creativity and effective action which “links the intellectual with the material” 
(Karenga, 2012b:189), “for it is through this process that living things work to 
transform the world around them” (Allen, 1988: 46). The potentialities that lie in 
nothingness (evil) therefore provide for the possibility of human action and agency 




This principle furthermore articulates that the harmonious balance that exists in 
society is always under constant threat from the violent capitalist system and it 
needs to be reaffirmed through the application of African victimology, which seeks 
to restore and sustain the existence harmonious balance. To ensure the realisation 
of this phenomenon, justice and power should be grounded in Maat to assure the 
attainment of “lawful regularity” (Karenga, 2012b: 194). That in part requires the 
orderedness of being through becoming in Ubuntu, for without it an ordered 
balance is complex to achieve. Therefore, the “performance of order” (Bonnel, 
1990: 82), within the realm of traditional knowledge will allow for the realisation 
of “justice, peace, reciprocity, propriety and uniformity” (Karenga, 2012b: 194). 
As such, justice is not the legal administration of rules and regulations but the just 
and proper relational obligations between individuals and the community. 
Likewise, “truth is not the simple correspondence to reality but things being in 
their rightful place” (ibid). It is when the recognition of such norms within the 
broader structures of society are realised, that the philosophical ideals of creating 
an equilibrium balance are established. The process of overcoming evil requires 
constant creative orderedness which is reflective of the cultural conditions of 
society that do not see differences but one that stresses affinities and connections 
(Finnestad, 1986). The state of unity through connectedness ensures the creation 
of a community and world whose rightness would triumph regardless of evil and 
disorderedness in the world (Karenga, 2012b). However, that does not refer to the 
non-recognition of the continuous existence of ‘evil’. Ptahotep an ancient Egyptian 
scholar attested to the fact that evil, violence and chaos in some cases prosper 
within society but in the end, it provides false prosperity that marks failure 
(Karenga, 2012b). Therefore, the way to overcome evil and disorder requires 
recreating, sustaining and restoring conditions of rightness and humanity (Karenga, 
2012b, 184). This posits a process of becoming within an existential environment 
that is cooperative and creative whose prime constant goal is the admiration of 
harmony and justice. It is within these philosophical bearings that African 
victimology enmeshes itself within for it is underlined by the virtues of African 
philosophy that aver that the exposition of falsehoods in any discourse assists in 
reducing evil (Kamalu, 1990). Hence, the exposition of the fact that the traditional 




traditional knowledge communities into being; the primordial essence of creativity 
towards a harmonious and ordered balance. 
5.3.4. Harmonious Co-Existence 
 
Harmony in ancient Egyptian society was represented by the Goddess Maat,102 who 
embodied the natural “order of things, proportional measures and balance as the 
eternal truth of nature” (Stakhov, 2006: 490). Within this realm, there is no 
ontological distinction between human beings and the natural world. Finnestad 
(1989: 31) highlighted that this ontology of non-separation “defines a human being 
as an entity of life belonging to life total, temporarily manifested in a body of 
being but in essence not separated from other bodies of being”. This expression of 
harmony was constructed and applied within a human context, as it was significant 
for the growth of humanity. Asante argued that: 
It is in the quest for harmony that is the source of all literary, rhetorical 
and behavioural actions. The sudic ideal which emphasises the primacy of 
the person can only function if the person seeks individual with collective 
harmony. . . one must understand to become human (Asante, 1998: 200) 
Therefore, social organisations are bound by a cosmos of harmonious motion of 
coexistence between humankind and their immediate natural environment. The 
pursuit of a harmonious co-existence leads to growth of well-being, which grows 
naturally to express its nature (Verharen, 2008). In other words, the collective 
well-being of community members is the purpose for creation, dissemination and 
application of traditional knowledge. Because a harmonious co-existence 
integrates all elements in the universe; traditional knowledge creates a relational 
balance between the sacred, spiritual, individual and community (Martin, 2008).  
This idea resonates with the Maatian ideal, which connects everything within the 
universe and relates it to the holistic nature of African society. In that regard, 
human action and knowledge must be derived from the cosmic harmony of the 
universe to ensure that it prevents ‘evil’ or deviant deeds from overwhelming the 
harmony of the cosmic world (Verharen, 2008). As such, “all things are bound in an 
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indestructible unity” (Tobin, 1989: 13). A quality phenomenon that unites all in a 
harmonious ordered balance.  
The integrated unity and harmonious existence of social life within an ordered 
universe reverberates into everything including traditional knowledge, which is a 
holistic “inter-connected, intra-connected and interactive network of knowledge 
clusters” (Velthuizeni, 2012: 53). In that regard, traditional knowledge becomes a 
harmonious network of psychological, biological, social and spiritual interactions 
within communities (Martin, 2008). It operates within a broader interrelated 
context that subsumes that all knowledge grows within its immediate environment. 
It is in a state of constant harmony, which “sustains peace, justice and other 
conditions for being in life”  (Verharen, 2008: 194). This includes people, 
communities, property, and custom as being part of a complete cosmic universe 
that permits them to grow. Therefore, the efficacy of any traditional knowledge 
protection mechanism must necessitate its viability with the harmony and peace of 
traditional communities and their immediate environment. Such an interactive 
approach contributes to the flourishing of humanity and their associated 
knowledge. 
Therefore, the traditional knowledge protection mechanisms should have an 
internal (that is harmony with traditional communities together with their 
associated customs and practices) and external harmony (that is harmony of the 
co-existence of traditional knowledge communities and reciprocal obligations 
between human and nature). A harmony that obliges empowerment while acting 
on solutions endorsed and authenticated by traditional knowledge communities. A 
fragmented approach towards the protection traditional knowledge in the absence 
of its holders and immediate environment creates a disharmony within the natural 
order of things. Any disturbance (isfet103) in the harmonious balance leads to social 
disruption. A distorted harmonious balance in society is deemed to be “fatalistic 
and restrictive” (Karenga, 2012b: 9) as it is a “negative force that prevents, 
change or development, holding the cosmos in a static condition” (Tobin, 1987: 
113-114).  
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The disrupted harmonious social balance in the ordered harmonious universe 
becomes a fertile breeding ground for inequality, subjugation and oppression (See 
Chapter 2.2). The individuals or groups that are behind such a disruption tend to 
benefit from their isfet at the prejudice of the community as a whole. Hence, any 
omission or failure to address the imbalance or factors that contributed to the 
imbalance over a period would be tantamount to reproducing conditions that are 
unequal and oppressive. (For more, see Chapter 3 and 4 for a discussion on the 
factors that contributed to the marginalisation and victimisation of traditional 
knowledge holders and how they were reproduced within the institutional 
structures that seek to protect traditional knowledge communities). With humans 
at the centre of the harmonious universe, it is their obligation to maintain order 
and to address anything that causes disharmony (Martin, 2008). This can be 
achieved through practicing Maat, which reconciles tension, maintaining the 
delicate and ever elusive order with its associated cadencies.  
5.3.5. Equality 
 
Equality in ancient Egypt was presented through the symbol of the weighing of the 
hearts of the dead for their deeds against the light feather of Maat (Zubrow, 
2010). This symbolic notion represented through Maat was applied to social 
relations based on social agreement of equal process that promoted social equality 
(Zubrow, 2010). Maat is therefore not the constituent element inequality but is 
the foundation of egalitarianism (Karenga, 2012b). This notion is conceptualised in 
Coffin texts, which reiterates that: 
I relate to you the four good deeds in order to silence evil…I made four winds 
that everyman might breathe therefore like his fellow in him his time…I 
made great flood waters that the poor might have rights in them like great 
men…I made everyman like his fellow. I did not command that they might do 
evil but it was their hearts that violated what I said so (cited in Breasted, 
1933: 221) 
The equality as propounded by Maat did not only  extent to man but also applied 
to women as a possessor of dignity and divinity in her own right; as an equal and 
complementary human being in relation to man. Women were equally 
“indispensable to the creator in the foundation of human society and the world” 




not diminish or reduce the status of any human being. All people are equal, enjoy 
equal legal rights, and participate in all areas of social, economic, religious and 
political life (Karenga, 2012). 
Such notions of equality between the females and male are based on the 
ontological principle that both  are derived from the “same cosmological source in 
Africa” (Asante, 2007: 49). Hence, equality is self-determining  (Zulu, 2012). It 
seeks to recognise the “quality  and dignity in human personality (humanness)” 
(Koka, 2002: 65). However, it should be noted that humanness is not constituted in 
human hood and humanity” (Komakech, 2012: 28). It extends this world not 
outside him or her but extended with him or her, the world besides human beings, 
and the world that is not non-human because humans are a composite of it and 
dependent on, but a world together-with-human beings (Komakech, 2014). 
As such, equalitarianism is not a legal concept but a notion that “seeks out of good 
in relation to need” (Frankfort et al., 1946: 109). This relational need is 
determined by the concept of wholeness advocated by Ubuntu. However, 
equalitarianism is not a frigid concept, as circumstances defining it evolve 
according to the dictates of time and context. As such, time becomes very 
imperative to the definition of what equalitarianism is, as time is a lived 
experience not an abstract concept. 
The inequality that exists between traditional knowledge holders and others 
knowledge producers is a reflection and a product of a disharmonious social 
relation in society. The restoration of harmony and equality (restorative justice) 
becomes imperative through the weighing and calculation of Maat: “levelness, 
evenness, straightness and correctness in the sense or regularity or order, 
uprightness, riotousness, truth and justice” (Frankfort et al., 1946: 108).  
In addressing the question of inequality between the two-knowledge regimes, one 
needs to take cognisance of the concept of symmetry practiced in African 
communities. This concept counter poses conflicting elements to secure a 
harmonious balance (Frankfort et al., 1946). This symmetrical foundation of 
equalitarianism means that the sustenance of communities is supported and 




certainty and predictability thereby limiting the opportunities for its subjection to 
institutional structures, which are determined by the arbitrariness of the dominant 
mode of production. Based on these notions of equality, the conditions in which 
traditional knowledge is produced should not be the determinant of its equality 
with other knowledge regimes. It is not the means but the end that determines its 
equality. Such an approach guarantees the recognition of divergence within 
knowledge producing cultures as one of the challenges that affects traditional 
knowledge protection is the means of it production not its constituent benefits 
(Granstrand, 1999) (For an extensive discussion with regards to this phenomenon 
see, Chapter 2.4.). 
5.3.6. Humanity 
 
African philosophy seeks to affirm the humanity of an African person, which is 
guided by justice, truth and righteousness (Kamalu, 1990; Teffo, 2011). The 
Maatian Declaration of Innocence serves as the conceptual foundation for these 
humanitarian considerations (Budge, 1967). In its prescriptive nature, the Maatian 
Declaration of Innocence obligates: 
Not to do wrong to people; not to impoverish familiars; not to cause pain; 
not to cause anyone to weep;  not to do what is harmful to people; not to 
mislead people; not to be deaf to the truth; to cause strife; not to wink to 
justice, not discriminate (Karenga, 2012b: 325) 
The underlying vestures of the foregoing statement emphasises that action should 
to be guided by humanity (not to do wrong, not cause pain, not to cause anyone to 
weep, not to do something harmful to people). Hence, any enterprise that seeks to 
protect the victims of traditional knowledge should be cognisant and guided by the 
value and worthiness of human dignity. Humankind is not an object or subject but 
a personality (not to confuse the message with the messenger). Secondly, the 
declaration obliges that any conduct should operate within the considerations of 
humanity (not to mislead people, not to be deaf to the truth, not to cause strife, 
not to wink to justice, not to discriminate). The second filament of these 
humanitarian considerations seeks to extinguish conduct that might diminish the 




Grounding the stated cyphers as articulated in the Maatian Declaration of 
Innocence within a traditional knowledge framework will permit for the recognition 
of traditional knowledge within social relational obligations that largely define 
African society. The rights pertaining to traditional knowledge would then be 
marked out by assessing the needs of the community vis a vis to that of an 
individual member as a, “man belongs to a society, not to himself. Property laws 
are not as important as the right relations with other man” (Frankfort et al., 1946: 
109). 
Humanity is therefore the root of all value (Kamalu, 1990; Ramose, 1999), which 
prohibits human mistreatment (Karenga, 2012b). It follows, that the denigration of 
one community or individual by another equates to the mutual disrespect of the 
person or group acting in the denigrate modus. Consequently, a vicious cycle of 
victimisation that does not recognise the value of humankind erupts whereof the 
material conditions end up determining social co-existence (Marx & Engels, 1976). 
Therefore, the divergence from humanity as a source of value in life will inevitably 
contribute to contestations based on material wealth, a scenario that has created 
victims within the field of traditional knowledge in Africa. The negation of the 
humanity by the material structural imputations of institutions is a source of 
concern in addressing the challenges that are associated with traditional 
knowledge misappropriation.  
Solutions to this caprice should found in actual relations that recognise the 
humanity of one person in relation to other persons as; 
Rights do not exist as an integral part of human nature. They arise from a 
person’s destiny of living in a relationship with family, friends, ethno-
linguistic group and nation. They are incidental, unavoidable and necessary, 
but not an attribute of being human. No rights can be exercised apart from 
one’s relationship with another (Zvobgo, 1979: 90) 
Therefore, conflict is not an abstract concept but a distortion to the harmonious 
balance caused by humans. Africans address any wrongdoing that has bedevilled 
the community by focusing on the individual that has distorted the harmonious 
balance. Breathstead (1933:27) could not have put it much better when he 
articulated that Africans, “think not of theft but the thief, not of love but the 




society”. Therefore, crime for example is not interpreted in its abstract sense as is 
dictated by the law (ideological state apparatus) but in line with the person who 
has committed isfet to reintegrate him or her back into society to restore the 
harmonious balance that was initially disrupted.  
Such an approach allows for a constant social transformation of the community as 
negative values are replaced with a humanising experience (Velthuizeni, 2012). 
Therefore, victimisation is addressed within a humanitarian spectrum where 
individuals and the community are at centre not at the peripheries, as the current 
traditional knowledge infrastructure presents.104  
5.4. UBUNTU 
 
From the reverberations of Maat, the dominant resonating thought was 
communality and wholeness. The individual soul is justified by living according to 
Maat so enable the community to receive tangible benefits (Martin, 2008). This 
dynamic two-way relationship between the individual and the community forms 
the fundamental basis of African society, a concept that feeds into the notions of 
Ubuntu. To demonstrate this assertion; the Zulu Declaration of Self is worth 
noting: 
I am sovereign of my life; my neighbour is of his life; society is a collective 
sovereignty; it exists to ensure that my neighbour and I realize the promise 
of being human. I have no right to anything I deny my neighbour; I am all, 
all are me. I cannot commit no greater crime to frustrate the life’s purpose 
of my neighbour. (Asante & Abarry, 1996: 371) 
The fore stated declaration advances the notion of peaceful co-existence of 
humankind that is not predetermined by any orientation. Hence, the respect for 
humanity transcends all boundaries of societal relations. It is from this ideational 
understanding that the term Ubuntu emerges. Ubuntu in its constitutive 
philosophical language is a hybridisation of two words, 
It consists of a prefix ubu- and the stem –ntu. Ubu evokes the idea of be-ing 
in general. It is enfolded be-ing before it manifests itself in the concrete 
form or mode of existence of a particular entity. Ubu- as enfolded be-ing is 
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always oriented towards unfoldment that is incessant concrete 
manifestation through particular forms and modes of being. Ubu is 
therefore oriented towards –ntu. –ntu as the nodal point, it assumes a 
concrete form or mode of being in the process of continued unfoldment.  
Ubu- and –ntu are not radically separate and irreconcilable opposite 
realities. On the contrary they are mutually founding in the sense that they 
are two aspects of be-ing as a oneness and indivisible wholeness (Ramose, 
1999: 50). 
It is very complex to translate Ubuntu into English, as it is an all-embracing African 
concept. In that regard, Ubuntu as a philosophical concept “is often interpreted in 
a flawed manner” (Venter, 2004). Maluleke (1999: 13) argues that Ubuntu is often 
“constructed in a sporadic, unstructured, naïve and dangerous way”. For instance, 
essentialist definition of Ubuntu, attempts to define it from the saying “umuntu 
ngumutu ngabantu/ munhu munhu nevanhu” (a human be-ing affirms his/her 
humanity by recognising the humanity of others and on that basis he/she 
establishes humane relations with them) (Letseka, 2012; Muvangua & Cornell, 
2012; Gade, 2011; Ramose, 1999). In other words, a person’s humanity is 
dependent on the appreciation, preservation and affirmation of another’s 
humanity (Eze, 2008). In that light society is determined by social 
interdependence; 
In traditional life, the individual does not and cannot exist alone except 
corporately. He owes his existence to other people, including those of past 
generations and his contemporaries. He is simply part of the whole. The 
community must therefore make, create or reproduce the individual for the 
individual depends on the corporate group. Whatever happens to the 
individual happens to the group and whatever happens to the group 
happens to the individual (Mbiti, 1969: 108-109). 
The community is therefore, a guarantor of the individuals action, while the 
individual guarantees the community’s survival by “advancing constitutive goods 
under the cardinal principle that if the community hurts, the individual gets hurt” 
(Eze, 2008: 388). Consequently, by nature of such an arrangement the community 
generates values that enhance human identity within a cultural context. The 
concept of “personhood does not therefore become an automatic quality of the 
human individual, it is something that is achieved” (Wiredu, 1996: 15) by virtue of 
the fact that the “community characterizes relations among the individual as a 
direct consequence of communitarian social arrangements” (Gyekye, 1998: 318). 




by fortune or misfortune of shared histories, heritage of common fate and destiny” 
(Eze, 2008: 389). 
Therefore, from the perspectives of the essentialist definition of Ubuntu, the 
primary aim of Ubuntu is the achievement of beneficial arrangements in a society; 
whose convictions are shared by members of the community. Within this context, 
the individual’s pursuit of his or her individual goals is expected to be in harmony 
with the overall communitarian goals. In other words, there is need for a common 
consensus between members of the community for the attainment of common 
goals (Ramose, 1999). 
However, the essentialist definition of Ubuntu is problematic. To understand the 
prejudices that are associated with such a preconception approach to Ubuntu, 
resort has to be made to the conceptual clarity of the terms “consensus and 
solidarity” in understanding of Ubuntu within a broader African setup. Generally, 
the attainment of a common good in Ubuntu in terms of essentialism is achieved 
through consensus within a community setup. Louw (2002: 18), defined consensus 
as “an equal chance to speak up until some agreement or group cohesion is 
reached in unity and in strength”. In other words, the validity of consensus is 
based on legitimation.105 Therefore, consensus is a “stamp of approval, any claim 
to gain legitimacy or validity in an object of administrative procedure, a metaphor 
for power or an instrument for domination” (Lyotard, 2000: 45; Eze, 2008). As 
such, by virtue of the fact that consensus is based on an administrative procedure 
it is therefore grounded in rights rather than on issues that are mutually good or 
mutually beneficial to the community. 
 Consequently, divergence becomes “suspect while single-meta physical narratives 
are celebrated, unanimity becomes a prerogative, while dissent is pressured to 
conform to the language of the game” (Eze, 2008: 392). Consensus becomes a 
brutal and oppressive force, which suppresses the core values of human identity, 
promotes dogmatic adherence to a meta-physical discourse in the name of 
consensual tyranny and uniformity. In that context what becomes the norm is, 
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To agree is more important than to disagree, conformity is cherished more 
than innovation, tradition is venerated, continuity is revered, change 
feared and difference shunned (Eze, 2008: 393) 
In addition, the conceptual interpretation of Ubuntu in the terms of “I am what I 
am because of who we all are” (Elechi et al., 2010) is problematic. The 
presentation of Ubuntu in such terms, translates to simunye (we are one). As such, 
it creates a unity that is bound by uniformity. It creates a possessive ideology “in 
which we simply become a photocopy image of the other. Indeed this fusion of the 
subject suppresses the other whose uniqueness informs, educates and enriches 
me” (Eze, 2008: 396).  
In close analysis,  
the idea of communal engagement and common good are subverted because 
if we are unanimously one, then they is neither a constitutive engagement 
with the other nor any need for substantive commitment to good and 
humanity: to view another as the other, is to possess and objectify the 
other. I acknowledge the other to possess him or her in expanding the circle 
of sameness. The subject is truncated, it receives nothing and learns 
nothing, which it does not know or already possess. (Eze, 2008: 396-397) 
Differently put, humanity is recognised through otherness. Such an interpretation 
of Ubuntu represents the individual notions of self-interest as it promotes 
individual rights rather than relational obligations as established by Maat. To avoid 
such a skewed understanding of Ubuntu, there is need to define it within its 
performative role. 
Ubuntu is a value, which “unites self and the world in a peculiar web of relational 
reciprocal obligations in which the subject and the object become 
indistinguishable” (Eze, 2008: 396).  In other words, Ubuntu promotes a policy of 
dialogue that seeks to understand the other in the overall ‘ontic-commitment’ to 
attain good in society. Therefore, humanity in Ubuntu seeks to understand the 
experiences and encounters of the other in his or her current historical context, 
which thereby informs and enriches the perspectives of others which in turn frees 
them from their dogma of judgment (Eze, 2008). Therefore, the values of goodness 
are internal to the people of Africa rather than external. 
Ubuntu is not fixed to a particular function or characteristic; it is open ended 




the unfoldment of ubu- as being gravitates (becoming) towards the recognition of -
ntu (humanity) to establish a harmonious balance of wholeness within a 
community. This balance is held by virtues which, Masina (2000: 170) identified as 
“caring, compassion, unity, tolerance, respect, closeness, generosity, genuineness, 
empathy, consultation and compromise”. As a consequence Ubuntu is a 
representation of collective interactive relational personhood that invokes “group 
support, acceptance, cooperation, care, sharing and solidarity” (Mbigi, 1997: 57).  
Within the domains of traditional knowledge in Africa, Ubuntu represents “a 
process and philosophy which reflects African heritage, traditions, culture, 
customs, beliefs and value systems” (Makhudu, 1993: 5). It forms the foundations 
of collective consciousness that are grounded in the values of reciprocity, 
reconciliation, dignity and respect (Prinsloo, 1996). All these values are primarily 
appreciated within the concept of selfhood in relation to the community relations. 
The subject and the other do not dissolve into one rather they are in constant 
contact and interaction such that the others uniqueness enriches another (Eze, 
2008). This process transforms society from a mode of production, which 
recognises individuals as objects to one that recognises the humanity of 
humankind, extinguishing oppression and victimisation (Brush & Stabinsky, 1996). 
5.4.1. Unity of being  
 
Ubuntu is applicable to most indigenous Africans because of its philosophical 
interrelatedness with cultural affinities and kinship (Ramose, 1999). Communalism 
therefore becomes the broader premise in which Ubuntu is understood, as the 
welfare of an individual,106 is dependent on the welfare of everyone 
(Kamwangamalu, 1999). It is this form of communalism and social solidarity that 
defines humanness in relation to Ubuntu (Gyekye, 1987). Therefore, Ubuntu is 
concrete in the everyday lives of Africans as it advances values that promote social 
interdependence.  
                                                          
106
 Individualism cannot thrive in traditional African culture; and that in spite of individual talents and 
capacities, the individual ought to be aware of his or her insufficiency to achieve his or her welfare through 




Based on this supposition the notion of be-ing/personhood within the conceptual 
framework of Ubuntu becomes imperative, as an individual exists by virtue of the 
fact that others exist. Being human therefore is not enough, it is becoming107 that 
completes the circle of Ubuntu, as it is an “embodiment of the fundamental 
ethical, social and legal judgement of human worth and conduct” (Ramose, 1999: 
52-53). Hence, becoming is centred on the be-ing. However, be-ing and becoming 
are not separate and apart from the other but they are a representation of two 
interrelated aspects of reality (Prigogine, Stengers & Toffler, 1984), which seek to 
establish an equilibrium balance within human relations. Therefore, the 
recognition of be-ing in the absence of becoming amounts to a fragmentation, 
which specifically focuses on the individual (self-interest) a scenario which 
consequently distorts the ordered balance of social relations. 
In that light, the community does not have priority over the individual and neither 
does the individual have priority over the community. The individual and the 
community are not “radically opposed in the sense of priority but engaged in a 
contemporaneous formation which is governed by a dialogical relationship” (Eze, 
2008: 386). Such an approach assists is constructing “human relations, human 
value, trust, dignity and social harmony” (Venter, 2004:151). 
From a traditional knowledge perspective, there is a realisation within the 
frameworks in Africa that advance a radical separation of the being from his 
existential environment through the creation of laws that are not culturally rooted 
in Ubuntu. Consequently, this affects and displaces their relative role from the 
larger context of their existence. This analysis espouses the fact that Ubuntu does 
not only relate to relational obligations between human beings but it also extends 
to their social existential environment. This is because when a being is thrust into 
the sphere of becoming, he or she causes other forms of being to come into 
existence. This form of self-affirmation and self-infusion in the existential 
conditions of society “serves as proof, a demonstration of existing existence: I 
exist therefore existence exists” (Obenga, 1989: 306). This affirmation allows for 
reciprocity between the act of creating traditional knowledge and the unity of its 
being within the traditional cultural context. Hence, all knowledge produced in 
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African traditional communities “relates to an understanding of the concreteness 
of a lived life” (Karenga, 2012b: 196). Therefore, conscience is derived from the 
harmonious social relational environment that is in harmonious co-existence with 
the whole universe. Ubuntu is thus anti-materialistic as it is based on relational 
social interdependence. 
Ubuntu is a philosophical branch of traditional knowledge; it fittingly merges 
within the cultural context of traditional knowledge. This renders traditional 
knowledge and Ubuntu a unity of being among many other social, political and 
cultural factors of traditional communities. However, the current traditional 
knowledge framework fragments traditional knowledge from the conventional 
practices in the local context. Such approach would necessarily cause social 
disharmony and destroy the lives of traditional communities (Muwanga-Zake, 
2009). Furthermore, such an approach has psychological implications in that it 
gravely affects the ability of the traditional communities to make sense of their 
environment thereby affecting their self-esteem and confidence (Gilbert, 1997). 
Gradually dislocations from the conceptual whole are more likely to occur 
especially if communities are “obliged to engage in new activities whose origins lie 
outside the local context” (Gilbert, 1997: 277). 
Ubuntu provides the necessary tools for protecting traditional knowledge in a 
systematic way. It is a lived experience which allows traditional knowledge 
communities to self-determine their being within their cultural and social realities. 
Such an approach will not merely give a ‘voice’ to traditional knowledge 
communities, but “evokes discourse through a process, which develops meaning or 
‘truth’ through a relationship of trust, reciprocity and co-operatively evolved 
methods of inquiry that remain true to the context” (Prior, 2007: 165). It creates a 
harmony with the cultural values and epistemology of the indigenous people 
(Muwanga-Zake, 2009). 
In other words, the interaction between traditional knowledge and Ubuntu 
becomes the seed for constructive development and the destruction of historical 
injustices (See Chapter 2.8). As such, Ubuntu becomes a means for social 
engineering and transformation (Gilbert, 1997). Furthermore, the reclamation of 




in Ubuntu promotes the decolonisation of the knowledge infrastructure. Such an 
approach makes traditional knowledge protection more relevant and practical in 
addressing the needs of traditional knowledge holders and communities. 
5.4.2. Restorative and social justice 
 
The validity and efficacy of Ubuntu is measured by the way in which a community 
responds to the welfare of victims and the ability of the community to restore an 
equilibrium balance. It adopts a victim centred approach that restores victims 
through empowering them and addressing their needs (Elechi et al., 2010) while at 
the same instance holding offenders accountable to victims and the community.  
This process is focussed on addressing the challenges that affect the victim while 
ensuring that the actions that harmed the victim will not be repeated in the 
future. The philosophical underpinning of such an assertion is based on the values 
that an act which is injurious to an individual injures the community as a whole. 
Therefore, redressing this injury becomes a corporate responsibility for the 
community. It sanctions healing, reintegration and transformation of the society 
from the harm that it has suffered. Restoring the victim back to his status quo is 
imperative as it allows for the continuance of his or her life within the same 
community context where the harm was committed (Elechi, 2004). 
On the other hand, it permits the community to self-introspect and re-evaluate its 
societal values, while allowing  a process of relearning the Ubuntu values of 
restraint, respect, empathy, forgiveness and responsibility (Elechi et al., 2010). 
The relearning of these virtues reminds the community about restoring 
relationships that establish an equilibrium balance. Such processes are exercised 
within an interconnected social equilibrium because individuals who are connected 
to communitarian values, value transformation than individuals who are 
fragmented and disconnected. 
African Victimology therefore advocates for, “restorative governance and justice 
aimed at re-establishing social relations and establishing new balances that can 




2012: 339; Shearer, 2012). Such a horizontal restorative epistemology is responsive 
to the cosmic relations of nature (Tandon, 2012).  
Within the domains of traditional knowledge; restorative justice re-establishes and 
maintains an equilibrium balance within the community and the communities that 
surround it. An African framework in achieving the latter is of utmost importance 
because; 
African law does not create offences, it does not create criminals, and it 
directs how individuals and communities should behave towards each other. 
Its whole object is to create an equilibrium, and the penalties are not 
directed against specific infractions, but to the restoration of an 
equilibrium (Driberg, 1934: 231). 
The re-establishment of the ‘equilibrium’ within the traditional knowledge domain 
would facilitate the reintegration of African communities within the overall 
knowledge producing cultures thereby allowing communities to be participants of 
processes that affect them. As such, justice becomes a source of peace and 
harmony (Ramose, 1999) because restorative justice is a lived experience that 
seeks to bring finality of an equilibrium balance (Nabudere & Velthuizen, 2011).  
The non-restoration of the equilibrium balance within African traditional societies 
has largely undermined the legitimacy of traditional knowledge, as the vestiges of 
colonialism and knowledge imperialism have permeated the current traditional 
knowledge protection framework in Africa (See Chapter 4.3.2.). The failure to 
acknowledge and address of these vestiges has left many concerns unanswered; a 
factor that can identified to have contributed to the non-functionality of 
frameworks that seek to protect traditional knowledge in Africa. 
What complicates these current indignities that are being suffered by traditional 
knowledge communities is that an “African believes that time cannot change the 
truth” (M'Baye, 1974: 147). Therefore, a debt or feud is never extinguished until 
the equilibrium has been restored, even if generations elapse (Driberg, 1934: 238). 
In that regard, abdicating from addressing past wrongs does not draw a veil over 
the injustices of the past. Addressing the past conflictions that affected traditional 
knowledge communities is imperative because it sanctions the recognition of the 




Therefore, restorative justice allows for the realisation of reparation for the 
vulnerable making it a “shared social wealth in terms of dealing, neighbourly 
generosity and special obligations to the vulnerable” (Karenga, 2012b: 332). These 
ethical notions derived from the ancient Egyptian Book of Khunanpu (written in 
2100 B.C) are instructive to the “true balancing of the land in doing justice” 
(Karenga, 2014: 2). In confirming such values, Elechi (2004) argued that; 
The African indigenous justice system is community based; human centred 
and employs restorative and transformative principles in conflict 
resolution. Restorative justice is negotiative and democratic; it empowers 
the community to mediate in conflicts. Conflict provides opportunities for 
primary stake-holders to examine and bring about changes to the society’s 
social, institutional and economic structure (Elechi, 2004: 18) 
Therefore, community-sustaining practices that respond to a community oriented 
restorative justice model should inform approaches that seek to address the needs 
and aspirations of victims. With that in mind, restorative justice becomes a pillar 
that stands at the centre of any progress in ending victimisation, for it begins in 
recognising individuals as human and responding to the their needs starting with 
the most vulnerable. Such an approach dismantles the justice model that is 
advocated by current traditional knowledge framework which a relatively an 
archetypal of false consciousness.  
Furthermore, an economic based solution to the protection of traditional 
knowledge is  deemed to enhance greed, which within African philosophy is seen as 
a “sever incurable disease, a collection of all kinds of evil and a bag of all kinds of 
hateful things” (Karenga, 2012b: 333).  This analysis is not far from the critical 
analysis about the economy as was advocated by Weber (1930) and Marx (1906), 
who argued that economic determinism was the determinant of the working class, 
who were abused by the bourgeoisie (see Chapter 2.2.) 
Therefore, the source and justification for social transformation are the people 
(Ramose, 1992). As such, law, politics, religion or ideologies should be anchored in 
Ubuntu, which guarantees authenticity and legitimacy within an African setting 
(Ramose, 1999). In that regard, political ends, strategic goals and the expectations 
of society are henceforth founded in the “meta-norms of humaneness, peace, 




consolidated by group solidarity and respect for human dignity (Mokgoro, 1998). 
Ubuntu becomes a lived concept which treats community members with justice 
and fairness (Higgs, 2012; Letseka, 2012). Justice becomes a continuous balancing 
act of peace and reconciliation, which seeks to extinguish any disturbance that 
annuls the harmonious co-existence. However, on the other hand justice with no 
peace there will be a “negation of the cosmic harmony, while peace without 
justice is a dislocation of Ubuntu from the cosmic order” (Ramose, 1999: 64). 
5.4.3. Reciprocity 
 
Traditional knowledge communities are built on a person-community relationship. 
For such a relationship to be fruitful, it should governed by reciprocal social 
relational obligations. Reciprocity shapes social relations. Assmann (1999: 39) 
defines reciprocity as; 
A social memory and horizon of motivation which does not reconstitute 
itself newly from day to day according to memontary interests , but 
establishes itself in the past, encompassing yesterday and today, attaching 
today to yesterday and thus linking actions to consequences, acting to 
success and sowing to reaping.  
These social relational obligations are governed by reciprocal actions, which 
represent “sensitivity to another, to seek to know another and understand one’s 
relationship to that other” (Karenga, 2012b: 363). Hence through reciprocity 
society is sustained through a process that allows “agents to develop a disposition 
for complementation that is necessary for mutually productive exchanges which 
create and sustain primary human goods” (Becker, 1986: 132-133). Such an 
approach allows a social formation that holds traditional knowledge to be 
grounded in notions of ‘justice’, ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’, ‘gratitude’ and ‘equality’ 
(Becker, 2014). The appeal for justice through reciprocity is based on harmony and 
equality where community reciprocal solidarity becomes a shared responsibility.  
Hence, the recognition of human value becomes the primary determinant of social 
relations as mutual respect and compassion for everyone in society despite their 
creed, class, or politics. Reciprocity in its application is not vertical in terms of the 
institutional and structural imputations of a capitalist society but as a horizontal 




responsiveness. Karenga (2012b) aptly surmises the conceptual formulation of 
reciprocity in African society when he attested that: 
The four basic norms of reciprocity in Maatian philosophy are constituted 
by: recompensatory, anticipatory, restraining and initiatory. 
Recompensatory is returning good for good received …. Anticipatory is that 
a good deed returns to its place yesterday …. Restraining reciprocity 
requires restraint from and of evil conduct by oneself and others ….. The 
fourth and final form of reciprocity is initiating reciprocity, which is taking 
an initiative to do what is good and just so as to set an example to be 
emulated and to create a context of maximum mutuality (Karenga, 
2012:368 -370) 
Reciprocity is thus a “concrete form of recognition, protection and respect for 
humanity” (Ramose, 1999:120) and a foundation where “mutual care for one 
another as human beings precedes the accumulation of wealth” (Ramose, 1999: 
142-143). This realisation should be complemented by the aptitude of restraining 
from evil, as using conflict and violence (retributive justice) to solve conflictions; 
will plunge society in an unending cycle of violence.  
Resisting crime or wrong doing is a fundamental expression of reciprocity because 
it aids community solidarity and justice (Karenga, 2012b). It should be noted that 
conflict in society is as a result of the existence of unequal power relations and 
class struggles (Williams & McShane, 1994). Therefore, through solidarity and 
equality, reciprocity permits the reduction or elimination of conflict (Becker, 
1986). In that regard, when conflict erupts in society, its becomes the obligation of 
the community to adopt corrective responses so to allow the restoration and 
sustaining productive reciprocal relationships (Becker, 2005), which will 
consequently facilitate the adequate protection of traditional knowledge. 
5.4.4. Futuristic obligations 
 
The relational obligations as propounded in Ubuntu, do not only refer to present 
existent community individuals but it also includes those who are in the future. 
This expansive concern includes the rightful and respectful obligations for future 
generations who shall occupy the community that current communities exist. 
However, that does not mean addressing the current ameliorations to benefit 




generations” (Karenga, 2012b:402). That is to say, traditional knowledge is 
historical which benefits the present generations and therefore it must be 
preserved and protected for future generations to profit from its invaluable 
wisdom. Therefore, the protection of traditional knowledge should 
Speak to the people who will come into being and those currently on earth, 
to the great and small saying come let me lead you on the way of life 
(Lefebvre, 1924: 1-3). 
Hence, traditional knowledge protection that speaks to the future will not destroy 
the notions of Ubuntu in a communitarian context as it self-consciously protects 
the present cultural context. This approach is additional as it allows traditional 
knowledge to remain relevant to the particular interests that might be existing in 
the community. It permits it to evolve responding to the needs of traditional 
communities while at the same time it is grounded in the tradition that built it.  
Therefore, the misappropriation and destruction of traditional knowledge affects 
the rights of future generations, which will in turn distort the harmonious balance 
that is already conceptually existent in the future. Therefore, justice becomes not 
a requisite for present generations but one that should be applicable to future 
generations. In that light it becomes imperative that, 
When we can reasonable predict that our actions will have a significant 
impact upon the interests of others, then we should take due account of 
that impact (Warren, 1992: 149 cited in Karenga, 2012b: 405) 
The person-affecting principle is intrinsically linked to the traditional knowledge 
affecting principle. It is unjustifiable to disregard the predictable effects of 
irresponsible destruction and peripherisation of traditional knowledge and future 
generations. The existence of future generations and traditional knowledge 
depends on the rightful humane approaches to such knowledge by present 
generations. Therefore, it becomes morally and scientifically compelling within an 
African context to strive to “limit damage to traditional knowledge, curtail 
wasteful knowledge consumerism and respect claims of traditional knowledge 





5.4.5. Shared heritage 
 
It is important to note that knowledge within the global environment is a shared 
cultural heritage in the sense that it is a divine gift for all humans to enjoy equal 
benefit from it (Karenga, 2012b). Secondly, it is a shared heritage for it imposes a 
filial responsibility in its preservation and protection. Based on the notions of 
equality of Maat namely “I made the four winds so that everyone might breathe 
therefrom in his time and place” (Breasted, 1933: 221)  can be interpreted as that 
knowledge is a shared heritage for the equal benefit and responsibility for all 
(Karenga, 2012b). These notions complemented by the communitarian ethics of 
Ubuntu emphasises that the denigration or marginalisation of trational knowledge 
is detrimental to general well-being of humanity in total. For actions that affect 
the “rights of others to the shared heritage of knowledge represents individualistic 
and self-centred concerns which are in direct violation of communitarian ethics” 
(Karenga, 2012b:395). The plunder, marginalisation and misappropriation of 
traditional knowledge as a shared heritage does not only affect future generations, 
but the very existence of the world (Bookchin, 1991). Therefore, from the 
reverberations of Maat and Ubuntu, one would realise that these African 
philosophical principles are dedicated to a just and harmonious realm. A realm 
that facilitates the preservation and promotion of human life and development 
based on the non-committal of actions that are likely to diminish the chances of 
fulfilling the lives of the present generation and future generations (Karenga, 
2012b). 
Actions that diminish the chances of future generations affect the guardianship 
and responsible fiduciary duties of the ontological principle of the unity of being 
(Callicott, 1984). Therefore, it becomes imperative to adopt responsive 
approaches that share accountability with other cultures to decline and reject the 
superficial want to misappropriate traditional knowledge for consumerism (See 
Chapter 4.3) while impinging the vital necessities of traditional knowledge 
communities. This approach would militate against treating knowledge as private 
property but as a “truly human heritage to be shared through just distribution and 
realistic use of knowledge resources” (Karenga, 2012b, 396). The derivative 




the present generations but is an ancestral heritage, which was preserved and 
passed for the benefit of future generations.  
In addition to the foregoing, Ubuntu through the concept of shared heritage can be 
used to rescue Africans from their loss of identity, let them gain their cultural, 
societal values and let themselves as human beings with dignity (Venter, 
2004:151). Therefore, the benefit of Ubuntu to traditional knowledge is that it is 
truly indigenous to African traditional communities. This is by virtue of the fact 
that “African world views are uniquely African grounded in African experience” 
(Higgs & Smith, 2008: 58). As such, by virtue that African victimology constitutes 
invaluable aspects of African heritage, it becomes conceptually possible to 
harmonise Africa’s broken past of development with the modern realities of 
globalisation (Nashon, Anderson & Wright, 2008)  
The following discussion shall focus on how African human security shall 
complement African victimology the protection and promotion of traditional 
knowledge together with its holders. Such a comprehensive approach towards the 
protection of traditional knowledge is imperative as it largely enriches 
victimological approaches through the incorporation of human security measures.  
5.5. AFRICAN HUMAN SECURITY 
 
The challenges affecting the legitimacy of traditional knowledge protection 
frameworks in Africa is largely based on their non-cultural rootedness in African 
traditions. In other words, the solutions they proffer largely do not secure the 
human security of traditional knowledge holders within their existential conditions. 
Furthermore, the top down approach towards the protection of traditional 
knowledge is devoid of any representation of reality within traditional 
communities as: 
From a community’s subjective point of view, the community is the 
observer of its actions, evaluates them in terms of its own actions, for the 
purpose it gives them. This point of view is abundantly free to define its 
life aspiration and needs. It understands its life regulated by the purpose it 
gives to its actions as opposed to their cause. This view is obviously private 




The community’s view is subjective, individual and therefore it is closed to 
the universe (Kamalu, 1990: 135). 
Based on this assertion a person or institution who/which is not culturally rooted in 
the community cannot assess the latters’ actions in terms of the purpose, which it 
gives them, for he or she is ever closed from the community. Tomaselli (2015), 
confirms this assessment by affirming that indigenous communities tend to provide 
information which very different from the real local conditions on the ground. 
Indigenous communities exactly know what researchers want to find out 
and they engage in subversive games that sell back to the researchers what 
they already ‘know’ and deliberately contaminate the data. More often 
than not most researchers leave the field non-the-wiser and contribute to 
the very popularly held myth-making that the academic enterprise is meant 
to deconstruct. (Tomaselli, 2015: 2). 
Based on these reasons, allowing traditional communities to determine their own 
matters enhances the management of traditional knowledge within a context that 
truly embellishes its value and existence. Traditional communities value their 
knowledge system and hence they design systems for its distribution, acquisition, 
use and dissemination within and beyond the community (Magaisa, 2007). Indeed, 
“all societies have had to devise norms for regulating the ownership and, use of 
different kinds of information . . . one can thus identify customary equivalents [in 
indigenous communities] of intellectual property” (Drahos 2000: 248). Heller 
(2008:674) has further argued that by removing ‘property’ from the principles of 
private property allows the encroachment of “efficient and stable informal norms 
that promote communitarian values”. As such the community will develop and 
adapt to locally generated innovation, alter and adjust to natural circumstances 
and communitarian ideologies (Howard, 2005), to meet the goals and perspective 
of the community.  
Such an approach dissuades the infiltration of political or state interference into 
the general governance of communities as community leaders in African 
communities are not political animals. They are “the real maa (real king), a divine 
and spiritual leader concerned divine principles that governing the world, 
upholding the laws of the universe and human society within which Maat is 
embodied in the cosmic order, truth, justice, harmony and protection” (Obenga, 




African States from being adjusted out of existence as nation states through 
globalisation (Tandon, 2012). African human security takes into account the voices 
of traditional knowledge communities that have normally been excluded from 
decision-making as solutions are sought through human agency of those who are 
affected by the problem in a collective mode. This process deciphers the best 
solution to the problem based on the nature and extent of the problem; in the 
absence of repressive or coercive state ideologies that seek to protect the 
interests of the few at the prejudice of the majority. 
From the foregoing, one can deconstruct the applicable philosophical doctrine that 
is applied within the governance domain of political issues that affect the 
community. Real authority is derived from a household level (symbolic expression 
of social space within a community set up), therefore higher authority does not in 
any way dictate the processes that happens at a community level (Komakech, 
2014). This authority is deliberated at through a communicative process, not only 
through other community members but with the ordered whole of the universe. 
Such an approach represents a significant paradigm shift from reliance on 
institutions and structures as a source of authority to the recognition of human 
agency in the process that determines the formation of a social formation. 
Therefore a social space, “is a value and the social sphere is a public space of 
visibility, interaction and plurality of voices” (Komakech, 2014: 31). In other 
words, there is nothing-called governance of social space in African philosophy but 
the nurturing of space that allows all forms of life to flourish within it. Hence, 
social interdependence becomes the basis of social relationships and decision-
making is an aggregate social process rather than a determination. 
This approach emphasises the notion of personal justice rather than impersonal 
law. Within this realm, Maat is a moral right to protest against the abuse of power, 
as it is applies to personal rule of conduct not through that of a political 
government. Thus, the negation of political relationships in favour of community of 
group democracy promotes the ethos of self-determination, which is founded in 
solidarity. As such, the human security of African communities that hold traditional 
knowledge will be determined by a culture that is grounded in African philosophy. 




with a community oriented approach which is a significant step towards the 
emancipation of traditional knowledge communities. 
Diversity needs not be cause for friction or tension but rather for complementary 
activity in harmony created by mutual understanding. This harmony means the 
clear recognition of individual deficiencies of the different groups and the full 
acceptance of mutual complementariness. In other words, it is the recognition of 
human interdependence and solidarity. One of the conditions for fruitful co-
operation is that each group should know what values the other groups contribute 
or can contribute to the universal cultural treasure (Mabona, 1967: 3) 
Furthermore, humanness in African philosophy is important especially when 
focused on human needs, interests and dignity. When these basic needs and 
interests are located within the African human security framework, traditional 
knowledge holders become relevant as their cultural, spiritual, political and social 
beliefs and it will create an identity grounded in African philosophy shared by all. 
In that realm, African victimology appropriates African culture to develop a more 
nuanced approach to victimisation. Despite the multiplicity of African cultures; the 
overriding concrete principle of humanity will assists in transcending such 
diversity. 
Therefore the African Human security is paradigm is 
Sine quo non in the construction and development of society and its 
institutions as it embodies Ubuntu an inherent value that is within all 
humans, which goes a long way towards alleviating most humanely created 
vestitutes of life (Teffo, 1998: 4) 
Lastly, the question of the non-concern of African governments failing to protect 
the interests of traditional knowledge holders is factor that affects the human 
security of traditional knowledge holders. African governments recognise the 
challenges that are affecting traditional knowledge communities, by virtue of their 
participation in the protection of traditional knowledge discourse at an 
international level. However, “no one can present something to someone as a 





Therefore, there is need for the development of an organic state, which is 
subservient to the interests of traditional communities that will facilitate the 
protection of traditional knowledge protection through participation.  
The audience has to be brought in the process of producing the message 
otherwise their own point of view is likely to be neglected in one way or 
another, impairing much of the productions of effect. The convention of 
peoples ways of knowing have to be respected (Raseroka, 2008: 244) 
Therefore, any solution for the protection of traditional knowledge, which is 
alienated from the views of traditional knowledge communities, amounts to an 
imposition of an ideology. When the state comprehends the interests of traditional 
knowledge holders through dialogue it will be capable to understand the interests 
and needs of traditional knowledge communities. Thus, allowing the process for 
the protection of traditional knowledge to be truthful while contributing to the 
positive actions based on communitarian reflections. Therefore, a process that 
creates alternatives towards the protection of traditional knowledge is in itself 
liberating as it connects with the geographic, linguistic and cultural status, which 
is always in a state of constant change and transformation.  
5.6. CONCLUSION 
 
In conclusion, it is important to recognise that the suffering of traditional 
knowledge holders is not a coincidence of globalisation but a deliberate act of 
oppression and marginalisation that has been reproduced from the past. In a bid to 
address such a nemesis, African Victimology assigns reason for a communal 
oriented framework for the protection of victims of traditional knowledge 
misappropriation while ridding traditional communities from the shackles that have 








RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
Who hasn’t heard of the six blind men of Indostan encircled around an elephant? 
The six—one a political scientist, one a librarian, one an economist, one a law 
professor, one a computer scientist, and one an anthropologist—discover, based on 
their own investigations, that the object before them is a wall, spear, a snake, a 
tree, a fan, and a rope. The story fits well with the question that propelled this 
chapter: how can an interdisciplinary group of scholars best analyse a highly 
complex, rapidly evolving, elephantine resource such as knowledge? Trying to get 
one’s hands around knowledge as a shared resource is even more challenging when 
we factor in the economic, legal, technological, political, social and psychological 
components—each complex in their own right—that make up this global commons 
(Hess & Ostrom, 2005: 1) 
6.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This study set to investigate and examine historical factors, which contributed to 
the victimisation and marginalisation of traditional knowledge communities in 
Africa. In doing so, the study analysed the victimisation of traditional knowledge 
communities in a broader multifaceted context of colonialism, institutional and 
structural violence, abuse of power and conflict (Peacock, 2013b). The general 
theoretical literature on this subject, specifically in Africa is inadequate regarding 
the victimisation of traditional knowledge communities. For instance, are the 
historical conditions that contributed to the victimisation of traditional knowledge 
reproduced in the current traditional knowledge protection framework in Africa?  
The findings of this thesis highlight that contradictions and contestations within 
the traditional knowledge protection framework are “sharpest in the peripheries” 
(Tomaselli, 2009: 9). African traditional knowledge communities have principally 
been on the receiving end of power contestations largely fuelled by a hegemonic 
intellectual property discourse endowed with oppression and subjugation. The 
outcomes of these contestations create silent or forgotten victims with African 
traditional communities. The African framework for the protection of traditional 
knowledge further complicates the apprehensions faced by traditional knowledge 




marginalisation and commoditisation (See Chapter 4). Based on the findings, this 
thesis developed an alternative African victimology framework, which seeks to 
promote the emancipation of traditional communities from the structural and 
institutional vestiges of knowledge imperialism. 
6.2. GENERAL FINDINGS 
 
The general findings of this thesis are chapter specific and were summarised in the 
respective chapters (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). The following discussion shall 
synthesise these findings vis a vis the objectives of this thesis. 
6.2.1. Factors that contributed to the marginalisation and victimisation of 
traditional knowledge and its owners in Africa 
 
Cumulatively a number of factors have facilitated the victimisation of traditional 
knowledge communities in Africa. Firstly, knowledge imperialism underwrote the 
misappropriation and marginalisation of traditional knowledge in Africa. Through 
cultural domination, traditional knowledge in Africa was subjugated into the 
peripheries of western knowledge. The cultural hegemony established by the 
dominant western knowledge regime was supported by a discriminatory knowledge 
infrastructure which reinforced perspectives of intellectual property that 
benefited a few at the expense of traditional communities. For instance, 
intellectual property protects economically relevant and scientifically produced 
knowledge to the exclusion of other knowledge systems, which contain the 
spiritual and cultural attributes of a community (See Chapter, 3.3). Consequently, 
the domination and exclusion of traditional knowledge by the intellectual property 
system prompted the enclosure and misappropriation of subordinated knowledge 
resources. The established cultural hegemony turned Africa into a laboratory of 
caprice that caused untold suffering to traditional communities, whose effects 
remain visible in present day (Wanda, 2010).  
The caprice of knowledge imperialism is not a new phenomenon. It is one 
reproduced from the history of knowledge development; facilitated by the state, 
dominant capital and the church. The state created rules, systems and procedures 




functionality of the state. However, because the power to award knowledge 
protection was abrogated to the state; it was abused as knowledge protection was 
granted at the vagaries of political power and personal relationships (May & Sell, 
2007). The inventive genius of knowledge producers was hardly recognised as the 
expansion of the mode of production determined the knowledge that was 
protected (May & Sell, 2006).Therefore, the protection of knowledge found its 
expression in class powers articulated by a proto-capitalist accumulation strategy 
(May, 2007). Consequently, the laws promulgated by the state became an 
instrument of power, which frequently altered the rules of the game by defining 
winners and losers based on which knowledge was recognised as property at the 
exclusion of others. 
Subsequently, the knowledge protection framework created knowledge cartels 
that forged an alliance with the state and the church, to police seditious and 
libellous materials while in turn they received unfettered control of knowledge 
resources (Patterson, 2002). It became complex for knowledge producers to claim 
ownership over their knowledge products because of the functional alliance 
between the cartels, state and church. The echoes of such a system are evident in 
the current traditional knowledge domain. Global conglomerates (knowledge 
cartels) misappropriate traditional knowledge and retain the commercial monopoly 
of the knowledge at the exclusion traditional knowledge producers. These 
victimisation patterns are embedded in the structural and institutional conditions 
of knowledge production, supported by an unequal intellectual property discursive 
practice that frustrates the commonwealth of knowledge producers (Masoff, 2001).  
Religion and education, justified the marginalisation and exclusion of traditional 
knowledge by labelling it as old, archaic and superstitious (Trosper, 2011). A 
ritualised colonial historical enterprise vilified and demonised traditional 
knowledge as witchcraft because it represented power and resistance to European 
imperialism. These pre-meditated axioms of religion developed into laws and 
processes that violently repressed the practice and use of traditional knowledge.  
The colonial and post-colonial education discourse largely supplanted African 
traditional ways of knowing by replacing them with western curricula (Magaisa, 




consciousness that African ways of knowing were inferior to western knowledge. 
This discourse consequently destroyed the spiritual and cultural bonds that yield 
traditional knowledge as power while systematically subordinating and stigmatising 
traditional ways of knowing (Proggler, 1999). Therefore, African cultural and 
linguistic objects were subjected to cultural violence and linguistic imperialism. 
Such an approach largely, delegitimised the significance of traditional knowledge 
in African communities. The suppression of African culture and language negatively 
affected the definitional foundations and values of traditional knowledge (Shiva, 
1993; Ngugi, 1986).  
The assimilation of the politically independent African state into an international 
intellectual property regime, without negotiating their terms of participation 
extended the interests of industrialised countries (net exporters of knowledge 
resources used in Africa) at the prejudice of African traditional knowledge. Such 
integration provided minimum opportunities for the recognition of traditional 
knowledge as a legitimate form of knowledge, because the intellectual property 
system became the determinant of legitimate knowledge in post-colonial Africa.  
The post-colonial integration of African states into the international intellectual 
property system was structured around the ideological prejudices of an oppressive 
colonial past. For instance, the political independence of African states 
substantially exchanged state power, but it did not transform the socio-economic 
conditions that contained colonial dispositions (Crabb, 1970). So, the post-colonial 
African state reproduced the historical conditions that facilitated the victimisation 
and disenfranchisement of traditional communities.  
Having established the factors that have contributed to the victimisation and 
marginalisation of traditional knowledge communities; it is imperative to examine 
the efficacy of the traditional knowledge frameworks in Africa. The following 
discussion shall examine whether or not the traditional knowledge protection 
frameworks in Africa reproduced the material and ideological conditions that 





6.2.2. Whether the African traditional knowledge framework reproduces historical 
conditions that victimise traditional communities 
 
Three regional frameworks namely, the Swakopmund Protocol, the OAPI 
framework and the AU Model law, constitute the traditional knowledge protection 
structure in Africa. Collectively, these frameworks hardly ameliorate traditional 
knowledge communities from the chains of knowledge imperialism. On the 
contrary, they reproduce the historical conditions, which facilitated the 
marginalisation and victimisation of traditional knowledge communities in Africa. 
The intellectual property regime with the influence of global capital mediated and 
structured the operational ambit of the regional instruments. Resultantly, the 
protectionist appetites of the powerful captured its legislative components while 
holding the interests of traditional knowledge community’s hostage to the 
oligopolistic caprices of capital (Reichman, 1997). Hence, the African regional 
framework is diametrically opposed to the local conditions of traditional 
communities; a phenomenon that separates traditional knowledge from the 
cultural spiritual values that established its collective ownership (Swiderska, 
2007). The failure by the regional instruments to circumscribe the jurisprudential 
divergence between traditional knowledge and intellectual property, entrenched 
the dominance of intellectual property over traditional knowledge resources. 
Therefore, grounding traditional knowledge protection within the intellectual 
property system reproduces exclusionary procedures and ideologies that victimise 
traditional knowledge communities.  
The failure to consult or incorporate the views and interests of traditional 
knowledge communities in the regional frameworks created a framework 
abstracted from the political, cultural and spiritual context that sustains 
traditional knowledge. This process is similar to the colonial conditions that muted 
the interests of traditional communities in favour of a pro-capitalist knowledge 
regime, which facilitated knowledge accumulation and knowledge segregation. 
Accordingly, the traditional knowledge frameworks in Africa enhanced the 
historical ‘positional superiority’ of intellectual property over traditional 
knowledge. In the process the frameworks have relegated customary laws and 




In that light, the traditional knowledge framework in Africa sufficiently facilitates 
the victimisation of traditional communities because it seeks to locate the 
oppressor and subjugators of traditional communities outside the body politic of 
intellectual property. While on the converse, it has created a complicated political 
image that is laden with internal oppressors. In other words, the African regional 
frameworks created a false consciousness, which in the name of protecting 
traditional knowledge “embodied ideas, values and language which justify social 
and economic inequalities in traditional communities” (Augoustinos, 1999: 298). 
The picture presented by this phenomenon, creates a victimisation mode of 
adaption that resulted from colonialism, recurrent indignities and multiple 
deprivations associated with capitalism and class struggles (Peacock, 2013a) 
Furthermore, the transitional property model provided by the regional instruments 
raises a number of complexities. The communitarian model established by the 
regional frameworks largely creates an environment that facilitates the ‘tragedy of 
the anti-commons’. That is to say, multiple members of the community are 
permitted to hold multiple rights against the external use of traditional 
knowledge. Therefore, the use of traditional knowledge outside the community’s 
context would require the collective consent of all members. However, if one 
community member opposes its use, he or she interdicts the community from 
pursuing that option. This legal smog is highly likely to routinise informal and 
corrupt norms in place of legal transactions because knowledge entrepreneurs will 
pressure individual community members to waive their rights for a fee to avoid 
such complexities (Heller, 1998). The consequent practical framework that will 
emerge, is a system constituted by a combination of badly specified legal rights 
together with a rearrangement of corrupt and illegal norms (De Soto, 1990). 
Therefore, instead of empowering traditional knowledge communities from the 
vestiges of colonial capitalism, the framework facilitates the further 
disenfranchisement of traditional knowledge communities.  
The institutionalisation and administration of justice for traditional communities in 
in criminal law and civil law by the regional instruments cements the civilisation of 
conflict (Peacock, 2008). This process assimilates victims of traditional knowledge 




fact that these solutions are significantly different from the conditions of their 
victimisation. Such an approach relegates traditional communities to observers 
rather than participants and agents in the justice process. Therefore, the 
application of an alien legal regime exposes traditional knowledge to a new 
information capitalism which repackages traditional knowledge as a legal concept 
without examining the lived and existential conditions within which traditional 
communities find themselves.  
Lastly, the traditional knowledge framework in Africa hardly recognises the 
historical injustices suffered by traditional communities. These historical 
conditions have contributed to the marginalisation and victimisation of traditional 
holders in Africa. The frameworks barely take into account the factors that have 
victimised traditional knowledge communities; while imposing notions of 
intellectual property on traditional knowledge without taking their peculiarities 
into account. The consequent effect of this framework is that it is highly likely to 
destroy fragile and subordinated knowledge regimes (Boyle, 1997). Having noted 
that the African framework on the protection of traditional knowledge reproduces 
the conditions that facilitate the victimisation of traditional communities, the 






6.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The expansion of the victimological theoretical framework is imperative to 
understand how historical patterns and cultures of victimisation have contributed 
to the marginalisation of traditional communities in Africa.  The radical and 
critical victimological theories, which locate victimisation within the 
interrelationship between state and the law examine the experiences suffered by 
victims through the arbitrary application of the law or the abuse of power 
(Walklate, 2012; Elias, 1985; Quinney, 1972). It is however, noted from this study 
that such an approach hardly identifies and examines how historical factors 
facilitate victimisation within a set of complex structures and institutions in 
society. As a result, the implications of the historical reproduction of victimisation 
cultures and patterns are hardly investigated within the current context of 
multiple victimisations and deprivations, specifically in Africa (Peacock, 2013). The 
findings of the study, identify that victimisation is facilitated through 
contestations created by the historical imposition of a dominant mode of 
production over the subordinate relations of production. Such a phenomenon 
creates subordinate gradations that disenfranchise and oppress those who do not 
control the means or mode of production. In understanding the historical 
oppressive conditions and relations, one is capable to appreciate the subordinated 
interests of the victims, while constantly analysing the viability of the victim 
support structures in society. Such an approach permits the identification of 
historical factors and conditions that plunge generations of victims within an 
unending cycle of victimisation.  
This analysis is similar with that presented by Marx (1906, 1937), Weber (1930, 
1949) and Althusser (1968, 2006) who locate oppression and subjugation within 
contestations that exist between capitalist mode of production and the relations of 
production. Hence, one would understand how the historical structures institutions 
of the colonial and imperial capitalist mode of production; misappropriated and 
marginalised traditional knowledge for the purposes of knowledge accumulation.  
Furthermore, radical victimological theories, measure victimisation by assessing 




conventions (Elias, 1996). Such a theoretical framework has been critiqued, on the 
basis of its non-ability to identify the historical factors that contributed to the 
creation human rights conventions (Mawby & Walklate, 1994). The findings of the 
study highlight that international human rights frameworks hardly ameliorate the 
historical conditions that contribute to victimisation. In the name of protecting 
victims, these international conventions or regional instruments reproduce the 
conditions that facilitated the oppression and marginalisation of victims. The 
thesis confirmed Marx’s (1937:4) assertion that “when men appear engaged in 
revolutionising things and themselves, they anxiously conjure up into their service 
the spirits of the past, assume their names, their battle cries, their costumes to 
enact a new historic scene in such time-honoured disguise and with such borrowed 
language”. Peacock (2013b) corroborated such assertions by arguing that 
victimology in Africa frequently omits the impact of how colonial and imperial 
capitalism facilitates the victimisation of African communities. Having noted that 
the current victimology approaches towards the protection of traditional 
knowledge hardly address the interests of traditional knowledge communities, this 
thesis affirmed Peacock’s (2013b) position by developing an African victimology 
framework that restores, reframes and theorises African existential experience, 
from African lived experiences. 
A harmonious cosmos of co-existence sustained by the philosophical principles of 
Maat, Ubuntu and Afrikology; define the conceptual boundaries of African 
victimology. Its approach is more contextual because context informs, transforms 
or complicates the legitimacy of victimological approaches especially if individuals 
and communities are accustomed to responding to the signs that define their 
being. The cultural and historical context creates material and spiritual objects 
that belong to a systematic language, which has a purposeful relationship to the 
community at large. Therefore, African victimology understands and responds to 
the contextual historical injustices that contribute to victimisation based on 
shared experiences that are mutually understood (Karsher, 2011). Hence, African 
victimology solutions are not influenced but are rather informed by the brutal 
historical vestiges that contribute to the victimisation of traditional communities 




Reclamation, the restorative and transformative aspect of African victimology 
largely seeks to emancipate victims from the vestiges of structural and 
institutional victimisation and knowledge imperialism. Its ideational basis strives to 
restore the disrupted harmonious balance guided by humanitarian and relational 
obligations of related rightness in the cosmic universe. Victims should be 
empowered to self-assert and affirm dialogue with apprehensions affecting their 
humanity.  In that regard, justice is not the procedural and substantial 
administration of legal rules but the just and proper relational obligations 
reflective of the cultural conditions, affinities and connections (Finnestad, 1986).  
6.5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The traditional knowledge policy in Africa has been recognised as a progressive 
step in addressing the needs, interests and aspirations of traditional communities 
in Africa (ARIPO, 2010). However, evidence from this thesis shows that the policy 
framework generally reproduces historical conditions that facilitated the 
victimisation of traditional communities. This study shows that it is highly 
improbable for the current policy on the protection of traditional knowledge to 
attain legitimacy within traditional communities in Africa.  Based on this 
assessment, there is need for a policy review that will facilitate the protection 
traditional knowledge within its socio-cultural settings. Not only would the policy 
framework address the legal challenges faced by traditional communities but also 
it will address and advance the political, socio-economic, cultural and spiritual 
aspirations of traditional communities.   
Therefore, it becomes imperative to develop policy frameworks that embody the 
cosmic order of truth, justice and harmony of traditional communities. Such an 
approach dissuades the infiltration of state interference into the general 
governance of communities. In that regard, governance becomes a process that is 
not only people driven but also one that is determined by human affairs 
(Komakech, 2014). This process is not mediated by institutions or structures but is 
expressed within a deliberative communication zone, in which community 
members resolve problems and challenges within a non-hierarchical model 




reliance of institutions and structures as a source of authority to the recognition of 
human agency and human security. 
The operational scope of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power should broaden its scope to include victims of 
historical injustices, marginalisation, colonialism and imperialism. Article 1 of the 
stated declaration delineates the study of victimisation to include either persons 
who have suffered harm through acts or omission that are in contravention of 
criminal law. Such an assertion is problematic because criminal law is an 
instrument of power; once captured it can be used to oppress and subjugate 
marginalised communities thus creating victims that are not seen 
6.6. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
 
The traditional knowledge debate is multifaceted. To generate achievable policy 
strategies and development targets concerning traditional knowledge protection, 
there is need for more information rich case studies at the local level. This will 
allow the further exploration and assessment of the local dimensions of traditional 
knowledge protection. Adopting the latter as a future research strategy allows 
researchers to have a deeper understanding of the gaps that the separate cultural 
meaning of traditional knowledge with other forms of knowledge, in a framework 
of competing epistemologies and practices. Furthermore, there is need to 
objectively understand the extent to which traditional communities embrace the 
concepts of African victimology, to appropriately develop victimological remedies 
that respond to the cultural conditions of traditional communities. Such an 
approach permits the formulation of how individuals, groups and communities 
subjectively create their own reality within a socio-historical context. 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
 
The traditional knowledge frameworks in Africa largely superordinate the law over 
a variety of social phenomena that influence and facilitate the victimisation of 
traditional communities in Africa. Rather than mitigating or extinguishing the 
conditions that victimise traditional knowledge communities, the framework 




past. This form of fundamentalism largely mischaracterises the unresolved and 
complex religious, ideological, political and socio economic historical exigencies 
that neglect and victimises traditional knowledge producers in Africa. Such an 
approach relegates the interests of traditional communities to the periphery, 
deletes the memories of historical injustices, legitimises the perpetrators of 
victimisations and disempowers traditional communities in redressing the wrongs 
of the past. Given the spiritual and cultural value of traditional knowledge in 
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